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Abstract 
This thesis examines the effects of two specific moral emotions - moral elevation 
(experienced when witnessing a moral virtue) and moral outrage (experienced when 
witnessing a moral transgression) ± on prosociality. While ample research has examined 
emotions such as sympathy and guilt, much less is known about moral elevation and moral 
outrage. Yet, their separate strands of research suggest that both moral elevation and moral 
outrage are promising emotions for promoting prosocial responses. Chapters 1 and 2 are 
theoretical chapters. Chapter 1 reviews the literatures on prosociality, moral emotions, and 
the effects of moral emotions on prosociality. Chapter 2 identifies and describes the key gaps 
in the moral elevation and moral outrage literatures. The key gaps in the literature and 
avenues for research include: (1) testing and comparing the specific and potentially 
distinctive prosocial outcomes of moral elevation and moral outrage, and (2) examining the 
specific component features of moral elevation and moral outrage, in particular focusing on 
the component features that have prosocial implications. Chapter 3 is a methodological 
chapter which reports three pilot studies testing the effects of emotion-inducing videos on 
feelings of moral elevation and feelings of moral outrage. The three pilot studies provide 
evidence for the effectiveness of the emotion-inducing stimuli used in this thesis.  
Chapters 4 and 5 are empirical chapters which test the effects of moral elevation and 
moral outrage on prosocial outcomes, drawing on the appraisal tendency framework (Horberg 
et al., 2011). Specifically, to identify, for the first time, how moral elevation and moral 
outrage may affect the same or distinct prosocial intentions and behaviours, Chapters 4 and 5 
report four studies testing the joint and independent effects of these two emotions on different 
types of prosocial outcomes. Comparing their effects in an experimental design enables a 
direct test of whether they increase helping behaviours generally (across moral domains), or 
whether their effects are more nuanced and depend on the salience of their associated 
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sociomoral concern (i.e., benevolence concerns for elevation and justice concerns for 
outrage). Specifically, Study 1 examines benevolence-relevant intentions in the form of self-
reported prosocial benevolence intentions. Study 2 examines justice-relevant intentions in the 
form of prosocial political action intentions following an inequality. Study 3 examines 
benevolence-relevant behaviour in the form of charitable donations. Study 4 examines 
justice-relevant behaviour in the form of third-party bystander compensation and punishment 
following unfairness. Results provide support for the appraisal tendency framework. 
Specifically, moral elevation promoted prosocial intentions and behaviours when outcomes 
were relevant to benevolence concerns (Studies 1 and 3). In contrast, moral outrage promoted 
prosocial intentions and behaviours when outcomes were relevant to justice concerns (Studies 
2 and 4).  
Chapters 6 and 7 examine the component features, rather than the behavioural 
outcomes of moral elevation and moral outrage. Chapter 6 reports two studies that explore 
the relationships between moral elevation and moral outrage and the behavioural activation 
and inhibition systems. The primary aim was to uncover whether moral elevation can be 
conceptualised as an approach-oriented emotion. Past research has already demonstrated that 
moral outrage is an approach-oriented emotion (Harmon-Jones, 2007). However, evidence 
for whether moral elevation can be conceptualised as an approach-oriented emotion is mixed. 
Results of both studies provide clear support for the notion that elevation is also an approach-
oriented emotion. Specifically, individual differences in moral elevation were related to 
individual differences in the behavioural activation but not inhibition system. Furthermore, an 
elevation-inducing video, as compared to a control video, increased an approach-oriented 
state, as well as prosocial motivation.  
Chapter 7 is the final empirical chapter. Chapter 7 reports two studies that explore the 
effects of moral elevation and moral outrage on two specific component features ± 
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stereotyping and self-focus. Study 7 demonstrates that sympathy (but not elevation or 
outrage) instigates undesirable paternalistic stereotypes. Study 8 shows that guilt (but not 
elevation or outrage) instigates relatively more self-focus than other-focus. These studies 
provide support for the distinctive roles of elevation and outrage as bases for more 
unqualified prosocial responses than are produced by sympathy or guilt. 
Chapter 8 provides an integrative discussion of this thesis, highlighting the key 
findings, the theoretical and applied implications, the limitations, and the future directions of 
this research. The primary findings of this thesis are that moral elevation and moral outrage 
may be particularly effective strategies for mobilising people to want to help others. 
However, their prosocial effects are distinctive and therefore the emotions should be used 
appropriately. This thesis informs and extends important theoretical frameworks including 
the appraisal tendency framework (Horberg et al., 2011) and the model of moral emotion 
prototypicality (Haidt, 2003), as well as the moral elevation and moral outrage literatures 
more specifically. The findings have direct implications for end-users including charitable 
organisations. Specifically, this thesis provides insights into the types of emotion-based 
interventions that may be effective for promoting prosocial action. Chapter 8 concludes with 
a discussion of important and exciting avenues for future research which include applying an 
intergroup framework to this research as well as testing the effects of moral elevation and 
moral outrage on prosociality among children and adolescents.  
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Within this general introduction the need for greater prosociality across societies is 
highlighted. Importantly, the review demonstrates the potential of emotions for promoting 
prosocial responses. While relatively under-researched, two specific moral emotions seem 
particularly promising for promoting a desire to help others. These two moral emotions are 
moral elevation (felt when witnessing a moral virtue) and moral outrage (felt when 
witnessing a moral transgression). This review describes their theoretical and empirical 
evidence to date.1 
 
Substantial inequalities and social injustices exist within as well as between countries 
and the rate of inequality is increasing rapidly (Oxfam, 2013; Stiglitz, 2012). Currently in the 
8QLWHG6WDWHVWKHWRSRQHSHUFHQWWDNHVPRUHWKDQSHUFHQWRIWKHQDWLRQ¶VLQFRPHDQG
holds one-WKLUGRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VZHDOWK7KH:DOWRQIDPLO\owners of the Walmart fortune) 
has as much wealth as the bottom 30 to 40 percent of Americans combined (cf. Stiglitz, 
2012). In the United Kingdom the number of people who have to use food banks to survive 
increased from 40,000 people in 2009-2010 to 290,000 people in 2010-2011 (BBC News, 
2013). During the colonial period, the gap between the richest and the poorest countries 
                                                 
 
1 Parts of this chapter form part of the following book chapter: Van de Vyver, J., & Abrams, D. (in press). 
Promoting prosocial behaviour: The potential of moral emotions. In E. Van Leeuwen & H. Zagefka (Eds.), 
Intergroup Helping. Springer. 
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widened from 3:1 to 35:1, partly because European powers extracted so much wealth from 
the Global South through resources and labour. Since then, that gap has grown to almost 80:1 
(Hickel, 2013). An inescapable conclusion is that economic and political reform is essential 
to overcome such persistent inequalities. What is perhaps most surprising though, is that such 
inequality has been met with relative quiescence by the general public. Why does there seem 
to be such emotional indifference to the plight of others? Might social psychological 
processes play a part in motivating the public to support reforms that could promote greater 
equality? This chapter summarises current theory and research on the potential for moral 
emotions (specifically moral elevation and moral outrage) WRLQFUHDVHSHRSOH¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWR
help others (i.e., their prosocial behaviour).  
This chapter will introduce some of the key topic areas of this thesis including the 
relevant theoretical frameworks and empirical evidence. It will begin with an overview of the 
literature on prosociality (including definitions, prevalence, and barriers). It will then 
highlight the potential of third-party individuals or groups to provide help. Following this an 
overview of emotions (including definitions and functions) and their potential for increasing 
prosociality will be reviewed. Once a comprehensive review of the prosociality and emotion 
literatures has been provided, the chapter will focus more specifically on the two emotions of 
relevance (i.e., moral elevation and moral outrage).  
Prosocial Behaviour 
Defining Prosociality 
Batson (1998) defined prosocial motivation as the desire to expend effort to help 
others. Prosocial motivation can be conceptualised as both a dispositional trait as well as 
shorter-term state (Grant, 2008). The dispositional trait of prosociality is typically associated 
with individual differences in agreeableness (Graziano, Habashi, Sheese, & Tobin, 2007), 
empathy (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005), and other-orientation (Meglino & 
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Korsgaard, 2004). The shorter-term state involves a temporary increased motivation to 
protect or promote the welfare or needs of another person (Batson, 1998; Grant, 2007, 2008). 
State prosocial motivation can be instigated by many factors, some of which include, contact 
with the person in need (Batson, 1998, Grant, 2007), induction of a particular emotional state 
(Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006; Schnall, Roper, & Fessler, 2010), engagement in prosocial video 
games (Greitemeyer & Osswald, 2010), or meditation (Condon, Desbordes, Miller, & 
DeSteno, 2013; Fredrickson, Cohn, Coffey, Pek, & Finkel, 2008). 
When prosocial motivation instigates action it is typically referred to as prosocial 
behaviour or social action (Penner et al., 2005; Snyder & Omoto, 2007). Instances of 
prosocial behaviour can include: cooperation, helping, kindness, generosity, and solidarity. 
Omoto, Snyder, and Hackett (2010) described prosocial behaviour (which they term social 
action) as follows:  
Some social action is explicitly political, as when people get involved in the political 
process by voting, working on a campaign, or running for office. As well, people 
engage in lobbying and advocacy, work for the passage of legislation, and participate 
in activist social movements. Other forms of social action are not necessarily political. 
For example, people serve as volunteers and help other people who have difficulty 
caring for themselves; similarly, people join neighbourhood groups and organizations 
and participate in community service programs (p. 1703).  
Thus, the term prosocial behaviour covers a wide range of behaviours. The crucial 
element is that it is instigated by a desire to help others.  
Prosocial behaviours can encompass behaviours that are egoistically driven and 
behaviours that are altruistically driven. If the intent is to benefit the self primarily, then the 
motive can be termed egoistic (Graziano & Habashi, 2010). For example, someone may 
HQJDJHLQYROXQWHHULQJDFWLYLWLHVSXUHO\WRHQKDQFHRQH¶VFXUULFXOXPYLWDH,QFRQWUDVWLIWKH
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intent is solely or primarily to benefit others without concern for oneself, the motive can be 
WHUPHG³DOWUXLVWLF´*UDziano & Habashi, 2010).  For example, someone may engage in 
volunteering activities because they care about helping a certain person or group of people.  
These motives can be difficult to disentangle; typically helping situations elicit more 
than one motive (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977). Helping can serve both egoistic and altruistic 
PRWLYHVE\UHOLHYLQJWKHSURYLGHU¶VGLVWUHVVDVZHOODVWKHYLFWLP¶V(Batson, 1991). The aim of 
this thesis is to understand strategies that encourage (state) prosocial behaviours that are 
primarily motivated by wanting to protect and promote the welfare of other people (Grant, 
2007; 2008).  
Moral behaviour is often confused with, or used interchangeably with the term 
prosocial behaviour. Nevertheless, they are underpinned by distinct motives. The motivation 
underpinning moraOEHKDYLRXULVDGKHULQJWRRQH¶VPRUDOSULQFLSOHVDQGVWDQGDUGV(Tangney, 
Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). In contrast, the motivation underpinning prosocial behaviour is 
EHQHILWWLQJRULQFUHDVLQJRWKHUV¶ZHOIDUH(Penner et al., 2005). In practice, it can be difficult to 
disentangle these two motives and behaviours. For example, if a person feels sympathy and 
helps another person ± they are probably not aware of whether they were thinking about the 
RWKHU¶VZHOIDUHRUDGKHULQJWRRQH¶VRZQPRUDOVWDQGDUGXQGHUSLQVWKLV emotion and 
behaviour. It is most likely a combination of both.   
Prevalence of Prosocial Behaviour 
An increasingly large body of research is providing evidence for the assertion that 
people have an intuitive and default tendency to help others (Keltner, Kogan, Piff, & Saturn, 
2014). Among infants, research shows that from three months of age, they show a preference 
for geometric shapes depicted as helping another (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007, 2010; 
Hamlin, Wynn, Bloom, & Mahajan, 2011). Among children, research shows that from 14 
months of age, they show helping and cooperative behaviours (Warneken & Tomasello, 
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2006, 2007; Warneken, Chen, & Tomasello, 2006). Furthermore, research shows that young 
children experience sympathetic arousal equally when they help a person themselves as when 
they witness a person being helped by a third-party. Thus, they are motivated to see the 
person helped, rather than gain credit for the helping (Hepach, Vaish, & Tomasello, 2012). 
This evidence suggests that from a young age children are intrinsically motivated to help 
others. 
Similar evidence for the intuitive nature of prosociality exists among adult 
populations. For example, Schulz, Fischbacher, Thöni, and Utikal (2014) WHVWHGSHRSOH¶V
intuitive prosociality by inducing either high or low cognitive load and measuring prosocial 
behaviour in a dictator game. The dictator game provided participants with a choice of how to 
distribute money (i.e., equally vs. unequally) between themselves and an unknown other 
person. To manipulate cognitive load participants were given one of two tasks to complete 
during the dictator game. In the high cognitive load condition, participants listened to letters 
over a headphone and were asked to press a key each time they heard a letter that was 
presented two letters earlier. In the low cognitive load condition, participants were asked to 
SUHVVDNH\HDFKWLPHWKH\KHDUGWKHOHWWHU³/´5HVXOWVVKRZHGWKDW participants under high 
cognitive load (i.e., decreased deliberation) were more prosocial than participants under low 
cognitive load (i.e., increased deliberation). Across 10 economic game studies, Rand, Greene, 
and Nowak (2012) also found evidence for the idea that prosociality is intuitive. Specifically, 
their results showed that participants who reached a decision more quickly were more 
cooperative. Moreover, when forced to make a decision quickly (vs. slowly) participants 
were more cooperative. Inducing participants to trust their intuitions (vs. inducing 
participants to reflect more) increased cooperation. In addition, recent research by Crockett 
DQGFROOHDJXHVVKRZHGWKDWSHRSOHSDLGPRUHPRQH\WRUHGXFHRWKHUSHRSOH¶VSDLQ
than their own, and WKDWSHRSOHUHTXLUHGPRUHFRPSHQVDWLRQWRLQFUHDVHRWKHUV¶SDLQWKDQ
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their own (Crockett, Kurth-Nelson, Siegel, Dayan, & Dolan, 2014). In sum, recent laboratory 
evidence suggests that helping and cooperation are intuitive.   
In line with these findings (e.g., Crockett et al., 2014; Rand et al., 2012), nationally 
representative surveys have also shown high levels of prosociality (e.g., volunteering, 
charitable giving) across society. For example, a recent survey in England with 5105 
respondents (Community Life Survey commissioned by the Cabinet Office, 2014) showed 
that 48% of people had participated in formal (i.e., via the workplace) and/or informal (i.e., 
outside of the workplace) volunteering at least once a month in the 12 months prior to 
interview. However, when only including informal volunteering (i.e., excluding workplace 
schemes), the figure dropped to 35% who had volunteered at least once a month in the 12 
months prior to interview. Reports on charitable giving were high. Specifically, in the four 
weeks prior to interview, 75% of respondents had given money to charity. The average 
amount donated in the four weeks prior to interview was £21. Finally, the survey also 
examined peoplH¶VFLYLFSDUWLFLSDWLRQVXFKDV engagement in democratic processes including 
contacting elected representatives or attending a demonstration. Results showed that 30% of 
respondents had engaged in some form of civic participation in the 12 months prior to 
interview.  
Barriers to Prosocial Behaviour 
Despite this intuitive motivation to help others, global levels of inequality and apathy 
persist. Indeed, while one in nine people on earth do not have enough food to lead a healthy 
active life (FAO, 2014), British households throw out 4.2 million tonnes of food and drink 
each year (the equivalent of six meals every week for the average UK household; WRAP, 
2013). Moreover, in 2008, British households spent an average of £57.40 on recreation and 
culture (i.e., TVs, computers, newspapers, books, leisure activities and package holidays) 
each week (ONS, 2008), but only £2.48 on charitable giving (CGAP, 2011). These 
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discrepancies are in line with evidence that shows that SHRSOH¶VLQWXLWLYH prosocial 
motivations are often not enacted (cf. Aquino, Freeman, Reed II, Lim, and Felps, 2009). 
There are a multitude of factors (or barriers) that disable, discourage, or bias prosocial 
behaviours, each of which is outlined below.  
First, sLWXDWLRQDOIDFWRUVFDQKHDYLO\LQIOXHQFHSHRSOH¶Vlikelihood to engage in 
prosocial behaviours. For example, research shows that the presence of competition, extrinsic 
rewards, and feeling hurried, all of which are very prevalent in Western societies, 
significantly reduce prosociality (e.g., Abrams, Van de Vyver, Pelletier, & Cameron, 2015; 
Darley & Batson, 1973; Warneken & Tomasello, 2014). Ample research has also shown that 
the number of people present in an emergency situation UHGXFHVSHRSOH¶V prosocial 
intervention, due to the diffusion of responsibility (Darley & Latané, 1968; Latané & Darley, 
1968, 1970). Thus, minRUVLWXDWLRQDOIDFWRUVFDQKDYHODUJHHIIHFWVRQSHRSOH¶VSURVRFLDOLW\ 
Second, research shows that demographics are related to SHRSOH¶Vlikelihood of acting 
prosocially. For example, Piff and colleagues (2012) demonstrated that upper-class 
individuals donate less to charity, share less in economic games, and are less inclined to help 
people in need (Piff, Kraus, Cote, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010). Furthermore, women tend to 
donate more than men, married people tend to donate more than single people, people with 
children tend to give more than people without children, and older people tend to give more 
than younger people (Charities Aid Foundation, 2011; Charities Aid Foundation, 2012; 
Wiepking & Bekkers, 2012). Thus, while evidence suggests that people have an intuitive 
motivation to help others (Crockett et al., 2014; Rand et al., 2012), not everyone is equally 
likely to help others.  
Third, personality research also shows that not all people are equally prosocial. For 
example, research has shown that highly agreeable individuals show high levels of 
prosociality across different tasks (Graziano et al., 2007), while individuals high in 
MORAL ELEVATION AND MORAL OUTRAGE 8
   
 
Machiavellianism are more likely to exploit others than to act prosocially (Gunnthorsdottir, 
McCabe, & Smith, 2002). Thus, again, while evidence suggests that people have an intuitive 
motivation to help others (Crockett et al., 2014; Rand et al., 2012), not everyone seems 
equally likely to help.  
Fourth, in line with evidence on intergroup relations, perceived similarity, and 
stereotyping (see Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; DeSteno, 2015), research shows that people 
are more willing to help some groups over others (cf. Abrams & Houston, 2006). For 
example, in a nationally representative British survey, people were more willing to donate 
money to causes helping disabled and elderly people than those supporting Black or Muslim 
people (Abrams & Houston, 2006). Moreover, the Charities Aid Foundation (2012) found 
that, while religious charities attract 17% of the overall amount donated, overseas (10%) and 
homelessness (2%) charities receive substantially less. Similar results can be found in the US, 
where religious charities also receive the majority of charitable contributions (National 
Philanthropic Trust, 2014). Statistics on volunteering also show that volunteering for 
religious activities is the most common kind (34.2%) (National Philanthropic Trust, 2014). 
Furthermore, evidence also shows that people are more likely to donate to organisations 
helping naturally caused rather than humanly caused disasters, as victims of naturally caused 
disasters are seen as less to blame for their plight (Zagefka, Noor, Brown, Randsley de 
Moura, & Hopthrow, 2011). Thus, while people are intuitively motivated to help others, 
substantial bias seems to exist in the determination of who is worthy of help. 
Therefore, while most people seem instinctively inclined towards prosociality (Rand 
et al., 2012), many situational, individual difference, and relational barriers exist in society 
that prevent or bias engagement in prosocial action. It is essential to develop strategies that 
effectively mobilise people to want to help others. The current thesis examines the potential 
of emotions for encouraging people to help others.  
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The Relatively Advantaged and Prosocial Behaviour 
To date, research on overcoming inequalities and injustices has largely focused on the 
disadvantaged and on when and how they can be mobilised to pursue social change efforts 
(Abrams & Grant, 2012; Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). However, 
increasingly researchers are also examining whether and how relatively advantaged people 
become interested in pursuing social change to promote more equal and just societies (e.g., 
Iyer & Leach, 2010; 6XEDãLü5H\QROGV	7XUQHU; Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 
20095HODWLYHO\DGYDQWDJHGSHRSOHRUJURXSVDUHWKRVH³VHFXUHLQWKHLUSRVLWLRQGXHWRWKHLU
greater size or controORYHUUHVRXUFHV´Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002, p. 137). Some 
researchers have highlighted that help provided by advantaged people may not be as rare as 
previously thought, and that such helping is an essential part of daily life (Wright & Richard, 
2010).  
Support from advantaged people can help, or even be critical to, accomplishing social 
change (Iyer and Leach, 2010; 6XEDãLüHWDO. This is because (1) advantaged people 
often collectively hold substantial political, economic, and social power, which can help 
promote social change, and (2) involvement from a few members of advantaged groups can 
also further encourage wider participation in the movement (Goodman, 2001; see Iyer and 
Leach, 2010). As expressed by 6XEDãLüHWDO, p. 331³when challenge to authority 
spreads beyond the minority to include those who are not directly (negatively) affected by the 
VWDWXVTXRVRFLDOFKDQJHEHFRPHVSRVVLEOH´Therefore, ³LIDFWLQJFROOHFWLYHO\WRFKDOOHQJH
the status quo is fundamental to social change, it becomes crucial to understand the process 
by which the [advantaged] become not only sympathetic toward the [disadvantaged] and its 
cause but also willing to actively challenge the authority in solidarity with the 
[disadvantaged]´ (6XEDãLüHWDO, p. 331). 
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Nevertheless, it is important to note that when advantaged people perceive an 
inequality as illegitimate they must also perceive their own privilege as illegitimate; this can 
be difficult and unpleasant (Goodman, 2001; Iyer & Leach, 2010). Advantaged individuals or 
groups have to recognise their responsibility in creating and maintaining the unequal status 
TXR7KLVPD\SRVHDWKUHDWWRWKHLURZQRUWKHLULQJURXS¶VLPDJH/HDFKHWDO 
Supporting social change efforts to overcome inequality entails working against RQH¶V own or 
RQH¶V ingroup¶s interest (Lipsitz, 1998). Therefore, while it is possible to mobilise advantaged 
groups to help disadvantaged groups (Wright & Richard, 2010), it can be a difficult and long 
process (Leach et al., 2002).  
Furthermore, when advantaged people help disadvantaged people there can be a risk 
of maintaining and perpetuating inequalities and injustices between the two groups (Nadler 
and Halabi, 2006; van Leeuwen & Täuber, 2010). This is because such helping can often be 
strategic and aimed at maintaining status differences and therefore inequalities (van Leeuwen 
& Täuber, 2010). Indeed, Nadler and Halabi (2006) have argued and demonstrated that 
helping is often a reflection of power and status, and that providing help enables the helper to 
(re)affirm their higher status, and portray the recipient of help as dependent and low status. 
Therefore, help provided by advantaged groups may ensure persisting inequalities and/or 
injustices.  
Third-Party Prosocial Behaviour 
The majority of research that examines solidarity or helping between groups employs 
a unimodal (i.e., mobilising disadvantaged members to act) or bimodal (i.e., mobilising 
advantaged groups to help disadvantaged groups) approach (Glasford & Pratto, 2014). 
However, with an increase in global connectedness, the context of social change does not 
typically encompass just two groups (i.e., the advantaged and the disadvantaged). For 
example, the apartheid regime in South Africa included: the advantaged and the 
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disadvantaged, but also a third-party group (i.e., the international community). The current 
research focuses on when and why third-party individuals or groups (also referred to as 
bystanders in other parts of the literature; Abbott & Cameron, 2014) help others. Third parties 
are those who are not directly involved in or affected by the relevant situation or context 
(e.g., inequality, injustice; see also Saab, Tausch, Spears, & Cheung, 2015).   
Help provided by third-party individuals or groups should encompass similar 
strengths as help provided by advantaged individuals or groups. Specifically, third-party 
individuals or groups may also (1) hold substantial economic, political, or social power, and 
(2) can also encourage wider participation in the movement. However, in contrast to 
advantaged individuals or groups, third-party individuals or groups may be more motivated to 
support disadvantaged people or groups as it should not threaten their own or their grRXS¶V
image or status. It is proposed that third-parties could significantly contribute to overcoming 
social inequalities and injustices, and it is therefore essential to understand how third-parties 
(or bystanders) can be mobilised to help others. This current thesis will examine emotional 
strategies for motivating third-parties to help others.   
The Potential of Emotions 
Emotions may provide a particularly effective tool for mobilising third-parties to help 
others (Thomas et al., 2009). The evidence for this assertion is set out below.   
Defining Emotions 
Although people understand what is meant by the word emotion, it is not an easy term 
to define. Giner-Sorolla (2012) made a useful attempt to define emotions, drawing on the 
characteristics (e.g., cognitive appraisals, physiological responses, and facial expressions) 
that accompany an emotional state, ³(PRWLRQVDULVHIURPVHQVRU\DQGFRJQLWLYHLQSXW
elaborated to a greater or lesser degree. From sources in the brain they activate peripheral 
nervous, endocrine, cardiovascular, and other physiological responses. At the same time they 
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activate hard-to-control bodily expressions that can be read by other people, in our faces, 
voices, and posture. As with many other psychological states, humans reflect on emotions 
and give them names, so that emotions take on a semantic life. And humans cannot help but 
speak about and learn about emotions within the context of a culture, leading to cultural 
GLIIHUHQFHVLQHPRWLRQH[SUHVVLRQDQGNQRZOHGJH´*LQHU-Sorolla, 2012, p. 6).  
Furthermore, when defining emotions it is important to compare the components of 
emotions to those of related concepts, such as moods and feelings. In terms of moods and 
emotions, researchers argue that they are distinctive as moods are less connected to a specific 
stimulus or event, are longer lasting, and more diffuse (Giner-Sorolla, 2012). In terms of 
feelings and emotions, they can be viewed as quite similar as both can be split along a core 
affect dimension (i.e., you can have a pleasant or an unpleasant feeling or emotion). Indeed, 
our internal biology is organised predominantly around the two dimensions of core affect 
(pleasantness vs. unpleasantness) and arousal (high vs. low arousal) (Russell, 2003). 
However, in terms of our expressive system and our language, there are a greater variety of 
emotions (vs. feelings) within each core affect dimension (e.g., anger, fear, and sadness vs. 
admiration, happiness, and moral elevation). Our expressive system can communicate around 
half a dozen emotions (Giner-Sorolla, 2012; Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002; Matsumoto, 
.HOWQHU6KLRWD)UDQN	2¶6XOOLYDQDQGRXUODQJXDJHV\VWHPFDQFRPPXQLFDWHD
huge range of emotions, depending on the particular lexicon. For example, English contains 
around 2000 emotion words, Dutch around 1500, Taiwanese Chinese around 750, Malaysian 
around 230, and the language of the Chewong (a small aboriginal group in Malaysia, Howell 
1981) only seven (Heelas, 1986; Russell, 1991; see Parkinson, Fischer, & Manstead, 2005). 
Therefore, emotion can be considered as a multi-layered concept, best explained by its 
characteristics (e.g., cognitive appraisals, physiological responses, and facial expressions) and 
cultural and linguistic influences (Giner-Sorolla, 2012). 
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Functions of Emotions 
Theoretical frameworks have attempted to explain how emotions work and what they 
are for. Recently, the functional conflict theory (Giner-Sorolla, 2012) integrated the disparate 
literatures on the functions of emotion into one overarching theoretical framework. The 
functional conflict theory suggests that emotions can serve four functions (that, at times, may 
interfere with one another): (1) they are part of a system of motivated appraisals of the 
current environment, leading to appropriate action tendencies (the appraisal function); (2) 
they are an associative learning system, more simple and rigid than other types of learning, 
that forms emotionally based attitudes by associating pleasurable or painful emotions with an 
object (the associative learning function); (3) they are also a self-regulation system that 
UHVSRQGVWRIHHGEDFNDERXWRQH¶VRZQDFWLRQV (the self-regulation function); and (4) they are 
a social communication system that provides output and cues to others (the social 
communication function). As this thesis will focus on experimentally testing the potential for 
emotions to increase prosocial action tendencies, the first function (the appraisal function) is 
particularly relevant. Nevertheless, the other functions also seem important for understanding 
the link between emotions and prosociality. For example, it seems likely that people may 
react differently to emotional charity adverts if they know in advance (due to past 
experiences) that the adverts will make them feel distressed (i.e., the associative learning 
function). Moreover, recent research has shown that people use emotional expressions to 
determine genuine and moral character in others (i.e., the social communication function; 
Barasch, Levine, Berman, & Small, 2014). While important for developing a complete 
understanding of the relationship between emotions and prosociality, these latter research 
questions are beyond the scope of this thesis. The current thesis will examine the effects of 
moral emotions (derived from specific appraisals) on action tendencies (i.e., it will examine 
the appraisal function).  
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Appraisal Theory of Emotion 
Appraisal theory in its most basic form, suggests that emotions depend on our 
cognitive appraisals of the environment (i.e., our interpretations of our surroundings; Arnold, 
1960; Ellsworth, 1991; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 2001; Smith and Lazarus, 
1993; see also Giner-Sorolla, 2012; Parkinson et al., 2005). For example, appraisal theorists 
would argue that fear derives from an appraisal of danger, while anger derives from an 
appraisal of injustice. More specifically, when one person hears about a terrorist attack in the 
news they may think about the danger to themselves and thus react with fear and a desire to 
flee. In contrast, another person might think about the unfairness and injustice of the attack, 
and react with anger and a desire to retaliate (example from Giner-Sorolla, 2012). Thus, 
relevant appraisals lead to specific emotional reactions (which include specific bodily 
changes, expressions, and action tendencies; Parkinson et al., 2005).2  
Appraisals provide a signal that current events require action, they make us want to do 
something, and they guide the form the action should take (Lazarus, 1991; Smith, 1989). For 
example, situations or objects appraised as good may encourage an approach motivation, 
whereas situations or objects appraised as bad may encourage an avoidance motivation 
(Arnold, 1960). Thus, a key element of appraisal theory is the emotional action tendencies 
(Frijda, 1986). An aFWLRQWHQGHQF\FDQEHXQGHUVWRRGDV³UHDGLQHVVWRHQJDJHLQRUGLVHQJDJH
                                                 
 
2
 Critics of appraisal theory highlight that people are not always aware of the appraisal prior to the emotional 
experience. For example, people can feel angry without knowing why (Parkinson et al., 2005). In response to 
these criticisms appraisal theorists have argued that appraisals can be fast and unconscious (Lazarus, 1984), as 
well as slower and more conscious (Lazarus & Folkman, 1988). Unfortunately this is incredibly difficult to test 
empirically (Parkinson et al., 2005). 
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IURPLQWHUDFWLRQZLWKVRPHJRDOREMHFWLQVRPHSDUWLFXODUIDVKLRQ´)ULMGD.XLSHUV	7HU
Schure, 1989, p. 213). Action tendencies typically change the relation between the emotional 
person and their environment, and sometimes more specifically, change the relationship with 
other people in their social environment (Parkinson et al., 2005). For example, a self-blame 
appraisal may instigate feelings of guilt which can then encourage reparative actions. An 
other-blame appraisal may instigate feelings of moral outrage which can then encourage 
motivations to remove the harm from the environment (Lazarus, 1991). Thus, as part of their 
very nature, emotions guide behaviours; ³WKHH[SHULHQFHof emotion is thought to serve as an 
internal signalling device, providing information about events in the environment and guiding 
WKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VSDWWHUQVRIWKRXJKWDQGDFWLRQLQDSSURSULDWHIDVKLRQ´(Goetz, Keltner, & 
Simon-Thomas, 2010, p. 361). Frijda (2010, p.571) DUJXHGWKDW³Hmotions are intimately 
UHODWHGWRDFWLRQ7KH\DUHDPRQJWKHPDLQGLUHFWFDXVHVRIDFWLRQ´Of interest to this thesis 
is how emotions can guide prosocial action in particular. 
Prosocial Action  
Increasingly researchers suggest that (certain) emotions can promote prosocial action. 
)RUH[DPSOH+DLGW¶VVRFLDOLQWXLWLRQLVWWKHRU\VXJJHVWVWKDWPRUDOLQWXLWLRQVZKLFK
include moral emotions) produce moral judgments and behaviours. In a similar vein, Tangney 
and colleagues (2007) suggested WKDW³PRUDOHPRWLRQVSURYLGHWKHPRWLYDWLRQDOIRUFH²the 
power and energy²WRGRJRRGDQGWRDYRLGGRLQJEDG´,QVXSSRUWRIthese assertions, 
clinical research has shown that individuals with brain impairments in areas associated with 
emotional processing typically show less prosocial but more antisocial behaviours; they judge 
harmful acts as more permissible, they show less empathy and regret, they are less 
cooperative in economic decision making games, and they show increased abuse towards 
others (Damasio, 1994; Koenigs et al., 2007; Koenigs, Kruepke, & Newman, 2010). This has 
also been shown with psychopathic individuals who typically understand social norms and 
MORAL ELEVATION AND MORAL OUTRAGE 16
   
 
laws, yet their impaired emotional ability hinders any motivation to act prosocially (Glenn, 
Raine, & Laufer, 2011). Thus, emotions seem to play a role in maintaining or increasing 
prosocial motivation and behaviour.  
A sub-class of emotions, termed moral emotions, may be particularly important in 
encouraging prosocial behaviours (Haidt, 2001)0RUDOHPRWLRQVDUH³WKRVHWKDWDUHOLQNHGWR
the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge 
RUDJHQW´ (Haidt, 2003, p. 276). Researchers suggest that moral emotions have evolved as 
commitment devices that encourage prosocial behaviour that may be costly in the short-term 
but beneficial in the long-term (e.g., cooperation; Haidt, 2003; Rand & Nowak, 2013; Teper, 
Zhong, & Inzlicht, 2015).  
Traditionally moral emotion research has focused predominantly on three emotions: 
sympathy, guilt, and empathy. Nevertheless, since the 1980-¶VWKLVUHVHDUFKDUHDKDV
expanded to include a wider range of emotions such as disgust, anger, moral elevation, and 
shame (Haidt, 2003). Moral emotions now include: (a) other-condemning emotions, such as 
disgust, anger, and contempt, (b) self-conscious emotions, such as shame, embarrassment, 
and guilt, (c) other-suffering emotions, such as compassion, and (d) other-praising emotions, 
such as gratitude and moral elevation (Haidt, 2003; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999).  
Model of moral emotion prototypicality. +DLGW¶s (2003) model of moral emotion 
prototypicality suggests that moral emotions (e.g., gratitude, shame, disgust, pride, moral 
outrage, moral elevation, guilt, and sympathy) vary in the extent to which they can be linked 
to the interests of society or of other people. The emotions that can be most directly linked to 
the interests of others are the most prototypical moral emotions, and thus most effective in 
inducing prosociality. +DLGW¶VPRGHOGUDZVRQWZRFRPSRQHQWIHDWXUHVLH
GLVLQWHUHVWHGHOLFLWRUVDQGSURVRFLDODFWLRQWHQGHQFLHVWRLQIRUPPRUDOHPRWLRQ¶V
prototypicality. The two component features are each outlined below.   
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opportunities affect the interests or needs of the self (Smith & Lazarus, 1993). However, 
humans can also react to social events that do not directly affect the self (Haidt, 2003). Some 
emotions occur more frequently when good or bad things happen to the self (e.g., happiness, 
fear). In contrast, other emotions occur more frequently when good or bad things happen to 
another person (e.g., moral elevation, sympathy, moral outrage). Haidt (2003) suggested that 
the frequency of which emotions occur due to disinterested elicitors (i.e., when there is no 
personal stake in the situation) informs the moral emotion prototypicality. He suggested that 
³WKHPRUHDQHPRWLRQWHQGVWREHWULJJHUHGE\VXFKGLVLQWHUHVWHGHOLFLWRUVWKHPRUHLWFDQEH
FRQVLGHUHGDSURWRW\SLFDOPRUDOHPRWLRQ´S 
Prosocial action tendencies. Emotions typically motivate some sort of action as a 
response to the eliciting event (Frijda et al., 1989). While the action is often not taken, the 
person enters into a motivational and cognitive state in which there is an increased likelihood 
to engage in a goal-related action (e.g., helping, seeking revenge, etc.). Action tendencies can 
be ranked by the degree to which they benefit others, or else uphold or benefit the social 
order. )RUH[DPSOHZKLOHKDSSLQHVVPD\LQFUHDVHSHRSOH¶VSRVLWLYHUHVSRQVHVWRRWKHUVLWV
action tendency is not to help others (i.e., it has a low prosocial action tendency). In contrast, 
the action tendency of compassion is quite clearly a motivation to help the person or group of 
people who are suffering (i.e., it has a high prosocial action tendency) (cf. Haidt, 2003).  
Using these component features, Haidt (2003) described moral elevation, moral 
outrage, compassion, and guilt as the most prototypical moral emotions. These emotions are 
theorised to be the most intrinsically linked to the welfare of others, and thus most effective 
in encouraging prosociality.  
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Since the development of the model of moral emotion prototypicality, research has 
shown that a range of moral intuitions (or motives) exists (i.e., harm/care, 
fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/ respect, and purity/sanctity), and that the 
relevance of these intuitions varies by political orientation (moral foundation theory; Graham, 
+DLGW	1RVHN+DLGW+DLGW¶VPRGHORIPRUDOHPRWLRQSURWRW\SLFDOLW\
appears to focus on the harm/care (i.e., prosocial) motive alone. Indeed, prior to the 
development of moral foundation theory (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007) 
research viewed morality as concerning the protection of individuals. The most cited 
definition of morality was: ³SUHVFULSWLYH judgments of justice, rights, and welfare pertaining 
WRKRZSHRSOHRXJKWWRUHODWHWRHDFKRWKHU´7XULHOSAs the current research aims 
WRXQGHUVWDQGWKHHIIHFWVRIHPRWLRQVRQSURVRFLDOLW\LWZLOOGUDZRQ+DLGW¶VPRGHO, 
and therefore focus on the harm/care domain.  
The current thesis will predominantly examine the prosocial effects of moral elevation 
and moral outrage, rather than those of sympathy and guilt. While evidence shows that moral 
elevation and moral outrage are promising emotions for increasing prosociality, much less is 
known about moral elevation and moral outrage than about sympathy and guilt. To 
demonstrate, several review articles have been published on sympathy (e.g., Batson & Shaw, 
1991; Goetz et al., 2010) and on guilt (e.g., Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Wohl, 
Branscombe, & Klar, 2006), yet no review articles have been published on moral elevation, 
and only one brief review article has been published focusing on moral outrage (van Doorn, 
Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2014). Several published review articles have examined moral 
emotions generally, in which moral elevation and/or moral outrage are either mentioned or 
examined in relatively little detail (Tangney et al., 2007; Teper et al., 2015; Thomas et al., 
2009). Nevertheless, more evidence is necessary to fully understand the effects of moral 
elevation and moral outrage, and therefore to inform their theoretical development and 
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applied use. The existing empirical evidence on moral elevation and moral outrage is 
reviewed below.  
Moral Elevation and Moral Outrage 
Moral Elevation  
Moral elevation is a positive emotion experienced when witnessing another person 
perform a virtuous act, one that improves the welfare of others (Algoe & Haidt, 2009). In lay 
PDQ¶VWHUPVLWFDQEHGHVFULEHGDVDIHHOLQJRIPRUDODGPLUDWLRQ+DLGWVXJJHVWHGWKDW
moral elevation consists of a feeling of warmth and expansion that is accompanied by 
admiration and affection for the person(s) who performed the exemplary behaviour. The 
action tendency of moral elevation is to emulate the moral exemplar (Haidt, 2003). That is, a 
desire to become a better person oneself and help others. Algoe and Haidt (2009) 
demonstrated that moral elevation is phenomenologically distinct from seemingly similar 
emotions such as gratitude and admiration. They found that moral elevation motivates 
prosocial and affiliative behaviours, gratitude motivates improved relationships with the 
benefactors, and admiration motivates self-improvement.  
Although people may be familiar with the feeling of moral elevation experientially, 
people do not typically recognise it by its name (Landis et al., 2009). Thomas Jefferson was 
the first person to consider moral HOHYDWLRQDVDWHUPDQGVDLG³:KHQDQ\VLJQDODFWRI
charity or of gratitude, for instance, is presented either to our sight or imagination, we are 
deeply impressed with its beauty and feel a strong desire in ourselves of doing a charitable 
DQGJUDWHIXODFWDOVR´-HIIHUVRQS$UHDOVXUJHRIUHVHDUFKLQWRmoral 
elevation began from around 2009 onwards (e.g., Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Aquino, McFerran, 
& Laven, 2011; Cox, 2010; Diessner, Iyer, Smith, & Haidt, 2013; Englander, Haidt, & 
Morris, 2012; Freeman, Aquino, & McFerran, 2009; Lai, Haidt, & Nosek, 2014; Piper, 
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Saslow, & Saturn, 2015; Schnall & Roper, 2012; Schnall et al., 2010; Silvers & Haidt, 2008; 
Thomson, Nakamura, Siegel, & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014; Vianello, Galliani, & Haidt, 2010). 
Even though moral elevation is a relatively novel and under-researched emotion (just 
over a dozen articles have been published to date), the available evidence suggests that it may 
be particularly effective at inspiring people to help others (Schnall & Roper, 2012). For 
example, Silvers and Haidt (2008) showed that nursing mothers who were exposed to 
elevation-inducing videos were more likely to nurse and marginally more likely to hug their 
infants than mothers who watched comedy videos. Moreover, Freeman et al. (2009) 
conducted three studies, which demonstrated that moral elevation (induced by a video or 
ZULWWHQWH[WDWWHQXDWHGWKHGHWULPHQWDOHIIHFWRI:KLWHVWXGHQWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶VRFLDOGominance 
orientation on donations to a Black-oriented charity (relative to a comparative control 
condition). Schnall and colleagues (2010) showed that elevation-inducing videos (in contrast 
to neutral or humorous videos) increased the likelihood of volunteering for a subsequent 
unpaid study and increased the likelihood of helping the experimenter with a tedious task. 
Oliver et al. (2015) showed that elevation-inducing videos (vs. humorous videos) increased 
feelings of overlap between the self and humanity, and this overlap was in turn associated 
with a greater sense of connectedness with people from other racial/ethnic groups.  
Leadership research has also demonstrated the importance of moral elevation in 
inspiring prosocial behaviour among employees. For example, Vianello and colleagues 
(2010) VKRZHGWKDWOHDGHU¶VHWKLFDOEHKDYLRXULHLQWHUSHUVRQDOIDLUQHVVDQGVHOI-sacrifice) 
induced feelings of moral elevation among employees, which then mediated the effect of 
OHDGHU¶VEHKDYLRXURQWKHSURVRFLDOEHKDYiour of employees (i.e., organisational citizenship 
behaviour and affective organizational commitment). Moreover, Thomson and colleagues 
(2014) showed that when participants were exposed to elevation-inducing stories (vs. control 
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stories), they felt more positively toward mentoring and showed greater intentions to mentor 
someone with less experience.   
In a naturalistic setting, 80 college students who participated in a week-long service 
trip to Nicaragua, were asked about (1) their volunteerism before the trip, (2) their moral 
elevation and planned volunteerism (general and trip-related) during the trip (3) their trip 
specific and general volunteerism after the trip, and (4) their trip specific and general 
volunteerism three months after the trip (Cox, 2010). Results showed that moral elevation 
was significantly related to planned (general and trip-related) volunteerism during the trip, 
trip-specific volunteerism one week after the trip, and trip-specific volunteerism three months 
after the trip. Moreover, the effect of moral elevation on volunteerism three months later was 
mediated by planned volunteerism during the trip. In other words, moral elevation, in a 
naturalistic setting, was significantly related to longer-term voluntary behaviours (Cox, 
2010).   
In order to understand how moral elevation motivates such prosociality, Schnall and 
Roper (2012) tested whether moral elevation increases prosocial outcomes through a 
threatened moral self-image or through a moWLYDWLRQDOVWDWHWRDFWRQRQH¶VPRUDOYDOXHV7KH
authors showed support for the latter. Specifically, participants who had taken part in a 
prosocial self-affirmation task before the moral elevation manipulation helped the 
experimenter significantly more with a boring task than participants who had not self-
affirmed and participants in the control condition. Thus, participants who were reminded of 
their own moral values and were then induced with moral elevation were the most prosocial; 
moral elevation acted as a motivational stimulus.  
Moreover, in order to examine the brain mechanisms underlying moral elevation, 
Englander et al. (2012) conducted an fMRI study with 10 healthy volunteers who watched 
nine video clips; three elevation-inducing video clips, three admiration-inducing video clips, 
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and three neutral video clips. Their results showed that the regions that were uniquely 
associated with the peak moments of moral elevation were those implicated in mentalising 
behaviour ± the ability to make inferences about the beliefs and mind states of others. 
Additionally, their results showed that the structures involved during moral elevation 
(precuneus, posterior and anterior cingulate) play a role in self-referential processes such as 
the construction of social narrative, integrating emotional experience, and action planning. 
The authors summarise that although moral elevation involves feelings of self-transcendence 
(i.e., a reduction in attention to the self), the experience of moral elevation is, at least 
somewhat, dependent upon an increase in self-referential processes (Englander et al., 2012). 
Landis et al. (2009) employed a different approach to the hitherto mentioned studies 
and examined moral elevation as a personality construct. They showed that trait moral 
elevation was significantly related to extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, 
and self-reported prosocial behaviour. Moreover, moral elevation positively correlated with 
self-reported prosocial behaviour even when controlling for the Five-Factor model of 
personality. From the relationship between moral elevation and the Five-Factor model (Costa 
& McCrae, 1992), the authors suggest that people high in moral elevation are: 
Warm, affectionate, friendly, genuinely like people, and tend to form close 
attachments to others. They tend to keep busy, have high energy levels, and tend to be 
socially ascendant. They are likely to experience such positive emotions as joy, 
happiness, love, and excitement, while being cheerful and optimistic. They are likely 
to have an appreciation for art and beauty, and are very receptive to their own inner 
feelings and emotions (often experiencing them more intensely than others). 
Moreover, they tend to be open-minded and entertain unconventional ideas. They 
view others as being honest and well-intentioned and worthy of being helped (easily 
being moved by the needs of others). They would rather forgive and forget than to 
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maintain interpersonal conflict. Finally, they feel well prepared to deal with life and 
tend to set high aspiration levels with a commitment and motivation to work hard in 
order to achieve their goals (Landis et al., 2009, p. 81) 
'LHVVQHUDQGFROOHDJXHVH[SDQGHGRQ/DQGLVHWDO¶VILQGLQJVDQG
showed that dispositional moral HOHYDWLRQRUDVWKH\WHUP³HQJDJHPHQWZLWKPRUDOEHDXW\´
predicted caring for others, being empathic of others, loving others, and valuing benevolence 
toward others.  
Aquino et al. (2011) tested whether moral identity moderates the effects of state moral 
elevation on prosocial outcomes. Blasi (1984) described moral identity as an individual 
difference reflecting the degree to which being moral is a central or defining characteristic of 
a SHUVRQ¶VVHQVHRIREOLJDWLRQ$TXLQRHWDOVKRZHGWKDWSDUWLFLSDQWVZKRDUHKLJKLQ
moral identity (state and trait) were more likely to recall uncommon acts of kindness and 
ZHUHPRUHOLNHO\WREHDIIHFWHGE\WKHP7KH\QRWHGWKDW³ZKHQPRUDOLGHntity is 
experienced as an important part of the self-concept, it can lead people to assign greater 
ZHLJKWWRPRUDOO\YLUWXRXVDFWV´S 
In sum, although only around a dozen studies have examined the effects of moral 
elevation, the studies conducted so far have contributed significantly to what is known about 
moral elevation. Specifically, moral elevation appears to induce a range of prosocial 
behaviours including donations to charity and helping the experimenter (Freeman et al., 2009; 
Schnall et al., 2010). It has predictive power in naturalistic settings and has long-term effects 
on volunteering (Cox, 2010). It induces prosociality by encouraging people to follow their 
moral values (Schnall & Roper, 2012,WDIIHFWVHPSOR\HH¶VSURVRFLDOEHKDYLRXUVin the 
organisational context (Vianello et al., 2010). Finally, it can also exist in the form of a stable 
individual difference variable, which similar to its state form, predicts prosocial outcomes 
(Diessner et al., 2013; Landis et al., 2009).  
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Moral Outrage   
9DQ'RRUQDQGFROOHDJXHV¶(2014) recent synthesis of research on the prosocial 
effects of anger (see also Haidt, 2003; Thomas et al., 2009) highlighted that while the vast 
majority of research conceptualises anger as an emotion with antagonistic outcomes, anger 
can also have prosocial outcomes. Specifically, in third-party contexts there is an alternative 
response to punishing perpetrators; people can also compensate and help victims.  
Witnessing an injustice to another person can make people feel outraged. This feeling 
has been referred to as anger (Haidt, 2003), righteous anger (Leach, 2008), and moral outrage 
(Montada & Schneider, 1989; Rothschild, Landau, Molina, Branscombe, & Sullivan, 2013; 
Thomas et al., 2009). However, moral outrage should be differentiated conceptually from 
anger. Specifically, although both may be experienced similarly, moral outrage refers to 
anger that results from witnessing a person or group transgress a moral standard (usually of 
fairness or justice) that harms another person or group, but which does not affect the self (cf. 
Rothschild et al., 2013; Thomas et al., 2009). Fehr and Fischbacher (2004, p. 64) 
distinguished between the cheated partner (the second party) and the uninvolved observer 
(the third party). In this example, the former might experience anger, the latter moral outrage. 
Moral outrage is considered as a high arousal emotion DQGLVGHILQHGDV³DQJHUSURYRNHGE\
the perception that a moral standard ± usually a standard of fairness or justice ± has been 
violatHGE\DWKLUGSDUW\JRYHUQPHQWRUDXWKRULW\RUV\VWHP´(Thomas et al., 2009).  
Many researchers have suggested that moral outrage induces a behavioural tendency 
to punish the perpetrator (cf. Pagano & Huo, 2007). Social dilemma research has indeed 
shown that witnessing unfairness between two unknown people can instigate altruistic 
punishment (Lotz, Okimoto, Schlosser, and Fetchenhauer; 2011; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 
2009). Altruistic punishment can be understood as costly punishment of perpetrators. Studies 
show that witnessing unfairness predicts altruistic punishment and that this effect is mediated 
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by feelings of moral outrage (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Lotz et al., 2011; Nelissen & 
Zeelenberg, 2009).  
However, recent research has shown that compensating the victim may be a more 
common response to witnessing injustice than punishing the perpetrator (Lotz et al., 2011). 
)RUH[DPSOHLQ/RW]DQGFROOHDJXHV¶study, after witnessing an unequal monetary 




their allocations by placing money into different envelopes for the perpetrator and for the 
victim, under the belief that the researcher would execute their interventions. Participants 
were told to keep any money they chose not to reallocate as participant payment. Results 
showed that participants actually compensated victims more than they punished offenders 
and that the majority of participants assigned both. Importantly, both compensation and 
punishment were predicted by perpetrator-oriented outrage. Thus, moral outrage increases 
both victim-focused compensation as well as perpetrator-focused punishment.  
Research has also shown that moral outrage can ignite support for social justice. 
Social justice efforts can include confronting or challenging people or institutions responsible 
for a particular transgression, seeking restitution for victims, and helping increase 
opportunities for affected persons (Iyer & Leach, 2010). For example, van Zomeren et al. 
(2004) found that feelings of moral outrage towards an authority for their unfair treatment of 
an outgroup predicted participants¶ willingness to participate in collective action efforts to 
challenge the authority (e.g., participate in a demonstration, sign a petition). Moreover, the 
effect of moral outrage on willingness to engage in collective action was equally strong when 
the unfair treatment affected the outgroup as when it affected the ingroup. Similarly, Iyer, 
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Schmader, and Lickel (2007) IRXQGWKDW%ULWLVKSHRSOH¶V moral outrage at the American 
JRYHUQPHQWIRUWKHRFFXSDWLRQRI,UDTSUHGLFWHGSHRSOH¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRWDNHFRQFUHWH
political actions (e.g., confronting those responsible for Iraq by signing a petition or attending 
a rally). Saab and colleagues (2015) showed that, among third-party groups, perceived 
injustice predicted collective action tendencies (i.e., protesting) and that this effect was 
mediated by feelings of moral outrage (and sympathy). van Zomeren and Lodewijkx (2005) 
showed that moral outrage (following a story about senseless violence) was significantly 
related to protest intentions HJ³would like to do something as a signal of protest against 
VRFLHW\´DVZHOODVKHOSLQJ intentions HJ³,ZRXOGOLNHWRVHQGDFDUGWRWKHUHODWLYHVRIWKH
YLFWLP´van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears, & Bettache (2011) showed that moral convictions 
(i.e., strong and absolute stances on moralised issues) against inequality predicted collective 
action tendencies through moral outrage (and efficacy).  
Montada and Schneider's (1989) victim-focused research showed that feeling moral 
outrage, rather than feeling guilt RUQHJDWLYHDIIHFWIROORZLQJH[SRVXUHWRYLFWLPV¶VWRULHVRI
poverty (unemployment/national poverty/immigration) predicted a range of prosocial 
intentions including donating money, signing a petition addressed to political leaders or 
institutions, participating in a demonstration, and joining an activity group. Thomas and 
McGarty (2009) found that in opinion-EDVHGJURXSVLQGXFLQJDQRXWUDJHQRUP³SHRSOHIHHO





the relationship between system justification, which has been negatively implicated in 
helping behaviours, and intentions to help a disadvantaged group (Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & 
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Chen, 2007). Lodewijkx, Kersten and van Zomeren (2008) showed that moral outrage against 
violence directly predicted intentions to participate in a silent march, but also indirectly 
predicted such intentions through re-establishing the belief in a just world, and through self-
directed moral cleansing reactions. Research among children has also shown that moral 
outrage about a bullying scenario (i.e., an injustice) significantly predicted intentions to tell a 
teacher (Jones, Manstead, & Livingstone, 2009). 
Particularly relevant in the current climate, Lindenmeier, Schleer, and Pricl (2012) 
found that moral outrage significantly predicted boycotting intentions following perceived 
unethical corporate conduct. Similarly, Grappi, Romani, and Bagozzi (2013) found that 
disgust and moral outrage predicted both negative word of mouth HJ³,LQWHQGWRVD\
QHJDWLYHWKLQJVDERXWWKLVFRPSDQ\´DQGDUDQJHRISURWHVWEHKDYLRXUVHJER\FRWWLQJWKH
company, blog against the company, complain to the company) following corporate 
irresponsible behaviour. However, this effect was moderated by SDUWLFLSDQW¶V other-regarding 
virtues.  
Overall this overview of studies shows that moral outrage can encourage people to 
help others and to stand up against injustices that do not affect the self. It can do so in a range 
of ways such as, by punishing the harm-doer (e.g., Lotz et al., 2011; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 
2009), compensating the victim (e.g., Lotz et al., 2011), supporting social justice efforts (e.g., 
Iyer et al., 2007; van Zomeren et al., 2004), donating money (e.g., Montada & Schneider, 
1989), volunteering (e.g., Montada & Schneider, 1989), and boycotting unethical corporate 
companies (e.g., Grappi et al., 2013; Lindenmeier et al., 2012).  
Guilt and Sympathy 
$FFRUGLQJWR+DLGW¶VPRGHORIPRUDOHPRWLRQSURWRW\SLFDOLW\JXLOWDQG
sympathy are also among the most prototypical emotions, and should therefore also be 
effective at increasing prosociality. Indeed, evidence for this assertion is abundant. In order to 
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test the prosocial implications of moral elevation and moral outrage, their effects are 
compared to those of guilt and sympathy in Chapter 7. For this reason brief overviews of 
guilt and sympathy are provided below.  For detailed reviews on guilt and sympathy see 
Tangney et al. (2007), Wohl et al. (2006; collective guilt), and Goetz et al. (2010; 
compassion). 
Guilt 
Appraisal theorists suggest that guilt results from an appraisal that a person has done 
something wrong and is responsible for harm caused to another person (Zeelenberg & 
Breugelmans, 2008). The individual is then motivated to amend or rectify that harm 
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). Guilt is a self-focused emotion (Tangney et al., 
2007). Guilt can function in a number of ways. In the immediate term it can motivate 
restitution toward the person harmed (Tangney et al., 2007). This can be done through 
confessions, apologies, and attempts to undo the harm caused (Caplovitz Barrett, 1995; 
Lewis, 1971; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984),]DUGSQRWHGWKDW³WKHH[SHULHQFHRIJXLOW
binds the person to the source of guilt and does not subside without reconciliation that tends 
WRUHVWRUHVRFLDOKDUPRQ\´ 
Ample research has demonstrated the positive effects of guilt for interpersonal 
relationships and society (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1994; Ketelaar & Tung Au, 2003). For 
example, Ketelaar and Au (2003) found that autobiographical recall procedures inducing guilt 
increased prosociality in social dilemma games. Similarly, Nelissen, Dijker, and deVries 
(2007) showed that an induction of guilt increased prosocial behaviour, while an induction of 
fear did not. Amodio, Devine, and Harmon-Jones (2007) demonstrated that guilt (following a 
bogus feedback task regarding racial bias) promoted greater interest in prejudice reduction 
when an opportunity presented itself (e.g., choosing to read articles that focus on how to 
reduce prejudice). Moreover, De Hooge, Zeelenberg, and Breugelmans (2007) found that 
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guilt affected both prosociality in a social dilemma task as well as in an everyday cooperation 
measure. Finally, Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, and Manstead (1998) found that Dutch 
SHRSOH¶VJXLOWDERXWWKHLUFRXQWU\¶VFRORQLVation of Indonesia predicted support for 
governmental compensation to Indonesia. Thus, guilt seems to motive prosocial intentions 
and behaviours.  
Sympathy 
Sympathy is an emotional response to ZLWQHVVLQJDQRWKHU¶VVXIIHULQJ. It is an other-
focused emotion (Batson, 1991). Sympathy is part of the compassion-related states which 
include: sympathy, pity, and empathic concern (Goetz et al., 2010). Each of these 
compassion-related states has been repeatedly and extensively linked to prosocial behaviour 
*RHW]HWDO,WLQYROYHVD³KHLJKWHQHGDZDUHQHVVRIDQRWKHU¶VSOLJKWDVVRPHWKLQJWR
EHDOOHYLDWHG´(Wispé, 1986, p. 314). Pity differs slightly from sympathy and empathic 
concern as it also involves the additional appraisal of feeling concern for someone considered 
inferior to oneself (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). The key action tendency for these 
compassion-related states is the desire to help the disadvantaged and mitigate their suffering.   
Empirical research has shown that compassion predicts prosocial behaviour in 
children as young as six years (Malti, Gummerum, Keller, & Buchmann, 2009). Self-reported 
individual differences in compassion have been positively associated with self-reported 
prosocial behaviour in Japan (Kitayama & Markus, 2000) and Brazil (Eisenberg, Zhou, & 
Koller, 2001). Empathic concern, one of the compassion-related states, is a powerful motive 
of volunteerism (Omoto, Malsch, & Barraza, 2009) and generally encourages altruistic 
behaviours towards those who suffer, even at a cost to oneself (Batson & Shaw, 1991).  
Moreover, Pagano and Huo (2007) showed that Americans¶ feelings of sympathy 
about the Iraqi war increased support for four different policy responses: humanitarian action 
to help Iraqi people obtain food and shelter, reparative action to compensate the Iraqi people 
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for the harm they have suffered, preventative action to reduce future political abuses against 
Iraqi people, and retributive action to punish Saddam Hussein and his collaborators. 
Sympathy was an especially important predictor of the humanitarian and reparative policies. 
Additionally, Iyer, Leach, and Crosby (2003) showed that European American SHRSOH¶V
sympathy about racial discrimination predicted their support for a policy that aimed to 
increase opportunities for those who had been disadvantaged by the inequality. Batson, 
Chang, Orr, and Rowland (2002) demonstrated that students, who were experimentally 
induced to feel more sympathy toward a heroin addict, were more willing to encourage their 
Student Union to allocate more of its budget to an agency that helps drug addicts, compared 
to participants in the control condition. 7KXVV\PSDWK\VHHPVWRLQFUHDVHSHRSOH¶V
willingness to help others.  
Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter aimed to introduce some of the key topic areas of this thesis. It 
highlighted the need for greater prosociality across societies and the potential for third parties 
to provide such helping. This chapter introduced the idea that moral emotions may be 
effective tools for motivating prosocial behaviours. Detailed summaries of moral elevation 
and moral outrage attest to their prosocial potential in particular. Similarly, brief overviews of 
guilt and sympathy also suggest that these two emotions are effective at promoting prosocial 
behaviours. The next chapter will identify and describe important gaps in the literature, which 
will then be addressed in this thesis.  
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Chapter 2 
Moral Elevation and Moral Outrage: Identifying the Key Gaps in the Literature 
This theoretical chapter identifies and describes the key gaps in the moral elevation 
and moral outrage literatures. First, this chapter identifies and highlights the need for 
research to examine the specific prosocial outcomes of moral emotions. It draws on the 
appraisal tendency framework (Horberg et al., 2011) which suggests that distinct emotions 
have specific and distinctive effects on judgments and behaviours. Drawing on this theory it 
is suggested that the prosocial effects of moral elevation and moral outrage may be 
distinctive and nuanced. This needs to be empirically tested. Second, this theoretical chapter 
highlights the need to examine the specific component features of moral emotions. 
Specifically, it proposes that research is necessary to examine the relationships between 
moral elevation and moral outrage, and stereotyping, self-focus, and approach-orientation in 
particular. This is because each of these component features has important prosocial 
implications.      
 
In order to fully understand the prosocial effectiveness of moral elevation and moral 
outrage, it is essential to examine both their prosocial outcomes (e.g., intentional and 
behavioural outcomes) as well as their specific component features (e.g., self-focus, 
approach-orientation). This chapter will first outline what is unknown in terms of the 
prosocial outcomes of moral elevation and moral outrage. It will then outline what is 
unknown in terms of the component features of moral elevation and moral outrage 
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Specificity of Prosocial Outcomes: The Appraisal Tendency Framework 
The existing evidence suggests that both moral elevation and moral outrage increase 
prosocial intentions and behaviours (see Chapter 1). Nevertheless, in order to maximise the 
prosocial effectiveness of moral elevation and moral outrage, it is important not just to know 
whether they influence prosocial behaviours but also which types of behaviours they 
influence and why. Indeed, research on the appraisal tendency framework (ATF) suggests 
that distinct emotions promote specific kinds of judgments and decisions as a function of 
their unique and distinctive cognitive appraisals (cf. Horberg et al., 2011; Lerner & Keltner, 
2000). 
The ATF draws on cognitive appraisal and functional (evolutionary) theories of 
emotion to understand how emotional experiences influence judgments and decisions (Lerner 
& Keltner, 2000). From cognitive appraisal theories of emotion, the ATF draws on the notion 
that a range of cognitive dimensions (rather than just valence) differentiates emotions from 
one another. From functional theories of emotion, the ATF draws on the notion that emotions 
trigger and coordinate effective responses (physiological, behavioural, experiential, and 
communicative), which enable a person to deal with situations, problems, or opportunities 
(Frijda, 1986; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1996). The ATF extends these theories and suggests 
that each emotion activates a cognitive predisposition to appraise situations in line with the 
central-appraisal dimensions that triggered the emotion ± termed appraisal tendency. In other 
ZRUGV³appraisal tendencies are goal-directed processes through which emotions exert 
effects on judgments and choice until the emotion-HOLFLWLQJSUREOHPLVUHVROYHG´/HUQHU	
Keltner, 2000, p. 477).  
Lerner and Keltner (2000) first developed the ATF as a response to the unique and 
KHDY\IRFXVRQHPRWLRQ¶VYDOHQFHWKHPDMRULW\RIVWXGLHVLQWKHOLWHUDWXUHKDYHFRPSDUHGWKH
effects of positive versus negative moods on judgments and decisions (e.g., Bower, 1991; 
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Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978; Johnson & Tversky, 1983). In general these studies find 
that positive moods induce positive judgments and negative moods induce negative 
MXGJPHQWV5HVHDUFKHUVHYHQVXJJHVWHGWKDW³WKHRQO\UHOHYDQWDVSHFWRIHPRWLRQLVWKHLU
YDOHQFH´(OVWHUSIURP+DQ/HUQHU & Keltner, 2007). However, according to 
ATF, emotions of the same valence (such as fear and anger) can exert opposing effects on 
judgments and decisions, while emotions of the opposite valence (such as anger and 
happiness) can exert similar effects (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & 
Kassam, 2015).  
Studies over the past decade have provided some initial support for the ATF. For 
example, Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein (2004) compared the effects of disgust and sadness 
on routine economic transactions. While both emotions are negative, their cognitive 
appraisals are distinctive. Sadness revolves around an appraisal theme of loss, while disgust 
revolves around an appraisal theme of being too close to an indigestible object or idea 
(Lazarus, 1991). Thus, when feeling sad people are motivated to change their circumstance, 
and when feeling disgust people are motivated to expel objects and avoid taking in anything 
new. In their study they hypothesised and found that, disgust would reduce choice prices as 
buying represents a potential source of contamination, whereas sadness would increase 
FKRLFHSULFHVDVEX\LQJRIIHUVDURXWHWRFKDQJHRQH¶VFXUUHQWFLUFXPVWDQces. Furthermore 
they hypothesised and found that both disgust and sadness would reduce selling prices as, for 
disgusted people reducing selling prices would offer an opportunity to get rid of current 
REMHFWVDQGIRUVDGSHRSOHLWZRXOGRIIHUDQRSSRUWXQLW\WRFKDQJHRQH¶VFLUFXPVWDQFH 
In another line of research, Iyer and colleagues (2007) showed that anger, guilt, and 
shame (all negative emotions) predicted distinct political action intentions in response to the 
American and British involvement in Iraq. Shame predicted intentions to support withdrawal 
from Iraq, anger predicted intentions to support confrontation of those responsible, to support 
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compensation to Iraq, and to support withdrawal from Iraq. Guilt did not predict any political 
action intentions. However, in a similar line of research, Pagano and Huo (2007) found that 
guilt predicted reparative actions. 
 Although the Iyer et al. and Pagano and Huo studies did not measure appraisals, the 
ATF would account for these distinct emotion-intention links as follows. The appraisal theme 
surrounding anger is that a person (or group) has transgressed some sort of societal standard 
(Frijda, 1986). Thus, anger should motivate action to undo the transgression or its effects. 
The appraisal theme surrounding guilt is that a person (or their ingroup) is responsible for 
specific negative actions (Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005). Thus, guilt 
should motivate action to undo the harm caused. The appraisal theme surrounding shame is 
similar to guilt but ZKLOHJXLOWIRFXVHVRQWKHEHKDYLRXU³,KDYHGRQHDEDGWKLQJ´VKDPH
focuses on tKHSHUVRQ¶VFKDUDFWHU³,DPDEDGSHUVRQ´1LHGHQWKDO7DQJQH\	*DYDQVNL
1994). Thus, shame should motivate avoidant behaviours to hide one¶s character. The Iyer et 
al. and Pagano and Huo findings seem to be in line with the appraisal tendency framework. 
Nevertheless, as appraisals were not measured, it is unclear whether the appraisal tendency 
framework can account for the differences in the effects of these emotions.  
 The Appraisal Tendency Framework and Moral Judgments 
The ATF has recently been extended to examine and understand the influence of 
distinct emotions on moral MXGJPHQWV+RUEHUJDQGFROOHDJXHV¶UHYLHZKLJKOLJKWVWKDW
certain emotions are instigated by appraisals linked to specific moral themes (e.g., Haidt & 
Graham, 2007; Rozin et al., 1999). For example, disgust, anger, and contempt derive from the 
distinct moral appraisal themes of purity, justice, and community roles respectively (Rozin et 
DO+RUEHUJDQGFROOHDJXHVVXJJHVWWKDWHDFKHPRWLRQ¶VPRUDODSSUDLVDOWKHPH
remains salient throughout the entire emotional state and colours subsequent moral judgments 
and behaviours by prioritising specific sociomoral concerns (or moral domains) that are 
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VHPDQWLFDOO\UHODWHGWRWKHHPRWLRQ¶VPRUDODSSUDLVDOWKHPH)RUH[DPSOHGisgust should 
influence moral judgments when purity concerns are salient, anger should influence moral 
judgments when justice concerns are salient, and moral elevation should influence moral 
judgments when virtue or benevolence concerns are salient.  
Importantly, Horberg and colleagues (2011) propose domain specificity. Domain 
specificity occurs when an emotion predominantly influences moral judgments about issues 
that express the associated sociomoral concern (vs. all sociomoral concerns). For example, 
disgust should primarily influence judgments relevant to purity concerns, while anger should 
primarily influence judgments relevant to justice concerns. There is some evidence for this 
notion. For example, people who are disgust-prone (vs. people who are not) show greater 
prejudice against homosexuals, but not towards African Americans (Tapias, Glaser, Keltner, 
Vasquez, & Wickens, 2007) and are especially likely to have conservative beliefs 
surrounding gay marriage and abortion, versus issues such as affirmative action (Inbar, 
Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009). Thus, research on disgust shows that its moral appraisal theme 
(purity) appears to guide its effects on moral judgments. Research has not yet examined 
whether the ATF can explain the effects of moral outrage and moral elevation. It is plausible 
that domain specificity only or predominantly appears for disgust. Furthermore, the majority 
of research has focused on moral judgments and attitudes but it is unclear whether the ATF 
can also account for behavioural effects. 
It is worth noting that the ATF has been criticised by some researchers. Specifically, 
psychological constructionist accounts of emotion posit general morality-emotion 
correspondences, rather than specific morality-emotion correspondences (see Cameron, 
Lindquist, & Gray, 2015 for review). Constructionists suggest that emotions depend on 
domain-general processes and vary across situations and cultures. Constructionists do 
MORAL ELEVATION AND MORAL OUTRAGE 36
   
 
acknowledge that emotion can be related to morality. However, they disagree with the notion 
that either morality or emotions can be divided into distinct types (Cameron et al., 2015).  
The current thesis will examine whether the ATF does (or does not) account for the 
effects of moral elevation and moral outrage on prosocial intentions (Chapter 3) and 
prosocial behaviour (Chapter 4). Examining moral elevation and moral outrage will provide a 
particularly effective test of the ATF. This is because while moral elevation and moral 
outrage derive from differing (perhaps even opposing) appraisals (i.e., appraisal of a moral 
virtue vs. appraisal of a moral transgression), they have convergent effects on prosociality 
(see Haidt, 2003; Chapter 1). Therefore, comparing the effects of moral elevation and moral 
outrage provides a direct test of whether these emotions increase prosociality across the 
sociomoral domains of benevolence and justice (see Figure 2.1), or whether their effects of 
domain specific (see Figure 2.2) (cf. Horberg et al., 2011).  
Some prior research is consistent with ATF and with the idea that moral outrage and 
moral elevation may have domain specific effects. Desteno, Petty, Rucker, Wegener, and 
Braverman (2004) showed that participants induced to feel interpersonal anger were more 
supportive of a tax increase when the appeal/message was framed in angering (mostly 
unfairness-relevant) terms. Participants induced to feel sadness were more supportive of a tax 
increase when the appeal/message was framed in saddening terms (mostly drawing on 
suffering, weakness, and need). Furthermore, Dasgupta, DeSteno, Williams, and Hunsinger 
(2009) showed that induced disgust increased bias against homosexuals but not Arabs, 
whereas the reverse was found for induced interpersonal anger. These studies did not measure 
moral appraisal themes but they do indicate that interpersonal anger (and perhaps by 
implication, moral outrage) may increase justice-relevant judgments.  
  





Figure 2.1. Depiction of the effects of moral elevation and moral outrage on prosociality when effects occur across sociomoral domains. 





Figure 2.2. Depiction of the effects of moral elevation and moral outrage on prosociality when effects are domain specific. 
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Another series of studies (Siegel, Thomson, & Navarro, 2014) examined whether 
moral elevation and gratitude have distinct effects on prosociality. Participants induced to 
feel moral elevation gave more to moral charities than did those induced to feel gratitude. 
Those induced to feel gratitude gave more to amoral charities than those induced to feel 
moral elevation. The researchers suggested that these differences occurred because moral 
elevation should encourage emulation of the exemplar whereas gratitude should encourage 
reciprocity. These differential outcomes suggest that the effects of moral elevation on 
behaviours are not merely due to positive valence, but rather involve specific underlying 
appraisals. The DeSteno et al. (2004), Dasgupta et al. (2009), and Siegel et al. (2014) studies 
did not examine moral appraisal themes, or how moral appraisal themes relate to emotional 
states and subsequent judgments and behaviours. However, they are consistent with the idea 
that moral elevation and moral outrage should have domain specific effects on behaviour.  
Chapters 3 and 4 will draw from the appraisal tendency framework to explicitly test 
whether moral elevation and moral outrage influence prosocial intentions and behaviours 
across the sociomoral domains of benevolence and justice, or whether their effects are 
domain specific (cf. Horberg et al., 2011).  
Component Features with Prosocial Implications 
Early theories of emotions have suggested that emotions can be distinguished 
according to their distinct component features (Frijda et al., 1989). These component features 
include (but are QRWOLPLWHGWRWKHHPRWLRQ¶VDSSUDLVDOVDFWLRQUHDGLQHVVRUDSSURDFK
orientation), action tendencies (Frijda, 1986; Frijda, 2009; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008), 
and attentional focus (Fredrickson, 2001). Importantly, some of these component features 
have direct implications for the prosocial potential of moral emotions.  
As discussed in Chapter 1+DLGW¶VPRGHOIRUprototypical moral emotions 
suggests that two specific component features, disinterested elicitors and action tendencies, 
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are crucial for understanding the prosocial effectiveness of moral emotions. Disinterested 
elicitors refer to the emotions that can be triggered even when there is no personal stake. 
Prosocial action tendencies refer to the degree to which the action tendency following the 
triggering event benefits others, or upholds the social order. Emotions high in both 
disinterested elicitors and prosocial action tendencies are prototypical moral emotions. Using 
these component features, Haidt (2003) suggested that elevation, outrage, sympathy, and guilt 
can be most intrinsically linked to the welfare of others, and thus most effective at inducing 
prosociality. Drawing on separate strands of the literature (outlined below), the current thesis 
proposes three additional component features that have implications for prosociality. These 
component features are: motivational orientation (approach vs. avoidance), stereotyping 
(paternalistic vs. non-paternalistic), and focus (self vs. other). Understanding the effects of 
moral elevation and moral outrage on these specific component features will help inform 
their prosocial effectiveness.  
Motivational Orientation 
Researchers have suggested that two systems inform and guide much of our 
behaviour. The behavioural activation system (BAS; Gray, 1982) manages appetitive and 
approach motivations and behaviours. The behavioural inhibition system (BIS; Gray, 1982) 
manages aversive, avoidant, and withdrawal-oriented motivations and behaviours. As part of 
their nature, emotions instigate an action readinessGHILQHGDVDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VUHDGLQHVVRU
unreadiness to engage with one¶VHQYLURQPHQWDOVRWHUPHGDFWLRQSRWHQWLDO or approach 
orientation). This action readiness can include moving toward, moving away, attending, 
rejecting, or moving against (Frijda et al., 1989). Some emotions are more likely to motivate 
behaviours that will move towards an object (e.g., approach, help, attack) while other 
emotions are more likely to motivate behaviours that will move away from an object (e.g., 
hide, avoid). The emotions that will be effective and useful in promoting prosociality will be 
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those that induce an approach orientation ± a desire to move towards an object, such as 
helping victims or punishing perpetrators of a transgression or emulating a moral exemplar 
by actively helping others.  This is because approach-oriented emotions will be most likely to 
encourage prosocial responses both in easy as well as in difficult situations (Algoe & Haidt, 
2009). 
Ample research shows that anger is an approach-oriented emotion (Carver & 
Harmon-Jones, 2009)ULMGDHWDO)RUH[DPSOHLQ5RVHPDQDQGFROOHDJXHV¶
UHVHDUFKUHFDOOLQJH[SHULHQFHVRIDQJHULQGXFHGEORRGUXVKLQJWKURXJKWKHERG\³WKDW\RX¶G






studies have shown that anger is consistently related to left anterior dominance (Damasio et 
al., 2000; Harmon-Jones, 2007; Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1998; Harmon-Jones & Sigelman, 
2001; Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, & Lawrence, 2003). Left anterior activity is widely 
understood as indicating an approach orientation, while right anterior activity indicates an 
avoidance orientation (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009). Given that the use of different 
terminology for anger versus moral outrage is due to conceptual rather than physiological 
differences (see Chapter 1), it is hypothesised that moral outrage also promotes an approach 
orientation.  
Nevertheless, little or no research has examined the approach orientation of moral 
elevation. Some researchers have examined similar constructs to moral elevation, such as 
being inspired and being moved. Specifically, Thrash and Elliot (2004) who examined 
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inspiration suggest that inspiration can provide energy for immediate action. Similarly, Frijda 
et al. (1989) examined pDUWLFLSDQW¶VUHFDOORIIHHOLQJ³PRYHG´)ULMGDDQGFROOHDJXHV¶
empirical findings found that feeling moved was an approach-oriented emotion. It instigated 
DGHVLUHWRDSSURDFK³,ZDQWHGWRDSSURDFKWRPDNHFRQWDFW´DQGDGHVLUHWRDWWHQG
Nevertheless, Thrash and Elliot (2004) and Frijda et al. (1989) did not specifically examine 
the motivational orientation of moral elevation.  
Algoe and Haidt (2009) did examine, albeit indirectly, the approach orientation of 
moral elevation in particular. Using recall (Study 1) and diaries (Study 2) they coded for 
participants¶ self-reported motivations and actions when they felt either: moral elevation, 
admiration, gratitude, or joy. 2QHRIWKHFRGHVZDV³HQHUJLVDWLRQ´ZKLFKZDVGHVFULEHGDV
³ZKHQSHRSOHLQGLFDWHGWKDt they wanted to do things like jump up and down, or shout with 
H[FLWHPHQW´STheir results showed that while admiration and joy involved 
HQHUJLVDWLRQPRUDOHOHYDWLRQGLGQRW7KLVOHGWKHPWRFRQFOXGHWKDWPRUDOHOHYDWLRQLV³D
calmer emotion which seems to increase openness and warmth towards others; it may not 
OHDGWRLPPHGLDWHDOWUXLVWLFDFWLRQZKHQVXFKDFWLRQLVGLIILFXOW´S0RUHRYHUWKH\QRWH
that moral elevation is associated with a release in oxytocin, which has sedative and stress-
reducing effects (Silvers & Haidt, 2008).  
$OJRHDQG+DLGW¶Vstudy used coding of participants¶ open-ended motivational 
VWDWHPHQWVDV³HQHUJLVDWLRQ´ to conceptualise elevation as an emotion that is low in approach-
orientation. However, this code seems unlikely to cover all aspects of the behavioural 
activation (i.e., the approach) system. Given this limitation and the contrasting hypotheses 
based on inferences from related research, it seems that further research is necessary to more 
concretely test the relationship between moral elevation and the behavioural activation 
(approach) and inhibition (avoidance) systems. Moreover, in order to develop a better 
understanding of the prosocial implications of moral elevation it is essential to directly test its 
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relationship with the behavioural activation and inhibition systems. Chapter 6 will address 
this gap in the literature. 
Stereotyping  
Paternalistic stereotyping occurs when groups are seen as high in warmth but low in 
competence. As paternalised groups (e.g., the elderly) are perceived as low status and 
dependent they tend to receive greater pity as well as helping (Fiske et al., 2002). 
Nevertheless, such helping does not come without its limitations. Recent empirical evidence 
has shown that paternalised people or groups tend to receive dependency-oriented rather than 
autonomy-oriented helping (Nadler & Chernyak-Hai, 2014). In dependency-oriented helping, 
the helper provides the full solution to a problem. Although this fulfils immediate needs, this 
type RIKHOSLQJUHVWULFWVWKHEHQHIDFWRU¶VVHOI-sufficiency over time. In autonomy-oriented 
helping, the helper provides only a partial solution to the problem. This type of helping fulfils 
immediate needs and provides the skills for self-sufficiency over time (Halabi & Nadler, 
2010). Thus, while paternalised people may receive more help (Fiske et al., 2002) this is 
likely to be dependency-oriented. Ultimately, such helping could be detrimental as it 
perpetuates dependence on high-status benefactors, rather than enabling recipients to become 
self-sufficient.  
Research has highlighted that sympathy runs the risk of leading to paternalistic 
stereotyping as it maintains high levels of disparity between the ingroup (i.e., the advantaged) 
and the outgroup (i.e., the disadvantaged) (Nadler & Halabi, 2006; Thomas et al., 2009). 
Sympathy may therefore induce helping that is contingent on dependency, which reaffirms 
status differentiation between the beneficiary and the victim. It is proposed that such helping 
can be problematic and perhaps termed as qualified. To date, no research has examined 
whether moral elevation and moral outrage also produce paternalistic stereotypes of the target 
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group. Testing this will inform the prosocial implications of moral elevation and moral 
outrage. Chapter 7 will address this gap in the literature.  
Self-Focus 
Emotions vary in the extent to which they instigate a self- or other-focus. Research 
shows that, as other-focused emotions draw attention to the needs of the disadvantaged, 
other-focused emotions motivate helping focused on the needs of others (altruistic 
motivation). In contrast, as self-IRFXVHGHPRWLRQVGUDZDWWHQWLRQWRRQH¶VRZQFLUFXPVWDQFH
self-IRFXVHGHPRWLRQVPRWLYDWHKHOSLQJWKDWSULPDULO\DOOHYLDWHVRQH¶VRZQGLVWUHVVHJRLVtic 
motivation; Batson et al., 1988; Batson & Shaw, 1991).  
Research has highlighted that due to its self-focused nature, guilt runs the risk of 
leading to normative and strategic responses primarily aimed at overcoming the self-focused 
negative state (Hopkins et al., 2007; van Leeuwen, 2007), which may then be associated with 
egoistic rather than altruistic action (Iyer, Leach, & Pedersen, 2004; McGarty et al., 2005). 
No research has examined whether moral elevation and moral outrage also produce a self-
focus. Testing this will inform the prosocial implications of moral elevation and moral 
outrage. Chapter 7 will address this gap in the literature.  
Summary 
Prosocial Outcomes 
This theoretical chapter highlights the importance of investigating the specific 
prosocial outcomes of moral emotions. The appraisal tendency framework (Horberg et al., 
2011) suggests that distinct moral emotions have nuanced and distinctive effects on 
judgments and behaviours. Drawing on the ATF, it is proposed that while moral elevation 
and moral outrage both promote prosocial intentions and behaviours (see Chapter 1), they 
may in fact stimulate distinctive types of prosocial outcomes. Employing the appraisal 
tendency framework to test the prosocial effects of moral elevation and moral outrage would 
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not only further inform theory but it would also inform important practical interventions (e.g., 
charitable campaigns) aimed at promoting prosocial action. Chapters 4 and 5 will address 
this gap in the literature and employ the appraisal tendency theory to test and compare the 
prosocial outcomes (intentional and behavioural) of moral elevation and moral outrage.  
Component Features 
It is essential to consider and empirically test the component features of moral 
emotions. +DLGW¶VPRGHO of moral emotion prototypicality highlights two useful 
component features for identifying prosocially effective emotions. In this thesis three 
additional component features are highlighted that could distinctively mark the prosocial 
quality of responses emanating from moral emotions. The effects of moral elevation or moral 
outrage on motivational orientation (approach vs. avoidance), stereotyping (paternalistic vs. 
non-paternalistic), and focus (self vs. other) are unknown. This will be the primary focus of 
Chapters 6 and 7.   
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Chapter 3 reports the findings of the pilot tests conducted for this thesis. Pilot Study 1 
tested the effects of an elevation-inducing, an outrage-inducing, and a control stimulus on 
emotion ratings. Pilot Study 2 tested the effect of an additional outrage-inducing stimulus on 
emotion ratings. Pilot Study 3 tested whether political orientation moderated the effects of the 
emotion-inducing stimuli on emotion ratings. The three pilot studies provide evidence for the 
effectiveness of the emotion-inducing stimuli used in this thesis.  
 
The current thesis examines the potential of moral emotions for promoting prosocial 
responses. Prosocial responses occur when people (want to) expend effort to help others 
(Penner et al., 2005). Evidence shows that moral emotions can motivate a range of prosocial 
responses (for reviews see Haidt, 2003; Tangney et al., 2007; see also Chapter 1). +DLGW¶V
(2003) model of moral emotion prototypicality suggests that four moral emotions may be 
particularly effective for increasing prosociality. These four moral emotions are: sympathy, 
guilt, moral elevation and moral outrage. The current thesis will focus on the latter two 
emotions (see Chapter 1).  
In order to test the effects of moral elevation and moral outrage on prosocial outcomes 
(Chapters 4 and 5) and component features (Chapters 6 and 7), it is essential to first pilot 
relevant emotion-inducing stimuli. The current chapter tests and reports the effectiveness of 
novel stimuli in inducing relevant emotions.  
Moral Elevation 
Moral elevation is a positive emotion felt when witnessing another person perform a 
virtuous act, one that improves the welfare of others (Algoe & Haidt, 2009). Moral elevation 
motivates people to emulate the exemplar and become a better person oneself (Algoe & 
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Haidt, 2009; Haidt, 2003). Recent evidence suggests that inducing participants to feel 
elevated motivates a range of prosocial behaviours including donating money to charity 
(Freeman et al., 2009), helping the experimenter (Schnall et al., 2010), and mentoring less 
experienced colleagues (Thomson et al., 2014).  
In order to effectively induce moral elevation, a stimulus must demonstrate another 
SHUVRQ¶VDFWRUDFWVRIPRUDOYLUWXH$FWVRIPRUDOYLUWXHW\SLFally consist of extreme acts of 
kindness and/or forgiveness (Jefferson, 1771/1975). Extreme acts of kindness and forgiveness 
are those that are extraordinary and challenging.  
The majority of past research has induced moral elevation using short video clips 
(e.g., Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Freeman et al., 2009; Lai et al., 2014; Oliver et al., 2015; Schnall 
et al., 2010; Schnall & Roper, 2012; Silvers & Haidt, 2008). Other research has induced 
moral elevation using written stories (e.g., Aquino et al., 2011; Freeman et al., 2009; 
Thomson & Siegel, 2013; Thomson et al., 2014; Vianello et al., 2010) or recall (e.g., Algoe & 
Haidt, 2009; Aquino et al., 2011; Siegel et al., 2014; Thomson & Siegel, 2013). Some 
research has measured (rather than manipulated) moral elevation (e.g., Diessner et al., 2013; 
Diessner, Solom, Frost, Parsons, & Davidson, 2008; Landis et al., 2009; Vianello et al., 2010; 
see Table 3.1).  
In order to induce feelings of moral elevation, Freeman and colleagues (2009) used a 
video clip about Amy Biehl; a white American activist in South Africa. Amy Biehl was 
murdered by Black youths while volunteering to help end apartheid. Rather than seeking 
YHQJHDQFH$P\¶VSDUHQWVHVWDEOLVKHGDQGIXQGHGWKH$P\%LHKO)RXQGDWLRQWRFRQWLQXH
$P\¶VZRUN7KHIRXQGDtion funded 15 programs and helped thousands of people including 
WZRRIWKH\RXWKVFRQYLFWHGRI$P\¶VPXUGHU7KLVYLGHRFOLSVKRZVERWKH[WUHPHDFWVRI
kindness as well as forgiveness. In their research, the video successfully induced feelings of 
moral elevation (Freeman et al., 2009). Many morally elevating stories such as this one exist. 
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Indeed, scholars have drawn on a range of elevation-inducing videos and stories to test the 
prosocial effects of moral elevation (see Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Aquino et al., 2011; Freeman 
et al., 2009; Oliver et al., 2015; Schnall et al., 2010).    
Moral Outrage 
Moral outrage is a negative emotion felt when witnessing another person transgress a 
moral standard (usually a moral standard of justice, fairness, or equality) that harms another 
person or group of people (Thomas et al., 2009). Moral outrage motivates people to reduce 
the harm done by compensating the victims and/or punishing the perpetrators (Lotz et al., 
2011). Empirical evidence has shown that moral outrage about injustices or unfairness is 
related to compensation (Lotz et al., 2011), altruistic punishment (Lotz et al., 2011; Nelissen 
& Zeelenberg, 2009), social justice efforts (Iyer et al., 2007; van Zomeren et al., 2004), 
donations (Montada & Schneider, 1989), volunteering (Montada & Schneider, 1989), and 
boycotting intentions against unethical corporations (Grappi et al., 2013; Lindenmeier et al., 
2012).  
In order to effectively induce moral outrage, a stimulus must demonstrate another 
SHUVRQ¶VDFWRUDFWVRIPRral transgression. Acts of moral transgressions typically occur 
when a person violates standards of fairness, equality, and/or justice (Thomas et al., 2009). 
Thus, in order to effectively induce moral outrage, a stimulus must demonstrate an 
unfairness, inequality, or injustice that adversely affects another person or group of people.  
The majority of past research has induced moral outrage using short stories or 
vignettes (e.g., Agerström & Björklund, 2009; Batson, Chao, & Givens, 2009; Glasford, 
2013; Glasford & Pratto, 2014; Lindenmeier et al., 2012; Thomas & McGarty, 2009; van 
Zomeren et al., 2004). Some research has induced moral outrage using video clips (e.g., 
Glasford, 2013; Sullivan, Landau, & Kay, 2016). A large proportion of research has 
measured, rather than manipulated, moral outrage (e.g., Lodewijkx et al., 2008; Saab et al., 
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2015; Pagano & Huo, 2007; Thomas et al., 2015; Wakslak et al., 2007). Finally, some 
research used a general vignette to set the context of the study (e.g., the war in Iraq) and then 
measured feelings of moral outrage (Fernando, Kashima, & Laham, 2014; Iyer et al., 2007; 
Rothschild et al., 2013; van Zomeren & Lodewijkx, 2005; van Zomeren et al., 2011; see 
Table 3.1).  
In order to induce feelings of moral outrage, Sullivan and colleagues (2016) showed 
participants two video clips that formed part of the Kony 2012 campaign. The video clips 
demonstrate the war crimes perpetrated by Joseph Kony, which include the forced 
recruitment of child soldiers. One of the main people featured was a young Ugandan named 
-DFRE$YD\HZKRVHEURWKHUZDVNLOOHGE\.RQ\¶VPLOLWLDJURXSThe video clip shows 
violations of justice, fairness, and equality and successfully induced feelings of moral 
outrage. Similarly to stories of virtue, many stories of injustices or inequalities exist. Indeed, 
most research has used distinct outrage-inducing videos or stories; developed or retrieved for 
the particular study (e.g., Agerström & Björklund, 2009; Batson et al., 2009; Glasford, 2013; 
Glasford & Pratto, 2014; Lindenmeier et al., 2012; Sullivan et al., 2016; Thomas & McGarty, 
2009; van Zomeren et al., 2004).  
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Table 3.1 
Overview of Past Approaches and Manipulations used to Instigate Feelings of Moral Elevation and Moral Outrage  
Approach used Moral elevation Moral outrage 
Emotion-inducing videos Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Freeman et al., 2009  
Lai et al., 2014; Oliver et al., 2015 
Schnall et al., 2010; Schnall & Roper, 2012 
Silvers & Haidt, 2008 
 
Glasford, 2013; Sullivan et al., 2016 
Emotion-inducing stories / 
vignettes 
Aquino et al., 201; Freeman et al., 2009  
Thomson & Siegel, 2013; Thomson et al., 2014 
Vianello et al., 2010 
 
Agerström & Björklund, 2009 
Batson, Chao, & Givens, 2009; Glasford, 2013 
Glasford & Pratto, 2014 
Lindenmeier et al., 2012  
Thomas & McGarty, 2009 
van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004 
 
Emotion-inducing recall tasks Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Aquino et al., 2011 
Siegel et al., 2014; Thomson & Siegel, 2013 
 
 
Authors measured rather than 
manipulated the emotion  
Diessner et al., 2008, 2013; Landis et al., 2009  
Vianello et al., 2010 
Lodewijkx et al., 2008; Saab et al., 2015 
Pagano & Huo, 2007; Thomas et al., 2015 
 Wakslak et al., 2007 
 
Authors employed general 
vignette to set the context and 
then measured the emotion 
 Fernando, Kashima, & Laham, 2014 
Iyer et al., 2007; Rothschild et al., 2013 
van Zomeren & Lodewijkx, 2005 
van Zomeren et al., 2011 
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The Current Research 
The primary aim of this thesis is to test, compare, and understand the effects of moral 
elevation and moral outrage on prosociality. In order to achieve this aim it is essential to first 
evaluate whether elevation-inducing and outrage-inducing stimuli effectively induce feelings 
of moral elevation and moral outrage, respectively. This chapter reports three pilot studies 
which test the effects of elevation-inducing, outrage-inducing, and control stimuli on feelings 
of moral elevation and moral outrage.  
Given the evidence demonstrating that outrage-inducing videos (vs. written stories) 
are most effective for increasing feelings of moral outrage (Glasford, 2013) and given that the 
majority of moral elevation research employed video clips (as opposed to other types of 
stimuli), the current chapter will pilot the effectiveness of elevation-inducing and outrage-
inducing video clips (rather than written stories) on feelings of moral elevation and moral 
outrage, respectively.  
Furthermore, in order to ensure equivalence across all videos (moral elevation, moral 
outrage, and control) in terms of length and style (e.g., interview vs. documentary vs. movie), 
novel (rather than existing) elevation-inducing and outrage-inducing stimuli are piloted.  
Pilot Study 1 (N = 78) tests the effects of an elevation-inducing, an outrage-inducing, 
and a control stimulus on ratings of moral elevation and moral outrage. Pilot Study 2 (N = 61) 
tests the effect of an additional outrage-inducing video on ratings of moral outrage. Pilot 
Study 3 (N = 59) tests whether political orientation moderates the effects of the elevation-
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Pilot Study 1 
Method 
Participants and design. The initial sample consisted of ninety-nine participants 
(77.8% female) with a mean age of 20.90 years (SD = 4.64). Participants were randomly 
assigned to condition in a one factor between-participants design with three levels 
(Condition: Elevation vs. Outrage vs. Control). Participants were psychology students who 
took part for course credit.  
Procedure. All participants provided informed consent. Participants then viewed the 
moral elevation, moral outrage, or control video. Participants then responded to the emotion 
measures. Participants received (on-line) debrief upon completion. 
Participant restrictions. Data analyses were restricted to British participants for two 
reasons. First, moral elevation and moral outrage are both other-oriented emotions which are 
elicited by events not directly related to the self (Englander et al., 2012; Haidt, 2003; Lotz et 
al., 2011). Ample research shows that a person¶VJURXSPHPEHUVKLSVWURQJO\LQIOXHQFHVWKHLU
attitudes, feelings, and behaviours (Abrams & Hogg, 2010). As nationality of targets was 
relatively salient in the videos, we ensured that all targets were out-group members (Northern 
Ireland, the DRC and the U.S.). Second, well-established research shows important cross-
cultural differences in domains such as fairness and cooperation (cf. Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010). Unfortunately, examining the cross-cultural differences in the effects of 
moral elevation and moral outrage on prosociality is beyond the scope of this thesis. To avoid 
any confounding effects of culture we restricted data analyses to British participants in Pilot 
Study 1 and in Studies 1, 3, 4, and 8 and to American participants in Pilot Studies 2 and 3 and 
in Studies 2, 5, 6, and 7. This restriction left a sample of 78 participants (74.4% female) in the 
current pilot study.  
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Experimental manipulations.  
Moral elevation. This pilot study tested the effectiveness of a 2.14-minute 
documentary-style video clip that described the story of a man (Richard Moore) who was 
shot between the eyes by rubber bullet, which permanently blinded him at the age of 10. It 
shows how he was able to forgive the perpetrator, take a positive attitude to life, and spend 
his life helping others. Thus, this video demonstrates extreme acts of kindness and 
forgiveness (see Appendix A).   
Moral outrage. An extract from a BBC documentary was piloted (2.42-minutes) in 
which a journalist reports how a (wealthy) financial speculator from the U.S. bought a three 
million dollar debt that Congo owed to former Yugoslavia for power lines. The financial 
speculators increased the debt to 100 million dollars, now demanding back that amount. The 
journalist also interviewed relevant Congo locals and international volunteers to show the 
extent of the cholera epidemic and the need for this money in Congo. Thus, this video clip 
shows violations of justice, fairness, and equality which adversely affected others (see 
Appendix A).  
Control. Similarly to Schnall et al. (2010) we also employed a nature video for our 
control stimulus (2.42-minutes) ± a National Geographic Channel documentary on 
Wildebeest Migration (see Appendix A). 
Measures. Participants responded to all items on a 9-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 
9 (very much). All items (described below) were presented on the same page and the 
presentation of all items was randomised.   
Moral elevation. Moral elevation was assessed by asking participants to rate the 
extent to which they felt: inspired, awe, and admiration (Aquino et al., 2011; Freeman et al., 
7KHLWHP³XSOLIWHG´ZDVDGGHGDVSULQFLSDOFRPSRQHQWVDQDO\VHVVKRZHGWKDWLWORDGHG
well on the moral elevation factor. Specifically, a principal components analysis was 
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conducted on the four items (uplifted, awe, admiration, inspired) using a maximum likelihood 
extraction and direct oblimin rotation. Results showed that all items loaded onto one factor 
(Eigenvalue = 3.11; Percentage of variance explained = 77.67). Factor loadings were as 
follows: uplifted (.82), awe (.77), admiration (.91), and inspired (.84). &URQEDFK¶VDOSKDZDV
.90. A mean score of the four items was computed to form the moral elevation measure (see 
Appendix B).  
Moral outrage. Moral outrage was assessed by asking participants to rate the extent to 
which they felt: angry, infuriated, outraged, and contempt (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011). 
&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDZDVA mean score of the four items was computed to form the moral 
outrage measure (see Appendix B). 
Results and Discussion 
Analyses of variance were conducted to test the effects of Condition (Elevation vs. 
Outrage vs. Control) on feelings of moral elevation and moral outrage. Results revealed a 
significant effect of Condition on feelings of moral elevation F (2, 75) = 32.65, p < .001, Ș2 
=.47 and on feelings of moral outrage F (2, 75) = 54.70, p < .001, Ș2 =.59.  
Pairwise comparisons revealed that participants who viewed the elevation-inducing 
video scored higher on feelings of moral elevation (M = 6.75, SE = 0.36, p¶VWKDQ
participants who viewed the outrage-inducing (M = 2.92, SE = 0.37) or control (M = 3.47, SE 
= 0.36) videos. Feelings of moral elevation did not differ between the moral outrage and 
control videos (p = .289). 
Furthermore, pairwise comparisons showed that participants who viewed the outrage-
inducing video scored higher on feelings of moral outrage (M = 5.90, SE = 0.31) than 
participants who viewed the elevation-inducing (M = 2.26, SE = 0.31) or control (M = 1.69, 
SE = 0.30) videos. Feelings of moral outrage did not differ between the moral elevation and 
control videos (p = .191).  
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Pilot Study 1 showed that the elevation-inducing and outrage-inducing videos were 
effective at increasing feelings of moral elevation and moral outrage, respectively. As 
expected, the control video did not promote feelings of moral elevation or moral outrage. The 
piloted emotion-inducing and control videos are deemed suitable for use in this thesis.  
Pilot Study 2 
Pilot Study 1 was conducted with a British sample. However, some of the studies in 
this thesis are conducted with American samples (Pilot Study 3 and Studies 2, 5, and 6). To 
ensure that moral outrage rather than guilt (due to nationality) is instigated, Pilot Study 2 tests 
the effectiveness of an outrage-inducing video to be used in the studies with American 
samples. 
Method 
Participants and design. Sixty-one (52.5% female) American participants with a 
mean age of 35.28 years (SD = 10.65) completed an on-line questionnaire. Participants were 
VDPSOHGIURP$PD]RQ¶V0HFKDQLFDO7XUNa site for web-based data collection that functions 
through a participant compensation system. Research suggests that MTurk offers a more 
diverse participant pool than other sampling methods, but retains a good to excellent quality 
of data which exceed the psychometric standards associated with published research 
(Buhrmester, Kawng, & Gosling, 2011). Participants were randomly assigned to condition in 
a one factor between-participants design with two levels (Condition: Outrage vs. Control).  
Procedure. All participants provided informed consent. Participants viewed either the 
outrage-inducing or control video. They then responded to the emotion measures. Participants 
received an (on-line) debrief upon completion. 
Experimental manipulations. The control video from Pilot Study 1 was employed 
(2.42-minutes in length). The new outrage-inducing video was a 2.58-minute documentary-
style video, which demonstrated how a British multinational company dodged taxes in 
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Zambia, and how this negatively affected the people in Zambia (a small-business owner in 
Zambia pays more a year in tax than the multinational company). Thus, this video clip shows 
violations of justice, fairness, and equality which adversely affected others (see Appendix A). 
Measures. The same moral outrage measure was used as in Pilot Study 1 (see 
Appendix B). Participants responded on a 7-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). 
All items were presented on the same page and the order of items was randomised.  
Results and Discussion 
Analyses of variance were conducted to test the effect of Condition (Outrage vs. 
control) on feelings of moral outrage. Results revealed a significant effect of Condition, F (1, 
59) = 163.51, p < .001, Ș2 =.74. Participants who viewed the outrage-inducing video scored 
higher on feelings of moral outrage (M = 5.02, SE = 0.18) than those who viewed the control 
video (M = 1.38, SE = 0.22).  
Pilot Study 2 showed that the alternative outrage-inducing video (for use with 
American samples) also increased feelings of moral outrage (vs. the control condition). Thus, 
the outrage-inducing video is deemed suitable for use in this thesis.  
Pilot Study 3 
Pilot Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated the effects of elevation-inducing, outrage-
inducing, and control videos on feelings of moral elevation and moral outrage. Pilot Study 3 
extends these findings by testing whether these effects are moderated by political orientation.  
According to moral foundation theory (Graham et al., 2009) liberals construct their 
moral system primarily upon two moral foundations ± Harm/care (e.g., whether or not 
someone is harmed) and Fairness/reciprocity (e.g., whether or not people are treated 
differently than others). In contrast, conservatives construct moral systems more evenly upon 
five moral foundations ± Harm/care, Fairness/reciprocity, Ingroup/loyalty (e.g., whether or 
not someone does something to betray his or her group), Authority/respect (e.g., whether or 
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not the people involved are of the same rank or status), and Purity/sanctity (e.g., whether or 
not someone does something disgusting). Moreover, liberals are more concerned with 
Harm/care and Fairness/reciprocity compared to conservatives and conservatives are more 
concerned with Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, and Purity/sanctity compared to liberals.  
The current chapter examines emotional reactions to moral (i.e., virtues) and immoral 
(i.e., transgressions) acts. Based on moral foundation theory, it seems plausible that political 
orientation may moderate the effects of witnessing moral and immoral acts on emotional 
responses. Specifically, it is hypothesised that political orientation and the emotion-inducing 
stimulus (Elevation vs. Outrage) interact to predict feelings of moral outrage. Specifically, as 
liberals prioritise Harm/care and Fairness/reciprocity foundations to a greater extent than 
conservatives, they should feel more moral outrage when witnessing immoral acts that show 
inequality, injustice, and unfairness. It is unclear whether morally virtuous acts (i.e., extreme 
acts of kindness and/or forgiveness) fall into the Harm/care domain or the Purity/sanctity 
GRPDLQ%HLQJNLQGWRRWKHUVLQYROYHVFDULQJDERXWRWKHU¶VIHHOLQJVDQGQHHGVLHWKH
Harm/care domain). Nevertheless, in one of Graham et al.¶s studies, an item in the 
3XULW\VDQFWLW\GRPDLQZDV³:KHWKHURUQRWVRPHRQHDFWHGLQDYLUWXRXVRUXSOLIWLQJZD\´
(Graham et al., 2009, Study 2). However, items for the Purity/sanctity domain across the 
RWKHUVWXGLHVODUJHO\DGGUHVVHG³GLVJXVWLQJ´RU³UHYROWLQJ´EHKDYLRXUV,WLVSODXVLEOHthat 
morally virtuous acts span these two domains. As liberals prioritise Harm/care and 
conservatives prioritise Purity/sanctity, political orientation should not (or not strongly) affect 
the influence of witnessing moral acts on feelings of moral elevation.     
Testing the moderating role of political orientation in this pilot study will uncover 
whether it should be employed as a factor or covariate in this thesis.   
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Method 
Participants and design. Fifty-nine (27.1% female) American participants with a 
mean age of 31.56 years (SD = 9.78) completed an on-line questionnaire. Participants were 
VDPSOHGIURP$PD]RQ¶V0HFKDQLFDO7XUN3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHUDQGRPO\DVVLJQHGWRFRQGLWLRQ
in a one factor between-participants design with two levels (Condition: Elevation vs. 
Outrage).  
Procedure. All participants provided informed consent. Participants viewed either the 
elevation-inducing or outrage-inducing video. Participants then responded to the emotion and 
political orientation measures. Participants received (on-line) debrief upon completion. 
Experimental manipulations. The elevation-inducing video from Pilot Study 1 was 
employed (2.14-minutes in length). As the sample was American, the outrage-inducing video 
from Pilot Study 2 was employed (2.58-minutes in length) (see Appendix A).  
Measures. Participants responded to all measures on a 7-point scale from 1 (not at 
all) to 7 (very much). All elevation and outrage items were presented on the same page and 
the order of items was randomised. Political orientation was measured along with 
demographic variables at the end of the study.  
Moral elevation and outrage. The same measures for moral elevation and moral 
outrage were used as in Pilot Studies 1 and 2 (see Appendix B).  
Political orientation. Political orientation was measured by asking participants to rate 
their political beliefs from 1 (strongly liberal) to 7 (strongly conservative) (Graham et al., 
2012).  
Results and Discussion 
Emotions. Analyses of variance were conducted to test the effects of Condition 
(Elevation vs. Outrage) on feelings of moral elevation and moral outrage. Results revealed a 
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significant effect of Condition on feelings of moral elevation F (1, 57) = 43.15, p < .001, Ș2 
=.43 and on feelings of moral outrage F (1, 57) = 50.16, p < .001, Ș2 =.47. 
Specifically, participants who viewed the elevation-inducing video scored higher on 
feelings of moral elevation (M = 5.24, SE = 0.26) than participants who viewed the outrage-
inducing video (M = 2.88, SE = 0.24). Similarly, participants who viewed the outrage-
inducing video scored higher on feelings of moral outrage (M = 4.92, SE = 0.27) than 
participants who viewed the elevation-inducing video (M = 2.10, SE = 0.29). These findings 
are in line with Pilot Studies 1 and 2.  
Moderation analyses0RGHUDWLRQDQDO\VHV+D\HV¶3URFHVVPDFURPRGHO
with 5000 bootstraps) were conducted to test whether political orientation moderated the 
effect of Condition (Elevation vs. Outrage) on feelings of moral elevation and on feelings of 
moral outrage. Results showed that Condition and political orientation did not interact to 
predict feelings of moral elevation (B = 0.12, SE = 0.22, t = 0.56, p = .576). Instead, in line 
with the ANOVA results, there was a main effect of Condition (B = -2.83, SE = 0.86, t = -
3.28, p = .002). Similarly, results showed that Condition and political orientation did not 
interact to predict feelings of moral outrage (B = 0.09, SE = 0.24, t = 0.40, p = .694). Instead, 
in line with the ANOVA results, there was a main effect of Condition (B = 2.61, SE = 0.94, t 
= 2.79, p = .007).  
Pilot Study 3 showed that political orientation did not moderate the effects of the 
outrage-inducing and elevation-inducing stimuli on ratings of moral outrage and moral 
elevation, respectively. While the moral outrage finding is contrary to the hypothesis, it can 
also be viewed as in line with moral foundation theory. Specifically, while liberals prioritise 
Harm/care more strongly than conservatives, conservatives prioritise the Harm/care 
foundation equally strongly as the four remaining moral foundations. Therefore, liberals and 
conservatives should both feel morally outraged when witnessing an 
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inequality/injustice/unfairness. Political orientation will therefore not be examined as a factor 
or covariate in this thesis.  
A-Priori Power Analyses 
A-priori power analyses were conducted to establish the sample sizes required for the 
studies reported in this thesis. Across Pilot Studies 1 to 3 the effect sizes for the effects of the 
emotion-inducing stimuli on reported emotions were very large Ș2 > .43). Power analyses 
showed that 20 to 25 participants per cell would be sufficient to detect medium to large 
effects.   
Conclusion 
This chapter presented the pilot studies conducted for this thesis. These were 
necessary to establish the effectiveness of emotion-inducing stimuli for inducing feelings of 
moral elevation and moral outrage. The emotion-inducing videos were deemed suitable as 
they effectively increased the relevant emotions. That is, the outrage-inducing stimuli 
increased feelings of moral outrage but not feelings of moral elevation and the elevation-
inducing stimulus increased feelings of moral elevation but not feelings of moral outrage. 
Moreover, the elevation-inducing and outrage-inducing stimuli increased feelings of moral 
elevation and moral RXWUDJHUHVSHFWLYHO\UHJDUGOHVVRISDUWLFLSDQWV¶SROLWLFDORULHQWDWLRQAs 
expected, the control video did not promote feelings of moral elevation or moral outrage, and 
is therefore deemed suitable for use in this thesis. The studies in this thesis will employ these 
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Chapter 4 
Testing the Prosocial Effectiveness of the Prototypical Moral Emotions: Elevation Increases 
Benevolence Intentions and Outrage Increases Justice Intentions 
How can we overcome apathy and instigate a desire to help others? This chapter tests 
and compares the prosocial effects of two of the most prototypical emotions on a range of 
prosocial intentions. Although moral elevation and moral outrage derive from opposing 
appraisals, separate strands of research show that they both instigate a desire to help others. 
The current research tests the appraisal tendency framework to explore whether moral 
elevation and moral outrage increase prosociality across moral domains or whether their 
prosocial effects are domain specific. Results of Study 1 showed that moral elevation, but not 
moral outrage, (marginally) increased benevolent helping intentions (i.e., benevolence 
domain). Study 2 showed that moral outrage, but not moral elevation, increased prosocial 
political action intentions (i.e., justice domain). The findings show that although moral 
elevation and moral outrage both inspire a desire to help others, they affect distinct types of 
prosocial intentions, offering support for the appraisal tendency framework. Applied and 
theoretical implications are discussed. 3 
 
                                                 
 
3
 Study 2 reported in this chapter forms part of the published manuscript, Van de Vyver, J., & Abrams, D. 
(2015) Testing the prosocial effectiveness of the prototypical moral emotions: Elevation increases benevolent 
behaviors and outrage increases justice behaviors. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 58, 23-33. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2014.12.005 
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High levels of poverty and inequality persist, with 22 percent of the developing 
ZRUOG¶VSRSXODWLRQVWLOOOLYLQJLQH[WUHPHSRYHUW\7KH:RUOG%DQN<HWPDQ\SHRSOH
remain as bystanders to these inequalities (Singer, 2009). This global wealth anomaly 
highlights the need for research to understand how we can mobilise people to take action to 
help others less fortunate than themselves. The current research contributes to this issue by 
testing the prosocial effects of two particularly powerful moral emotions ± moral elevation 
and moral outrage (Haidt, 2003; see also Chapter 1). Once their effects are better understood 
they could inform real-world interventions aimed at fostering greater prosocial action.  
Increasingly, research demonstrates that moral emotions can mobilise people to help 
others (i.e., prosociality; Tangney et al., 2007). 0RUDOHPRWLRQVDUH³WKRVHWKDWDUHOLQNHGWR
the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge 
RUDJHQW´+DLGWSFor example, disgust, moral outrage, moral elevation, 
admiration, sympathy, and gratitude can all be considered as moral emotions (Haidt, 2003). 
The current chapter will test the prosocial effects of two moral emotions in particular ± moral 
elevation and moral outrage.  
Moral Elevation and Moral Outrage 
Moral elevation is felt when witnessing another person perform a virtuous act that 
helps another person or benefits society (Algoe & Haidt, 2009). Moral elevation motivates 
people to emulate the exemplar, become a better person oneself, and help others (Algoe & 
Haidt, 2009; Haidt, 2003). Evidence from (the relatively few) studies on moral elevation 
suggests that it inspires helping. For example, participants in moral elevation conditions (vs. 
control conditions) are more likely to volunteer for a subsequent study and spend longer 
helping the experimenter with a tedious task (Schnall et al., 2010). Moral elevation attenuates 
the negative effect of social dominance orientation on donations (Freeman et al., 2009). 
Moral elevation is related to long-term volunteering in college students (Cox, 2010). 
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Individual differences in moral elevation predict caring, empathy, and love toward others, as 
well as valuing benevolence (Diessner et al., 2013). Thus, research shows clear evidence for 
the notion that moral elevation increases prosocial responses. Given this prosocial potential, 
moral elevation warrants further research in order to develop a more detailed theoretical 
understanding of its effects, and therefore its applied use. 
Moral outrage is a negative emotion and is felt when witnessing another person 
transgress a moral standard (usually a moral standard of justice, fairness, or equality) that 
results in harm against another person or group of people (Thomas et al., 2009). Research 
shows that moral outrage increases a range of prosocial intentions and behaviours. For 
example, Montada and Schneider (1989) showed that, following exposure to stories of 
poverty, moral outrage rather than guilt or negative affect predicted prosocial intentions 
including donating money and participating in a demonstration. Thomas and McGarty (2009) 
found that in opinion-based groups, inducing a moral outrage norm increased commitment to 
WKH³ZDWHUIRUOLIH´FDPSDLJQHJDWtending a fundraiser). Wakslak and colleagues (2007) 
found that moral outrage mediated the relationship between system justification, which has 
been widely implicated in helping behaviours, and intentions to support community programs 
(e.g., donating money, volunteering) and support for the redistribution of resources. Thus, 
while it is a negative emotion, moral outrage has positive effects and encourages people to 
help others. Given this prosocial potential, moral outrage also warrants further research in 
order to develop a more detailed theoretical understanding of its effects, and therefore its 
applied use. 
While research shows that moral elevation and moral outrage increase prosociality, 
less is known about the types of prosocial intentions and behaviours that these emotions 
induce. Specifically, it is unclear whether moral elevation and moral outrage motivate 
distinctive types of prosociality, or whether they motivate a general desire to be prosocial, 
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and therefore promote any type of prosocial intention and/or behaviour. For example, while 
moral elevation and moral outrage are highly distinctive emotions (i.e., their appraisals differ, 
they have a different valence), evidence shows that they have convergent effects on 
prosociality. An important question for research is whether elevation and outrage influence 
similar types of prosociality (consistent with their separate research strands in the literature) 
or whether their effects are more specific and distinctive (consistent with the appraisal 
tendency framework; Horberg et al., 2011). This can only be tested if the prosocial effects of 
moral elevation and moral outrage are compared in the same research framework. This will 
form the focus of the current chapter.  
The Appraisal Tendency Framework 
As discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, research on the appraisal tendency 
framework (ATF) suggests that distinct emotions promote specific kinds of judgments and 
decisions as a function of their unique and distinctive cognitive appraisals (cf. Horberg et al., 
2011; Lerner & Keltner, 2000). In applying the appraisal tendency framework to moral 
emotions in particular Horberg and colleagues (2011) proposed that, during the emotional 
state, HDFKHPRWLRQ¶VPRUDODSSUDLVDOWKHPHUHPDLQVVDlient and affects subsequent moral 
judgments, intentions, and behaviours by prioritising specific sociomoral concerns (or moral 
GRPDLQVWKDWDUHVHPDQWLFDOO\UHODWHGWRWKHHPRWLRQ¶VPRUDODSSUDLVDOWKHPH)RUH[DPSOH
disgust, anger, and contempt derive from the distinct moral appraisal themes of purity, 
justice, and community roles respectively (Rozin et al., 1999). Therefore, according to the 
ATF, disgust should influence moral judgments (or intentions) when purity concerns are 
salient, anger should influence moral judgments (or intentions) when justice concerns are 
salient, and contempt should influence moral judgments (or intentions) when community role 
concerns are salient. Moral eOHYDWLRQ¶VPRUDODSSUDLVDOWKHPHLVEHQHYROHQFHYLUWXHWKHUHIRUH 
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moral elevation should influence moral judgments (or intentions) when benevolence/virtue 
concerns are salient (see Horberg et al., 2011).  
Some empirical evidence exists to support the appraisal tendency framework. For 
example, research shows that anger, guilt, and shame predict distinct types of prosocial 
intentions (Iyer et al., 2007; Pagano & Huo, 2007). When assessing the relationship between 
these emotions and participants¶ responses to the invasion of Iraq, researchers found that 
anger predicted intentions to support confrontation of those responsible, compensation to 
Iraq, and withdrawal from Iraq. Shame predicted intentions to support withdrawal from Iraq 
(Iyer et al., 2007). Guilt predicted reparative actions (Pagano & Huo, 2007). Although these 
studies did not measure appraisals, their effects are in line with the appraisal tendency 
framework. The appraisal theme surrounding anger is that a person (or group) has 
transgressed some sort of societal standard (Frijda, 1986). Thus, anger should motivate action 
to undo the transgression or its effects. The appraisal theme surrounding guilt is that a person 
(or their ingroup) is responsible for specific negative actions (Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, 
Scarnier, & Ames, 2005). Thus, guilt should motivate action to undo the harm caused. The 
appraisal theme surrounding shame is similar to guilt however, while guilt focuses on the 
EHKDYLRXU³,KDYHGRQHDEDGWKLQJ´VKDPHIRFXVHVRQWKHSHUVRQ¶VFKDUDFWHU³, am a bad 
SHUVRQ´1LHGHQWKDOHWDO, 1994). Thus, shame should motivate avoidant behaviours to hide 
RQH¶VFKDUDFWHUThese studies provide some indirect support for the appraisal tendency 
framework (see Chapter 2 for a more detailed review).   
While research has shown that emotions (including moral elevation and moral 
outrage) have nuanced effects on moral outcomes (Dasgupta et al., 2009; DeSteno et al., 
2004; Siegel et al., 2014; see Chapter 2), no research has directly examined the moral 
appraisal themes of moral elevation and moral outrage, or how moral appraisal themes relate 
to emotional states and subsequent judgments and behaviours. Thus, no research has directly 
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applied the ATF to test, compare, and understand the prosocial outcomes of moral elevation 
and moral outrage. The current chapter addresses this gap in the literature and tests whether 
the effects of moral elevation and moral outrage on prosocial intentions are domain specific, 
or whether moral elevation and moral outrage increase prosociality across moral domains.  
The Current Research 
Overview 
LerneUDQG.HOWQHUSVXJJHVWWKDWUHVHDUFKRQWKH$7)³VKRXOGFRPSDUH
emotions that are highly differentiated in their appraisal themes on judgments/choices that 
UHODWHWRWKDWDSSUDLVDOWKHPH´ Moral elevation and moral outrage differ substantially in 
terms of their core appraisals. From their definitions, we infer that moral outrage and moral 
elevation should be underpinned by opposing appraisals. Specifically, moral elevation derives 
from an appraisal of a moral virtue (i.e., upholding a moral standard). In contrast, moral 
outrage derives from an appraisal of a moral transgression (i.e., violating a moral standard). 
Moreover, while moral elevation and moral outrage derive from opposing appraisals, the 
empirical evidence to date documents convergent effects of both emotions on similar 
prosocial outcomes (e.g., charitable donations, volunteering). Thus, comparing moral 
elevation and moral outrage allows a direct test of whether the two emotions influence 
prosocial behaviours across the sociomoral domains of justice and benevolence, or whether 
their effects are domain specific (cf. Horberg et al., 2011).  
To identify, for the first time, how moral elevation and moral outrage may act in 
concert to affect the same or distinct prosocial behaviours, the current chapter reports two 
studies testing the joint and independent effects of these two emotions on different types of 
prosocial intentions. Comparing their effects in an experimental design will enable us to 
understand whether they increase prosocial intentions generally (across moral domains), or 
whether their effects are more nuanced and depend on the salience of the relevant sociomoral 
MORAL ELEVATION AND MORAL OUTRAGE 69
   
 
concern (domain specific). Specifically, Study 1 examines benevolence-relevant intentions in 
the form of benevolent helping intentions. Study 2 examines justice-relevant intentions in the 
form of prosocial political action intentions following an inequality.  
Hypotheses 
Based on the domain-specific predictions from ATF, we hypothesise that moral 
elevation and moral outrage have domain specific effects on prosocial intentions. Moral 
elevation should increase prosocial intentions most when the intention measure is relevant to 
benevolence concerns. Moral outrage should increase prosocial intentions most when the 
intention measure is relevant to justice concerns.  
In Study 1 moral elevation, but not moral outrage, should increase prosociality 
(benevolent helping intentions) and this effect should be mediated by elevation appraisals and 
feelings of elevation. In Study 2, moral outrage, but not moral elevation, should increase 
prosociality (prosocial political action intentions) and this effect should be mediated by 
outrage appraisals and feelings of outrage.  
Alternatively, a domain general hypothesis would hold that moral elevation and moral 
outrage should positively affect prosocial intentions across all sociomoral domains. Thus, the 
induction of either emotion should be sufficient to increase benevolent helping intentions 
(Study 1) and prosocial political action intentions (Study 2).  
Dual Exposure 
It is very common in everyday life to feel multiple emotions, whether at once or close 
together in time. Thus, extending the typical paradigms that have instigated a single 
emotional state to one in which we instigate two emotional states is an essential step for 
advancing our understanding of the processes, components, and outcomes of different 
emotional states.  
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In the current research we induce moral elevation, moral outrage, both moral 
elevation and moral outrage (dual exposure), or neither, and give participants an opportunity 
to act prosocially in one domain (in different studies, benevolence or justice). Dual exposure 
enables us to investigate the flexibility or rigidity of the appraisal±intention link. We are able 
to test the ATF further and explore what happens to the intentional outcome when two 
emotions with opposing appraisals are experienced concurrently. According to ATF, 
appraisals following dual exposure should make both justice and benevolence concerns 
salient. One possibility is that either concern is sufficient to increase prosocial intentions 
because people may respond flexibly, taking any domain-relevant opportunity that presents 
itself. Thus, following dual exposure, prosocial intentions would be high regardless of 
whether the opportunity is relevant to justice or benevolence concerns. Alternatively, the two 
appraisals might interfere with one another, attenuating the impact of either on subsequent 
prosocial intentions.  
Study 1 
Method 
Participants and design. One hundred and three (86.4% female) British participants 
with a mean age of 20.13 years (SD = 4.79) completed an on-line questionnaire. Sample sizes 
were determined on the basis of providing sufficient power (.8) to detect a medium to large 
effect size. Participants were randomly assigned to condition in a 2 (Elevation: viewed vs. not 
viewed) X 2 (Outrage: viewed vs. not viewed) between-participants design. Data were 
collected using an on-line questionnaire (via a platform called Qualtrics). Participants were 
recruited via the psychology GHSDUWPHQW¶VUHVHDUFKparticipation scheme at the University of 
Kent and took part in exchange for course credit.  
Procedure. All participants provided informed consent. Participants viewed either 
one or two videos (elevation, outrage, both elevation and outrage, or control). When 
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participants viewed both the elevation-inducing and outrage-inducing videos, the videos were 
viewed consecutively, and the order was counter-balanced. Order did not affect feelings of 
moral outrage, F (1, 23) = 0.90, p = .353, Ș2 = .04, or feelings of moral elevation, F (1, 23) = 
0.22, p = .642, Ș2 = .01. Participants then responded to the emotion, appraisal, and prosocial 
measures. Participants received (written) debrief and course credit upon completion of the 
study.  
Experimental manipulations. The elevation-inducing (2.14-minutes in length), 
outrage-inducing (2.42-minutes in length), and control (2.42-minutes in length) videos as 
described in Pilot Study 1 were employed (see Chapter 3 and Appendix A).  
Measures. Measures were presented to participants in the following order: first 
appraisals, then emotions, and then benevolent helping intentions (each on a separate page). 
Presentation of items within each of these three constructs was randomised.   
Appraisals. Moral elevation arises from an appraisal of a moral virtue whereas moral 
outrage arises from an appraisal of a moral transgression (cf. Haidt, 2003). These appraisals 
will be referred to as elevation appraisals (i.e., upholding a moral standard) and outrage 
appraisals (i.e., transgressing a moral standard). A four-item scale was devised to measure 
elevation and outrage appraisals. Specifically, elevation appraisals were measured by asking 
participants to rate their agreement with the following two itePV³7RZKDWH[WHQWLVWKHUH
behaviour in the video clip which is well above the normal standards of behaviour"´DQG³7R
ZKDWH[WHQWGLGDQ\DVSHFWVRIWKHYLGHRFOLSUHIOHFWWKHZD\SHRSOHVKRXOGEHKDYHLGHDOO\"´
A mean score of these two items was computed to form the elevation appraisal measure. 
Outrage appraisals were measured by asking participants to rate their agreement with the 
IROORZLQJWZRLWHPV³7RZKDWH[WHQWLVWKHUHbehaviour in the video clip which is well below 
the normal standards of behaviour"´DQG³7RZKDWH[WHQWGLGDQ\DVSHFWVRIWKHYLGHRFOLS
UHIOHFWWKHZD\SHRSOHVKRXOGQ¶WEHKDYH"´A mean score of these two items was computed to 
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form the outrage appraisal measure. Cronbach alphas were .75 and .68 for the elevation and 
the outrage appraisal dimensions, respectively. Participants responded on a 5-point scale from 
1 (not at all) to 5 (very much) (see Appendix C). 
Moral elevation and moral outrage. The same moral elevation and moral outrage 
measures as described in Pilot Study 1 were employed (see Chapter 3 and Appendix B). 
Participants responded to the items on a 7-point scale from 1 (GLGQ¶W feel it at all) to 7 (felt it 
very strongly). 
Benevolent helping intentions. %HQHYROHQFHLVGHILQHGDV³LQFOLQDWLRQRUWHQGHQF\WR
help or do good WRRWKHUVFKDULW\´&ROOLQV(QJOLVK'LFWLRQDU\2QOLQH%HQHYROHQFH-
UHOHYDQWSURVRFLDOLQWHQWLRQVZHUHPHDVXUHGXVLQJ3DYH\DQGFROOHDJXHV¶SURVRFLDO
intentions scale (Pavey, Greitemeyer, & Sparks, 2011). This scale asks participants to rate the 
extent to which they would intend to: ³JLYHPRQH\WRFKDULW\´³GRQDWHJRRGVRUFORWKHVWRD
FKDULW\´³*RRXWRItheir ZD\WRKHOSDIULHQG´DQG³JRRXWRIWKHLUZD\WRKHOSDVWUDQJHULQ
QHHG´Rver the next 6 weeks. Participants responded on a 7-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(very much). A mean score of these four items was computed to form the benevolent helping 
intentions measure (see Appendix D).  
Results and Discussion 
Table 4.1 shows intercorrelations among variables, as well as their means and 
standard deviations. Data were analysed using 2 (Elevation: viewed vs. not viewed) X 2 
(Outrage: viewed vs. not viewed) ANOVAs.  
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Table 4.1 
Study 1: Means, Standard Deviations, Confidence Intervals, and Correlations among Key Variables 
Variable Mean (SD) 95% CI 2 3 4 5 
1.Elevation 4.50 (1.52) [4.21, 4.80] .11 .55*** -.33** .38*** 
2.Outrage 3.35 (1.42) [3.07, 3.63]  -.003 .41*** .14 
3.Elevation appraisals 3.31 (1.21) [3.07, 3.55]   -.40 .20* 
4.Outrage appraisals 2.70 (1.16) [2.47, 2.92]    -.28** 
5.Benevolence 4.99 (0.98) [4.80, 5.18]     
Note.  N = 103. CI = confidence interval. All measures were scored on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very strongly) except for appraisals 
which were scored on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all, 5 = very much).  
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Appraisals and emotions. There was a significant main effect of Elevation. 
Participants who viewed the elevation-inducing video scored higher on elevation appraisals, 
F (1, 98) = 87.78, p < .001, Ș2 =.47 (M = 4.10, SE = 0.12) and on feelings of elevation, F (1, 
98) = 46.23, p Ș2 = .32 (M = 5.29, SE = 0.17) than participants who had not viewed 
this video (Mappraisals = 2.45, SE = 0.13; Melevation = 3.63, SE = 0.18).  
There was a significant main effect of Outrage. Participants who viewed the outrage-
inducing video scored higher on outrage appraisals, F (1, 98) = 21.91, p < .001, Ș2 = .18 (M = 
3.19, SE = 0.14) and on feelings of outrage, F (1, 98) = 15.98, p Ș2 = .14 (M = 3.88, 
SE = 0.19) than participants who had not viewed this video (Mappraisals = 2.26, SE = 0.14; 
Moutrage = 2.85, SE = 0.18). 
There was also a significant main effect of Elevation on outrage appraisals, F (1, 98) 
= 14.24, p < .001, Ș2 = .13, whereby outrage appraisals were lower when participants had (vs. 
had not) watched the elevation-inducing video. There was a significant main effect of 
Outrage on feelings of elevation, F (1, 98) = 9.17, p  Ș2 = .09, whereby feelings of 
elevation were lower when participants had (vs. had not) watched the outrage-inducing video. 
Finally, there was a significant Elevation X Outrage interaction on feelings of outrage, F (1, 
98) = 6.35, p  Ș2 = .06. This interaction occurred because feelings of outrage reduced 
in the dual condition (M = 3.47, SE = 0.26) relative to the outrage-only condition (M = 4.29, 
SE = 0.27, p = .029). There were no other significant main or interaction effects (all p¶V!
.330). See Table 4.2 for all cell-specific descriptives.  
Benevolent helping intentions. There was only a marginal main effect of Elevation 
on benevolent helping intentions, F (1, 98) = 3.32, p = .071, Ș2 = .03. Participants who had 
viewed the elevation-inducing video were marginally more willing to help others (M = 5.15, 
SE = 0.13) than those who had not viewed this video (M = 4.80, SE = 0.14). The main effect 
of Outrage, F (1, 98) = 2.22, p = .140, Ș2 = .02 and the Elevation X Outrage interaction, F (1, 
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Table 4.2 
Study 1: Means, Standard Errors, and Cell Sizes for each Condition 
 Condition 




Cell sizes N = 28 N = 24 N = 26 N = 25 
1. Elevation 
appraisals 
4.20 (0.17) 2.52 (0.18) 4.00 (0.18) 2.30 (0.18) 
2. Outrage 
appraisals 
1.95 (0.19) 3.63 (0.20) 2.76 (0.20) 2.58 (0.20) 
3. Feelings of 
elevation 
5.74 (0.23) 3.34 (0.25) 4.83 (0.25) 3.91 (0.25) 
4. Feelings of 
outrage 
3.09 (0.25) 4.29 (0.27) 3.47 (0.26) 2.61 (0.26) 
5. Benevolence 
intentions 
5.29 (0.18) 4.66 (0.20) 5.01 (0.19) 4.94 (0.19) 
Note. Table depicts means. Standard errors are provided in brackets. All measures were 
scored on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very strongly) except for appraisals which were 
scored on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all, 5 = very much).  
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Mediation analyses. Sequential mediation aQDO\VHVXVLQJ+D\HV¶3URFHVV
macro model 6) were conducted to test whether elevation appraisals and then feelings of 
elevation sequentially mediated the marginally significant effect of the elevation-inducing 
video on benevolent helping intentions. Due to the 2 X 2 design and as we were only 
interested in the mediating role of the elevation main effect, the outrage-inducing video was 
entered as a covariate. Results showed that elevation appraisals and then feelings of elevation 
significantly and sequentially mediated the marginal effect of the elevation-inducing video on 
benevolent helping intentions, B = 0.15, SE = 0.07, 95CI 0.05/0.36 (indirect effect). The 
marginal total effect of the elevation-inducing video on benevolence intentions (B = 0.35, SE 
= 0.19, t = 1.83, p = .070) was reduced to non-significance in the direct model (B = -0.07, SE 
= 0.26, t = -0.28, p = .778) (see Figure 4.1 for path coefficients).  
To summarise, Study 1 offers partial support for the appraisal tendency framework 
(Horberg et al., 2011). Moral elevation, but not moral outrage, marginally increased 
benevolent helping intentions and this effect was sequentially mediated by elevation 
appraisals and feelings of elevation.  




Figure 4.1. Study 1: Unstandardised B coefficients for sequential mediation analyses using Process macro (Hayes, 2013).  
Note. **p < .01. ***p < .001.  
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Participants and design. One hundred and sixty-four (51.8% female) American 
participants with a mean age of 35.75 years (SD = 12.46) completed an on-line questionnaire 
(via a platform called Qualtrics). Sample sizes were determined on the basis of providing 
sufficient power (.8) to detect a medium to large effect size. Participants were sampled from 
$PD]RQ¶V0HFKDQLFDO7XUNDVLWHIRUZHE-based data collection that functions through a 
participant compensation system. Participants were randomly assigned to condition in a 2 
(Elevation: viewed vs. not viewed) X 2 (Outrage: viewed vs. not viewed) between-
participants design. Two participants had seen the video before so were excluded from the 
analyses (leaving a sample of 162).   
Procedure. All participants provided informed consent. Participants viewed either 
one or two videos (elevation, outrage, both elevation and outrage, or control). Participants 
then responded to the appraisal, emotion, and prosocial measures. Participants received 
(written) debrief and compensation upon completion of the study.  
Experimental manipulations. The elevation (2.14-minutes in length) and control 
(2.42-minutes in length) videos as described in Pilot Study 1 were employed (see Chapter 3 
and Appendix A). As the sample was American (rather than British), the outrage-inducing 
(2.58-minutes in length) video as described in Pilot Study 2 was employed (see Chapter 3 
and Appendix A).  
Measures. Participants responded to the measures in the following order: first 
appraisals, then emotions, and then prosocial political action intentions (each on a separate 
page). Presentation of items within each of these three constructs was randomised. Appraisals 
were measured using the same items as described in Study 1. Moral elevation and moral 
outrage were measured using the same items as described in Pilot Study 1 (see Chapter 3 and 
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Appendix B and C). Participants responded to the appraisals on a 5-point scale from 1 (not at 
all) to 5 (very much), and to the emotions on a 7-point scale from 1 (GLGQ¶W feel it at all) to 7 
(felt it very strongly).  
Prosocial political action intentions. This measure was adapted from Iyer et al. 
(2007). It is considered a justice-relevant measure as it assesses responses to inequality. 
3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHWROG³5HFHQWGDWDIURP Oxfam shows that 72 million children 
worldwide are out of school and that 771 million adults worldwide are illiterate. Some 
Americans are taking action to express their opinions about what should be done to improve 
access to education worldwide´3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHWROGDERXWWKUHHJURXSVZKRVXSSRUW
GLVWLQFWVWUDWHJLHVVXSSRUW³RQHJURXSKDVEHHQIRUPHGWRFDOOIRUWKH86WRSURYLde 
more support and help to improve access to education (e.g., by funding the development of 
VFKRROEXLOGLQJVERRNVWHDFKHU¶VZDJHVDQGFKLOGUHQ¶VXQLIRUPV´FKDOOHQJH³RWKHU
Americans have formed a group to identify those responsible for the lack of access to 
education worldwide and to directly challenge WKHPWRIL[WKHSUREOHPVWKH\KDYHFUHDWHG´
DQGDYRLGDQFH³RWKHU$PHULFDQVKDYHIRUPHGDJURXSWRDGYRFDWHIRUWKH86WRnot get 
involved in this issue RIDFFHVVWRHGXFDWLRQZRUOGZLGH´ Participants were asked how 
willing they would be to get involved with each group in eight different ways: ³MRLQWKH
group's e-PDLOOLVW´³YROXQWHHUZLWKWKLVJURXS´³VLJQDSHWLWLRQ´³DWWHQGDUDOO\´³recruit 
others to become involved with this group´³YRWHIRUDFDQGLGDWHZKRDJUHHVZLWKWKLV
JURXS´³ZHDUDEDGJHVXSSRUWLQJWKLVJURXS´DQG³JRWRDPHHWLQJRIORFDOUHSUHVHQWDWLYHV
RIWKLVJURXS´ (see also ,\HUHWDO&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDVZHUHIRUthe support and 
challenge items, and .97 for the avoidance items. Participants responded on a 5-point scale 
from 1 (not at all willing) to 5 (very willing).  Participants responded to this measure in the 
following order: the support group first, then the challenge group, and then the avoidance 
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group (each on a separate page). Presentation of items within each of the groups (e.g., sign a 
petition) was randomised (see Appendix E).  
Behavioural engagement with prosocial group. In order to measure behavioural 
HQJDJHPHQWSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHG³,I\RX would like more information about one or more 
RIWKHJURXSVSOHDVHLQGLFDWHWKHJURXS\RXZRXOGOLNHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXW´3DUWLFLSDQWVFRXOG
then tick one or more of the three groups (see Appendix E).  
Results and Discussion 
Table 4.3 shows the correlations among variables, as well as their means and standard 
deviations. Data were analysed using 2 (Elevation: viewed vs. not viewed) X 2 (Outrage: 
viewed vs. not viewed) ANOVAs.  
Emotions and appraisals. There was a significant main effect of Elevation. 
Participants who had viewed the elevation-inducing video scored significantly higher on 
elevation appraisals, F (1, 158) = 115.35, p Ș2 = .42 (M = 4.27, SE = 0.10) and on 
feelings of elevation, F (1, 158) = 61.30, p Ș2 = .28 (M = 5.23, SE = 0.17), than those 
who had not viewed the elevation-inducing video (Mappraisals = 2.79, SE = 0.10; Melevation = 
3.38, SE = 0.16).  
There was also a significant main effect of Outrage. Participants who had viewed the 
outrage-inducing video scored significantly higher on outrage appraisals, F (1, 158) = 126.03, 
p Ș2 = .44 (M = 3.93, SE = 0.11), and on feelings of outrage, F (1, 158) = 167.06, p < 
Ș2 = .51 (M = 5.08, SE = 0.16) than those who had not viewed the outrage-inducing 
video (Mappraisals = 2.13, SE = 0.12; Moutrage = 2.01, SE = 0.17).  
There was also a significant main effect of Outrage on elevation appraisals, F (1, 158) 
= 7.27, p = .008, Ș2 = .04, whereby elevation appraisals were lower when participants had (vs. 
had not) watched the outrage-inducing video. There was a significant main effect of Outrage 
on feelings of elevation, F (1, 158) = 19.19, p Ș2 = .11, whereby feelings of elevation 
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were lower when participants had (vs. had not) watched the outrage-inducing video. There 
were no other significant main or interaction effects (all p¶V! See Table 4.4 for all cell-
specific descriptives.
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Table 4.3 
Study 2: Means, Standard Deviations, Confidence Intervals, and Correlations among Key Variables 
Variable Mean (SD) 95% CI 2 3     4 5 6 7 
1.Elevation 4.45 (1.69) [4.19, 4.71] -.09 .67*** -.26** .20** .15 -.01 
2.Outrage 3.63 (2.14) [3.30, 3.96]  -.01 .68*** .40*** .42*** .08 
3. Elevation appraisals 3.49 (1.15) [3.31, 3.67]   -.06 .05 .10 .07 
4. Outrage appraisals 3.08 (1.35) [2.87, 3.29]    .05 .10 .07 
5. Support intentions 3.27 (0.08) [3.11, 3.44]     .72*** -.06 
6. Challenge intentions 3.20 (0.08) [3.04, 3.36]      .11 
7. Avoid intentions 1.75 (0.08) [1.60, 1.91]       
Note.  N = 162. CI = confidence interval. The emotions were scored on a 7-point scale (1= not at all, 7 = very much). The appraisals and political 
action intentions were scored on a 5-point scale (1= not at all, 5 = very much).  
a T-tests showed that the correlations between outrage and support (t (161) = -5.44, p < .001) and outrage and challenge (t (161) = -5.52, p 
< .001) were significantly different to the correlations between elevation and support and elevation and challenge, respectively.  
**p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 4.4 
Study 2: Means, Standard Errors, and Cell Sizes for each Condition 
 Condition 
 





Cell sizes N = 39 N = 47 N = 39 
 




























1.56 (0.16) 1.77 (0.15) 1.85 (0.16) 1.83 (0.16) 
Note. Table depicts means. Standard errors are provided in brackets. The emotions were 
scored on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very strongly). The appraisals and political action 
intentions were scored on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all, 5 = very much). 
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Prosocial political action intentions. There was a main effect of Outrage on support 
intentions, F (1, 158) = 4.25, p  Ș2 = .03 and on challenge intentions, F (1, 158) = 7.46, 
p  Ș2 = .05. Participants who had viewed the outrage-inducing video were significantly 
more likely to support a group that advocated victim-focused support (M = 3.44, SE = 0.12), 
and significantly more likely to support a group that advocated perpetrator-focused challenge 
(M = 3.40, SE = 0.11), than participants who had not viewed the outrage-inducing video 
(Msupport = 3.09, SE = 0.12; Mchallenge = 2.97, SE = 0.12). There was no effect of Elevation on 
support, F (1, 158) = 0.27, p  Ș2 < .001 or challenge intentions, F (1, 158) = 0.21, p = 
Ș2 = .001. There were also no significant interaction effects on support, F (1, 158) = 
0.15, p  Ș2 = .001 or challenge intentions, F (1, 158) = 1.90, p  Ș2 = .01. Finally, 
there were no significant effects on avoidance intentions (all p¶V!See Table 4.4 for all 
cell-specific descriptives. 
Behavioural engagement. Hierarchical loglinear analyses showed a marginally 
significant interaction between the outrage-inducing video and behavioural engagement with 
the challenge group, Ȥ2 (1) = 3.15, p = .076, whereby of the 62 participants who had requested 
further information, 38 had viewed the outrage-inducing video (61.29%) (see Figure 4.2). 
There were no other two or three-way interactions between the emotion-inducing videos and 
behavioural engagement (p¶V! 
Mediation analyses. Sequential mediation analyses (+D\HV¶3URFHVVPDFUR
model 6 was employed) were conducted to test whether outrage appraisals and then feelings 
of moral outrage sequentially mediated the effect of the outrage-inducing video on support 
intentions, challenge intentions, and behavioural engagement with the challenge group. Due 
to the 2 X 2 design and as we were only interested in the mediating role of the outrage main 
effect, the elevation-inducing video was entered as a covariate for all three mediation 
analyses. Results showed that outrage appraisals and then feelings of outrage significantly 
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and sequentially mediated the effect of the outrage-inducing video on support intentions, B = 
0.37, SE = 0.10, 95CI 0.22/0.61 (indirect effect), on challenge intentions, B = 0.34, SE = 0.09, 
95CI 0.20/0.56 (indirect effect), and on behavioural engagement with the challenge group, B 
= 0.61, SE = 0.21, 95CI 0.30/1.14 (indirect effect) (see Figure 4.3 for path coefficients). 
The significant total effect of the outrage-inducing video on support intentions (B = 
0.35, SE = 0.17, t = 2.09, p = .039) was reduced to non-significance in the direct model (B = -
0.25, SE = 0.23, t = -1.09, p = .277). Similarly, the significant total effect of the outrage-
inducing video on challenge intentions (B = 0.44, SE = 0.16, t = 2.79, p = .006) was reduced 
to non-significance in the direct model (B = -0.11, SE = 0.22, t = -.53, p = .598). The 
marginal effect of the outrage-inducing video on behavioural engagement with the challenge 
group (B = 0.58, SE = 0.33, Z = 1.76, p = .079) was reduced to non-significance in the direct 
model (B = -0.42, SE = 0.56, Z = -0.75, p = .455). 
To summarise, Study 2 offers support for the appraisal tendency framework (Horberg 
et al., 2011). Moral outrage, but not moral elevation, increased justice-relevant prosocial 
intentions and behavioural engagement, and these effects were sequentially mediated by 
outrage appraisals and feelings of outrage.   
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Figure 4.2. Study 2: Hierarchical loglinear analyses testing the interaction between the 
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Figure 4.3. Study 2: Unstandardised B coefficients for sequential mediation analysis using Process macro (Hayes, 2013).  
Note. ***p < .001.  
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General Discussion 
Two studies provided partial support for the domain-specificity predictions of the 
appraisal tendency framework (Horberg et al., 2011; Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Specifically, 
results showed that although moral elevation and moral outrage both instigated prosocial 
responses, the two emotions derived from distinctive appraisals and had distinctive effects on 
prosocial intentions.  
Prior research indicates that the ATF can help to account for the influence of emotions 
(particularly disgust) on moral judgments (e.g., Tapias et al., 2007). The present research 
extends this substantially by selectively comparing the prosocial effects of two emotions 
(moral elevation and moral outrage) that are highly distinctive in terms of their appraisals but 
similar in terms of their action tendencies. Direct comparison of the effects of moral elevation 
and moral outrage enabled us to test whether they influence intentions across moral domains 
(e.g., justice, benevolence), or whether their effects are specific to a single moral domain. 
Domain specificity suggests that moral elevation should predominantly increase 
benevolence-relevant intentions (Study 1) and that moral outrage should predominantly 
increase justice-relevant intentions (Study 2). Consistent with the ATF, Study 1 showed that 
in the benevolence domain, only moral elevation (marginally) increased prosocial intentions. 
Furthermore, this effect was sequentially mediated by elevation appraisals (i.e., upholding a 
moral standard) and then by feelings of moral elevation. Study 2 provided further support for 
the ATF by showing, in a justice-relevant domain, that only moral outrage increased 
prosocial political action intentions and behavioural engagement. These effects were 
sequentially mediated by outrage appraisals (transgressing a moral standard) and then by 
feelings of moral outrage. Thus, across two studies we showed that the effects of inducing 
moral elevation and moral outrage on prosociality are domain specific, and correspond to 
their appraisal themes.  
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The results from dual exposure provided further insight into ways that these 
contrasting appraisals may combine. In Studies 1 and 2, dual exposure did not inhibit the 
prosocial effects of the alternative emotion. This suggests flexibility in the appraisal-intention 
link, whereby both sociomoral concerns (benevolence and justice) can remain salient during 
the emotional states and can respond to whichever prosocial opportunity presents itself.  
Theoretical and Applied Implications 
Past research testing the ATF has focused on understanding the effects of discrete 
emotions on distinctive action tendencies (e.g., to harm others or to help others; Iyer et al., 
2007; Lerner et al., 2004; Pagano & Huo, 2007). However, a dearth of research has tested 
whether effects of moral emotion are moral domain specific (e.g., benevolence, justice, or 
purity; Tapias et al., 2007). The present research substantially extends the ATF literature by 
testing whether moral elevation and moral outrage have domain specific effects on prosocial 
intentions. These two emotions offer a particularly effective test of the ATF because despite 
both having positive connotations for prosociality they imply distinct domain specific effects 
(benevolence vs. justice, respectively). The current studies showed that moral elevation and 
moral outrage increased domain-specific prosocial intentions associated with their distinct 
moral appraisal themes, thus providing support for the ATF.  
As well as providing insights into how emotions affect individual-level prosocial 
intentions, the current research raises interesting new questions about how distinct emotions 
may impact upon interpersonal-level and society-level processes. Researchers have 
highlighted the importance of considering the social context of emotions (Parkinson et al., 
2005; Parkinson & Manstead, 2015; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010). Specifically, 
when researching emotions it is important to also consider the social appraisals of emotions. 
SociDODSSUDLVDOVLPSO\WKDWSHRSOHWDNHRWKHUSHRSOH¶VHPRWLRQVLQWRDFFRXQWZKHQ
appraising what is happening (Parkinson & Manstead, 2015). Therefore, it would be 
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interesting to explore whether the relationship between instances of moral virtues and 
feelings of elevation and the relationship between elevation and prosociality vary depending 
RQRWKHU¶VUHDFWLRQVLQWKHVDPHFRQWH[W. Similarly, it would also be interesting to explore 
whether the relationship between instances of injustices and feelings of outrage and the 
relationship between outrage and prosociality vary depending on others¶ reactions in the same 
context. Some evidence already exists showing that anger is more likely to influence 
willingness to engage in social action when this emotional reaction is shared by other group 
members (Livingstone, Spears, Manstead, Bruder, & Shepherd, 2011). Future research should 
further H[SORUHWKHUROHWKDWWKHVRFLDOFRQWH[WFDQSOD\LQSUHGLFWLQJSHRSOH¶VHPRWLRQDOand 
behavioural responses to moral virtues and moral transgressions.  
Emotions may also impact on society-level processes such as moralisation. 
Moralisation is the process by which moral judgments become embedded into societal value 
systems, often through emotions. Research on moralisation shows some support for society-
level domain specificity in the influence of emotions such as disgust on attitudes towards 
societal issues such as homosexuality (cf. Horberg et al., 2011). Therefore, it would be 
interesting to explore whether other emotions, in particular under-researched emotions such 
as moral elevation, can also instigate the moralisation of societal phenomena. For example, it 
is plausible that, across a community, the presence of selfless acts may generate shared 
feelings of moral elevation that create new moral standards of benevolence (rather than of 
justice). Similarly, it is plausible that, across a community, exposure to stories of injustices or 
inequalities may generate shared feelings of moral outrage that create new moral standards of 
justice (rather than benevolence).  
The current studies offer important insights for campaigns that aim to increase 
prosocial action. Firstly, the current research provides further empirical support for the 
effectiveness of moral elevation and moral outrage at increasing prosocial action. Charitable 
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campaigns typically draw on sympathy and guilt to instigate prosociality, however sympathy 
runs the risk of instigating paternalistic helping (Nadler & Halabi, 2006; Thomas et al., 2009) 
while guilt runs the risk of instigating self-focused helping (Iyer et al., 2004; see also Chapter 
2). Thus, moral elevation and moral outrage appear as powerful alternatives for motivating 
prosociality.  
Secondly, the current research provides initial evidence for the notion that moral 
elevation and moral outrage promote distinct types of prosociality. Moral elevation may be 
more effective at increasing prosociality if benevolence concerns are salient, while moral 
outrage may be more effective at increasing prosociality if justice concerns are salient. 
Nevertheless, given that intentions (rather than behaviours) were measured, and given that the 
effect in Study 1 was marginal, further research is necessary. In particular, it is necessary for 
future research to test the effects of moral elevation and moral outrage on prosocial 
behaviours (rather than intentions).  
Limitations and Caveats 
Across Studies 1 and 2 ratings of moral elevation and moral outrage were either not 
particularly high or differed by only 2-points from the control video. Research shows that 
nature (the control stimulus) can inspire feelings of awe (Keltner & Haidt, 2003). However, it 
is unlikely that the video instigated any feelings of moral elevation. It is also highly doubtful 
that the control stimulus instigated feelings of moral outrage. Thus, it is likely that 
participants in the control condition felt as though they should report some sort of emotional 
response, rather than actually feeling any emotion. It is plausible that with even stronger 
elevating and outrageous stimuli, prosocial effects may be more pronounced. Nevertheless, 
the significant differences between the emotion-inducing videos and the control video on 
respective emotion ratings, and the consistency of the overall empirical findings with the 
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theoretical predictions provide confidence in our stimuli. Future research should examine 
effects of a greater range of elevation-inducing and outrage-inducing stimuli.  
ANOVA results across the two studies were in line with the theoretical predictions, 
but some of the correlational data merit further comment. Whereas both types of appraisal 
directly correlated with prosociality in Study 1 neither type of appraisal correlated directly 
with prosociality in Study 2. It is plausible that participants who dispositionally evaluate 
behaviour with reference to moral standards (regardless of the particular situation) may also 
be more benevolent, but it is unclear why they might not also engage in justice-related 
actions. Future research should therefore investigate whether particular individual differences 
can explain these relationships.  
In Study 2 feelings of moral elevation correlated significantly with willingness to 
engage with the support group (justice-relevant). Although this was not hypothesised, it does 
not contradict the primary hypothesis that the predominant influence over justice-relevant 
intention should be outrage. Specifically, in line with the domain-specificity hypothesis the 
relationship between moral outrage and justice-relevant outcomes (r = .40) was substantially 
larger than the relationship between moral elevation and justice-relevant outcomes (r = .20, t 
(161) = -5.44, p < .001).  
In Study 1, while the effect of Elevation on prosocial benevolent intentions was in 
line with a-priori predictions, the effect was only marginally significant. Further research is 
necessary to test whether this effect of moral elevation on benevolent helping indeed exists 
and therefore whether it is replicable using other measures.  
Furthermore, the current research measured prosociality using intentional rather than 
behavioural measures. Study 2 did attempt to improve on such intentional measures by 
assessing behavioural engagement. However, research is necessary to test whether the 
domain-specific effects replicate when using behavioural measures.  
MORAL ELEVATION AND MORAL OUTRAGE 94
   
 
Conclusion 
The present chapter has examined, for the first time, whether and how moral elevation 
and moral outrage can produce prosocial responses via different appraisals. Understanding 
how these appraisals and moral emotions influence prosociality is essential for deciding 
whether and how to use them in important practical interventions such as charity campaigns, 
educational efforts, or social policy strategies. The evidence shows, for the first time, that 
moral elevation and moral outrage have distinctive prosocial effects, and suggests interesting 
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Chapter 5 
A Behavioural Approach to Testing the Prosocial Effects of Elevation and Outrage: Elevation 
Increases Benevolent Behaviours and Outrage Increases Justice Behaviours 
This chapter extends the findings from Chapter 4 by testing and comparing the effects 
of moral elevation and moral outrage on prosocial behaviours (rather than intentions). This 
is essential in order to inform theory development as well as applied interventions. More 
specifically, the current chapter draws on the appraisal tendency framework to examine 
whether moral elevation and moral outrage increase prosocial behaviours across moral 
domains, or whether their behavioural effects are domain specific. It is hypothesised that, in 
line with the findings from Chapter 4 and with the appraisal tendency framework, moral 
elevation will increase benevolent-relevant prosocial behaviour, while moral outrage will 
increase justice-relevant prosocial behaviour. Results of Study 3 showed that moral 
elevation, but not moral outrage, increased donations to charity (i.e., benevolence domain). 
Study 4 showed that moral outrage, but not moral elevation, increased compensation in a 
third-party bystander game (i.e., justice domain). This research provides further support for 
the findings from Chapter 4 and suggests that moral elevation and moral outrage affect 
distinct types of prosocial behaviours. Applied and theoretical implications are discussed.4 
                                                 
 
4
 Studies 3 and 4 reported in this chapter form part of the published manuscript, Van de Vyver, J., & Abrams, D. 
(2015) Testing the prosocial effectiveness of the prototypical moral emotions: Elevation increases benevolent 
behaviors and outrage increases justice behaviors. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 58, 23-33. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2014.12.005 
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Large inequalities and injustices occur and persist across societies every day. Indeed, 
iQWKH86WKHWRSWDNHVPRUHWKDQRIWKHQDWLRQ¶VLQFRPHFI6WLJOLW]
Nevertheless, many people remain apathetic to the needs of others. Researchers have a 
unique ability to empirically test strategies that can effectively mobilise people to be more 
helpful and supportive of others. The current chapter aims to contribute to the existing 
literatures surrounding prosociality (see Haidt, 2003; Penner et al., 2005; Tangney et al., 
2007) by testing the effects of two particularly promising emotions on prosocial behaviours. 
In particular, this chapter draws from social psychological theories (e.g., appraisal tendency 
theory; Horberg et al., 2011) to explore whether emotions increase prosocial behaviours, and 
the types of prosocial behaviours that they promote.  
Prosocial motivation can be understood as the desire to expend effort to help others 
(Penner et al., 2005). Prosocial behaviour (or action) occurs when this motivation is enacted. 
Research shows that moral emotions increase action, and particularly prosocial action 
7DQJQH\HWDO,QGHHG³PRUDOHPRWLRQVSURYLGHWKHPRWLYDWLRQDOIRUFH± the power 
and energy ± WRGRJRRGDQGWRDYRLGGRLQJEDG´7DQJQH\HWDO0RUDOHPRWLRQV
KDYHEHHQGHILQHGDV³WKRVHWKDWDUHOLQNHGWRWKHLQWHUHVWVRUZHOIDUHHLWKHURIVRFLHW\DVD
ZKROHRUDWOHDVWRISHUVRQVRWKHUWKDQWKHMXGJHRUDJHQW´+DLGWS Examples of 
moral emotions include: disgust, sympathy, moral elevation, moral outrage, and admiration 
(Haidt, 2003). The current chapter examines the effects of moral elevation and moral outrage 
on prosocial behaviours (see Chapter 1).  
Moral Elevation and Moral Outrage 
Moral elevation is a positive emotion felt when witnessing another person perform a 
virtuous act, one that improves the welfare of others (Algoe & Haidt, 2009). Moral elevation 
motivates people to emulate the exemplar and become a better person oneself (Haidt, 2003). 
5HFHQWVWXGLHVKDYHVKRZQWKDWPRUDOHOHYDWLRQLQFUHDVHVSHRSOH¶VKHOSLQJEHKDYLRXUV)RU
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example, Silvers and Haidt (2008) showed that nursing mothers who were induced to feel 
elevation (vs. a control condition) were more likely to nurse and marginally more likely to 
hug their infants. Moreover, Schnall and colleagues (2010) showed that participants induced 
to feel moral elevation (vs. control conditions) were more likely to volunteer for a subsequent 
study as well as help the experimenter with a tedious task. In a field context, Cox (2010) 
showed that moral elevation predicted volunteering three months later. Therefore, empirical 
research suggests that moral elevation can mobilise people to help others.  
Moral outrage is a negative emotion felt when witnessing another person transgress a 
moral standard (usually a standard of justice, fairness, or equality) that harms another person 
or group (Thomas et al., 2009). Moral outrage motivates people to undo the harm caused by 
helping the victim and/or punishing the perpetrator (Lotz et al., 2011). Studies show that 
moral outrage increases helping intentions. For example, Thomas and McGarty (2009) found 
that in opinion-EDVHGJURXSVLQGXFLQJDQRXWUDJHQRUP³SHRSOHIHHOJHQXLQHDQGSDVVionate 
outrage that people in developing countries still, in the modern day, do not have access to 
VDIHZDWHU´LQFUHDVHGFRPPLWPHQWWRSRVLWLYHVRFLDOFKDQJHHJ³,LQWHQGWRVXSSRUWWKH
Water for Life movement by attending a rally which calls for chanJHRIJRYHUQPHQWSROLF\´
RU³,LQWHQGWRVXSSRUWWKH:DWHUIRU/LIHPRYHPHQWE\DWWHQGLQJDIXQGUDLVLQJHYHQW´
Lodewijkx and colleagues (2008) showed that feelings of moral outrage against violence 
directly predicted intentions to participate in a silent march. Saab and colleagues (2015) 
demonstrated that perceived injustice predicted collective action tendencies (i.e., protesting) 
and that this effect was mediated by feelings of moral outrage (and sympathy). Therefore, 
empirical research suggests that outrage can mobilise people to want to help others.  
The Appraisal Tendency Framework 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, research on the appraisal tendency framework 
(ATF) suggests that distinct emotions promote specific kinds of judgments and decisions as a 
MORAL ELEVATION AND MORAL OUTRAGE 98
   
 
function of their unique and distinctive cognitive appraisals (cf. Horberg et al., 2011; Lerner 
& Keltner, 2000). In applying the appraisal tendency framework to moral emotions in 
particular Horberg and colleagues (2011) proposed that, during the emotional state, each 
HPRWLRQ¶VPRUDODSSUDLVDOWKHPHUHPDLQVVDOLHQWDQGDIIHFWVVXEVHTXHQWPRUDOMXGJPHQWV
intentions, and behaviours by prioritising specific sociomoral concerns (or moral domains) 
WKDWDUHVHPDQWLFDOO\UHODWHGWRWKHHPRWLRQ¶VPRUDODSSUDLVDOWheme. For example, moral 
outrage should influence moral judgments (or behaviours) when justice concerns are salient 
and moral elevation should influence moral judgments (or behaviours) when 
benevolence/virtue concerns are salient (see Horberg et al., 2011).  
In line with the ATF (Horberg et al., 2011) research has shown that emotions 
(including moral elevation and moral outrage) have nuanced effects on moral outcomes 
(Dasgupta et al., 2009; DeSteno et al., 2004; Siegel et al., 2014). However, until this thesis, 
no research had directly examined the moral appraisal themes of moral elevation and moral 
outrage, or how moral appraisal themes relate to emotional states and subsequent judgments 
and behaviours. Thus, no research had directly applied the ATF to understand the prosocial 
effects moral elevation and moral outrage.  
In order to advance theoretical developments of moral elevation and moral outrage 
(Haidt, 2003) and of the appraisal tendency framework (Horberg et al., 2011), Chapter 4 
tested whether effects of moral elevation and moral outrage were domain specific, or whether 
these two emotions promoted prosocial intentions across moral domains. Two studies were 
reported in Chapter 4, which showed that, in line with the appraisal tendency framework (see 
Horberg et al., 2011; for a detailed description see Chapter 2), moral elevation and moral 
outrage have domain specific effects on prosocial intentions. Specifically, Study 1 showed 
that moral elevation (marginally) promoted benevolence-relevant intentions. Moreover, the 
elevation-inducing stimulus promoted benevolence-relevant intentions through elevation 
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appraisals and feelings of elevation. Study 2 showed that moral outrage promoted justice-
relevant intentions. The outrage-inducing stimulus promoted justice relevant intentions 
through outrage appraisals and feelings of moral outrage. Therefore, moral elevation and 
moral outrage seemed to have distinctive effects on prosocial intentions that were driven by 
their distinctive moral appraisal themes.  
Prosocial Intentions versus Prosocial Behaviours 
Nevertheless, an important limitation of Chapter 4 was that prosociality was 
measured using self-report intentions rather than actual behaviours. The current chapter 
overcomes this limitation by testing the effects of moral elevation and of moral outrage on 
prosocial behaviours. A substantial body of research has tested the effects of emotions on 
moral judgments and intentions (see Teper et al., 2015). However, there is a significant lack 
of behavioural research across areas of social psychology, particularly in moral psychology 
(see Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder, 2007; Teper et al., 2015). Given the dissociation between 
attitudes and behaviours (Blasi, 1980), it is essential to understand how emotions affect 
behaviour (Teper et al., 2015).  
,QGHHG3LDJHWQRWHGWKDW³WKHUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQWKRXJKWDQGDFWLRQDUH
YHU\IDUIURPEHLQJDVVLPSOHDVFRPPRQO\VXSSRVHG´S)HVWLQJHU¶VFRJQLWLYH
dissonance theory similarly showed that people often engage in behaviour that is inconsistent 
with their attitudes (see also Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). Teper et al. (2015) suggested that 
given the normative nature of morality, the discrepancy between attitudes and behaviours 
might be more evident in the moral domain than in other domains. As people usually prefer 
to see themselves and be seen by others as moral and as moral behaviours are often costly, 
people often support moral values but fail to act morally (Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, 
Whitney, & Strongman, 1999). 7KLVQRWLRQZDVVXSSRUWHGLQ%ODVL¶VUHYLHZDUWLFOH
which showed that only half of the studies investigated reported a positive relationship 
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between self-reported morality and moral behaviour (honesty); the other half found no 
significant relationship.  
A similar discrepancy occurs between moral intentions and moral behaviours (Teper 
et al., 2015). For example, across various moral dilemmas (e.g., cheating, charitable 
GRQDWLRQVFRRSHUDWLYHEHKDYLRXUVSHRSOH¶VEHKDYLRXUDOIRUHFDVWVGRQRWSUHGLFWtheir actual 
behaviour (Epley & Dunning, 2000; Teper, Inzlicht, & Page-Gould, 2011). In other words, 
attitudes and intentions do not consistently predict actual behaviours. Given this dissociation 
between intentions and behaviours, it is essential to replicate the findings of Chapter 4 using 
behavioural measures. This will enable a stronger test of the appraisal tendency framework.  
The Current Research 
Chapter 4 showed that moral elevation (but not moral outrage) marginally increased 
benevolent-relevant prosocial intentions and that moral outrage (but not moral elevation) 
increased justice-relevant prosocial intentions. The current chapter extends Chapter 4 by 
testing whether these findings can be replicated when employing behavioural measures. To 
identify, for the first time, how moral elevation and moral outrage may act in concert to affect 
distinct prosocial behaviours, the current research reports two studies testing the joint and 
independent effects of these two emotions on different types of prosocial behaviours. Study 3 
examines benevolence-relevant behaviour in the form of charitable donations. Study 4 
examines justice-relevant behaviour in the form of third-party bystander compensation and 
punishment following unfairness.  
Hypotheses 
Based on the domain-specific predictions from ATF (see Horberg et al., 2011; 
Chapters 2 and 4), we hypothesise that moral elevation and moral outrage have domain 
specific effects on prosocial behaviours. Moral elevation should increase prosocial behaviour 
most when the behavioural measure is relevant to benevolence concerns. Moral outrage 
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should increase prosocial behaviour most when the behavioural measure is relevant to justice 
concerns.  
In Study 3 moral elevation, but not moral outrage, should increase prosociality 
(donations) and this effect should be mediated by elevation appraisals and feelings of 
elevation. In Study 4, moral outrage, but not moral elevation, should increase prosociality 
(third-party bystander compensation and punishment) and this effect should be mediated by 
outrage appraisals and feelings of outrage.  
Dual Exposure 
The findings from Chapter 4 suggest that dual exposure (i.e., the induction of both 
elevation and outrage) does not inhibit the prosocial effects of the alternative emotion. 
Specifically, there seems to be a certain flexibility in the appraisal-intention link, whereby 
both sociomoral concerns (benevolence and justice) can remain salient during the emotional 
states and participants can respond to whichever prosocial opportunity presents itself.  In line 
with these findings it is hypothesised that following dual exposure, prosocial behaviour will 
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Participants and design. Ninety-two (70.7% female) British participants with a mean 
age of 23.05 years (SD = 7.83) completed an on-line questionnaire5. Sample sizes were 
determined on the basis of providing sufficient power (.8) to detect a medium to large effect 
size. Participants were randomly assigned to condition in a 2 (Elevation: viewed vs. not 
viewed) X 2 (Outrage: viewed vs. not viewed) between-participants design. Data were 
collected using an on-line questionnaire (via a platform called Qualtrics). Participants were 
recruited via (1) a formal university-led strategy, 50.5% (i.e.WKHGHSDUWPHQW¶VUHVHDUFK
credits scheme); or (2) an informal social network strategy, 49.5% (e.g., Facebook).  
Procedure. All participants provided informed consent. Participants viewed either 
one or two videos (elevation, outrage, both elevation and outrage, or control). When 
participants viewed both the elevation and outrage inducing videos (i.e., dual exposure 
condition), the videos were viewed straight after one another, and the order was randomised. 
Participants then responded to the emotion, appraisal, and prosocial measures. Participants 
received (written) debrief (and compensation if applicable) upon completion of the study. 
Prize draw allocation was organised upon completion of data collection (i.e., once all 
participants had taken part). 




and reanalysis has subsequently been conducted.  
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Experimental manipulations. The elevation (2.14-minutes in length), outrage (2.42-
minutes in length), and control (2.42-minutes in length) videos as described in Pilot Study 1 
were employed (see Chapter 3 and Appendix A).  
Measures. Participants responded to the measures in the following order: first 
appraisals, then emotions, and then charitable donations (each on separate pages). 
Presentation of items within each of these three constructs was randomised. Appraisals were 
measured using the same items as described in Study 1 (see Chapter 4 and Appendix C). 
Feelings of moral elevation and moral outrage were measured using the same items as 
described in Pilot Study 1 (see Chapter 3 and Appendix B). Participants responded to the 
appraisals on a 5-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much), and to the emotions on a 9-
point scale from 1 (GLGQ¶WIHHOLWDWDOO) to 9 (felt it very strongly).  
Charitable donations. Benevolence-relevant prosocial behaviour was measured 
according to the amount of prize draw money participants donated to charity (cf. Aquino et 
al., 2011; Freeman et al., 2009; McFarland, Webb, & Brown, 2012). All participants were 
entered in to a £60 ($96) prize draw. Participants could donate none, some, or the entire 
amount to their chosen charity (they were given a selection of 10 charities to choose from; 
see Appendix F).   
Results and Discussion 
All analyses controlled for recruitment strategy (formal university-led strategy vs. 
informal social networking strategy).  
Descriptives. Table 5.1 shows intercorrelations among variables, as well as their 
means and standard deviations. Data were analysed using 2 (Elevation: viewed vs. not 
viewed) X 2 (Outrage: viewed vs. not viewed) ANOVAs.  
Appraisals and emotions. There was a significant main effect of Elevation. 
Participants who viewed the elevation-inducing video scored higher on elevation appraisals, 
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F (1, 87) = 41.80, p Ș2 =.33 (M = 3.55, SE = 0.12) and on feelings of elevation, F (1, 
87) = 29.23, p < .001Ș2 = .25 (M = 5.02, SE = 0.28) than participants who had not viewed 
this video (Mappraisals = 2.30, SE = 0.15; Melevation = 2.66, SE = 0.34).  
There was a significant main effect of Outrage. Participants who viewed the outrage-
inducing video scored higher on outrage appraisals, F (1, 87) = 31.96, p Ș2 = .27 (M = 
3.54, SE = 0.15) and on feelings of outrage, F (1, 87) = 31.01, p Ș2 = .26 (M = 4.00, 
SE = 0.26) than participants who had not viewed this video (Mappraisals = 2.24, SE = 0.17; 
Moutrage = 1.85, SE = 0.29). 
There were significant Elevation X Outrage interactions on elevation appraisals, F (1, 
87) = 24.73, p Ș2 = .22 and on outrage appraisals, F (1, 87) = 4.04, p = .048Ș2 = .04. 
Specifically, elevation appraisals reduced in the dual condition (M = 3.10, SE = 0.16) relative 
to the elevation-only condition (M = 4.01, SE = 0.19, p < .001). In contrast, outrage appraisals 
did not differ between the dual exposure condition (M = 3.49, SE = 0.19) and the outrage-
only condition (M = 3.58, SE = 0.24, p = .779). See Table 5.2 for all cell-specific 
descriptives.  
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Table 5.1 
Study 3: Means, Standard Deviations, Confidence Intervals, and Correlations among Key Variables 
Variable Mean (SD) 95% CI 2 3 4 5 
1.Elevation 3.98 (2.37) [3.49, 4.47] -.07 .56*** -.14 .32** 
2.Outrage 3.11 (2.08) [2.68, 3.54]  .07 .56*** .13 
3.Elevation appraisals 3.02 (1.16) [2.78, 3.26]   .09 .33** 
4.Outrage appraisals 2.99 (1.25) [2.74, 3.25]    .23* 
5.Donations 29.71 (23.89) [24.76, 34.65]     
Note.  N = 91. CI = confidence interval. Elevation and outrage were scored on a 9-point scale (1= GLGQ¶WIHHOLWDWDOO 9 = felt it very strongly).                                                                                                      
Cognitive appraisals were scored on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all, 5 = very much). Prosocial behaviour was measured according to the amount 
of money (from £0-60) donated to charity. A t-test showed that the correlation between elevation and donations versus the correlation between 
outrage and donations did not differ significantly, t (89) = -1.64, p = .104.                                                           
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.  
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Table 5.2 
Study 3: Means, Standard Errors, and Cell Sizes for each Condition 
 Condition 




Cell sizes N = 23 N = 20 N = 32 N = 17 
1.Elevation 
appraisals 
4.02 (0.19) 2.85 (0.20) 3.06 (0.16) 1.79 (0.22) 
2.Outrage 
appraisals 
2.65 (0.22) 3.55 (0.24) 3.52 (0.19) 1.82 (0.26) 
3.Feelings of 
elevation 
5.80 (0.42) 2.25 (0.45) 4.20 (0.36) 3.12 (0.49) 
4.Feelings of 
outrage 
2.36 (0.38) 3.95 (0.40) 4.06 (0.32) 1.34 (0.44) 
5.Prosocial 
behaviour 
35.70 (4.87) 29.90 (5.22) 32.28 (4.13) 16.53 (5.66) 
Note. Table depicts means. Standard errors are provided in brackets. Elevation and outrage 
were scored on a 9-point scale (1 = GLGQ¶WIHHOLWDWDOO 9 = felt it very strongly). Cognitive 
appraisals were scored on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all, 5 = very much). Prosocial behaviour 
was measured according to the amount of money (from £0-60) donated to charity.  
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Charitable donations. There was only a main effect of Elevation, F (1, 87) = 4.58, p 
= .035Ș 3DUWLFLSDQWVZKRKDGYLHZHGWKHHOHYDWLRQ-inducing video donated 
significantly more (M = £34.00, SE = 3.21) than those who had not viewed this video (M = 
£23.20, SE = 3.89). The main effect of Outrage, F (1, 87) = 0.98, p = .325Ș DQGWhe 
Elevation X Outrage interaction, F (1, 87) = 2.71, p = .103Ș ZHUHQRQ-significant. 
See Table 5.2 for all cell-specific descriptives. 
Mediation analyses6HTXHQWLDOPHGLDWLRQDQDO\VHVXVLQJ+D\HV¶3URFHVV
macro model 6) were conducted to test whether elevation appraisals and feelings of elevation 
sequentially mediated the effect of the elevation-inducing video on donations. Due to the 2 X 
2 design and as we were only interested in the mediating role of the elevation main effect, the 
outrage-inducing video was entered as a covariate. Results showed that elevation appraisals 
and then feelings of elevation significantly and sequentially mediated the effect of the 
elevation-inducing video on donations, B = 2.48, SE = 1.48, 95CI 0.32/6.37 (indirect effect). 
The significant total effect of the elevation-inducing video on donations (B = 9.95, SE = 5.07, 
t = 1.96, p = .053) was reduced to non-significance in the direct model (B = -0.93, SE = 5.82, 
t = -0.16, p = .874) (see Figure 5.1 for path coefficients). 
To summarise, Study 3 offers support for the appraisal tendency framework (Horberg 
et al., 2011). Moral elevation, but not moral outrage, increased donations to charity (i.e., 
benevolence relevant prosocial behaviour) and this effect was sequentially mediated by 
elevation appraisals and feelings of elevation.   




Figure 5.1. Study 3: Unstandardised B coefficients for sequential mediation analyses using Process macro (Hayes, 2013).  
Note. *p = .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.  
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Study 4 
Study 4 examines whether the effects of moral elevation and moral outrage extend to 
affect justice-relevant prosocial behaviours. Specifically, Study 4 explores participants¶ 
compensation and punishment following unfair distributions in a third-party bystander game.  
Method 
Participants and design. Seventy-eight (91% female) British participants with a 
mean age of 19.92 years (SD = 5.55) completed an on-line questionnaire. Sample sizes were 
determined on the basis of providing sufficient power (.8) to detect a medium to large effect 
size. Participants were randomly assigned to condition in a 2 (elevation video: viewed vs. not 
viewed) X 2 (outrage video: viewed vs. not viewed) between-participants design. Data were 
collected in the laboratory. Participants were undergraduate students recruited via the 
SV\FKRORJ\GHSDUWPHQW¶VUHVHDUFKSDUWLFLSDWLRQVFKHPHDWWKH8QLYHUVLW\RI.HQW
Participants took part in exchange for course credit. Two participants had seen the video 
before so were excluded from the analyses (leaving a sample of 76 participants).  
Procedure. Participants were invited to sign-up to a three-person laboratory study. 
All participants provided informed consent. Participants first watched either one or two 
videos (elevation, outrage, both elevation and outrage, or control). When participants viewed 
both the elevation-inducing and outrage-inducing videos (i.e., dual exposure condition), the 
videos were viewed straight after one another, and the order was randomised. Participants 
then responded to the appraisal and emotion measures. Then they took part in the third-party 
experimental game. Participants received a written as well as verbal debrief at the end of the 
study. Participants also received course credit upon completion of the study.  
Third-party experimental game. We employed a modified experimental game to 
measure third-party bystander compensation and punishment in response to unfairness 
(Fetchenhauer & Huang, 2004; Lotz et al., 2011). Participants took part in this study at the 
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same time as two other particiSDQWV3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHWROGWKHIROORZLQJ³<RXDUHJRLQJWR
participate in an interaction between three parties. All participants will be randomly assigned 
to either one of three possible roles, Player A, B, or C. In the course of this interaction, you 
and the other players can earn points. Each point is equivalent to £0.10. When the 
experimenter has collected all of the data, ten percent of participants will be randomly 
selected by a lottery and will receive their amount of money based on the decisions made in 
their interaction. This means that your decisions in this interaction may determine how much 
you receive if you win the study lottery. Before we start, the computer will now randomly 
DVVLJQHDFKSDUWLFLSDQWWRWKHUROHRIHLWKHU3OD\HU$%RU&´ All participants were in fact 
assigned the role of Player C. Participants were then told³,QWKLVVRFLDOLQWHUDFWLRQ3OD\HU$
has 100 points, Player B has no points, and Player C has 50 points. In Phase 1, Player A may 
allocate a voluntary number of points to Player B.  It is up to Player A to decide how many 
points he or she will allocate to Player B. Player B has no say in how much he or she 
receives. Player A may decide not to allocate any points at all to Player B, or to allocate half 
of the points to Player B. All possible distributions that Player A could make are shown 
EHORZ´3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHWKHQVKRZQDOOWKHSRVVLEOHGLVWULEXWLRQVLQDWDEOHVHHAppendix 
G). Participants were finally told that Player C (i.e., the participant) then has the option to 
compensate Player B (any amount from 0-16 points) or punish Player A (any amount from 0-
16). Participants¶ decisions were made more efficient: every reduction point assigned to 
Player A reduced Player C's number of points by 1, but reduced Player A's number of points 
by 3. Every compensation point assigned to Player B reduced Player C's total number of 
points by 1, but increased Player B's total number of points by 3 (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2004; Lotz et al., 2011). To ensure clarity and understanding examples were provided in table 
formats (see Appendix G). 
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To avoid confounding effects of anger about the unequal distribution we asked 
participants to make their choices while Player A made theirs. Thus, participants (Player C) 
indicated their compensation and reduction points for each possible distribution that Player A 
could make. Participants were told that their decisions would be binding. Furthermore, each 
point in the game was equivalent to £0.10. Participants were told that 10% of participants 
would be selected by a lottery and would receive their amount of money based on the 
decisions made in their interaction. This prize draw approach was employed due to budgetary 
UHDVRQV+RZHYHU)HKUDQG6FKPLGW¶VPHWD-analysis shows that participant¶V
behaviour in experimental games does not change dependent on whether the money 
distribution is individual or by prize draw allocation. For the transcript of the instructions to 
participants see Appendix G.  
A mean score was calculated separately for (1) compensation and for (2) punishment. 
Specifically, the compensation score was computed by creating a mean score of all of 
SDUWLFLSDQW¶VFRPSHQVDWLRQFKRLFHV-16 compensation points) following the five possible 
unequal distributions (i.e., when Player A assigned zero, 10, 20, 30, and 40 points to Player 
B). Similarly, the punishment score was computed by created a mean score of all of 
SDUWLFLSDQW¶VSXQLVKPHQWFKRLFHV-16 punishment points) following the five possible 
unequal distributions (i.e., when Player A assigned zero, 10, 20, 30, and 40 points to Player 
B). 
Experimental manipulations. The same elevation-inducing (2.14-minutes), outrage-
inducing (2.42-minutes), and control (2.42-minutes) videos as described in Pilot Study 1 (see 
Chapter 3 and Appendix A) were employed.  
Measures. Participants responded to the measures in the following order: first 
appraisals, then emotions, and then the behavioural measure (each on separate pages). 
Presentation of items within the appraisal and emotion constructs were randomised. 
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Appraisals were measured using the same items as described in Study 1 (see Chapter 4 and 
Appendix C). Feeling of moral elevation and moral outrage were measured using the same 
items as described in Pilot Study 1 (see Chapter 3 and Appendix B). Participants responded to 
the appraisals on a 5-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much), and to the emotions on a 
7-point scale from 1 (GLGQ¶WIHHOLWDWDOl) to 7 (felt it very strongly). 
Results and Discussion 
Table 5.3 shows the correlations among variables, as well as their means and standard 
deviations. Data were analysed using 2 (Elevation: viewed vs. not viewed) X 2 (Outrage: 
viewed vs. not viewed) ANOVAs.  
Emotions and appraisals. There was a significant main effect of Elevation. 
Participants who had watched the elevation-inducing video scored higher on elevation 
appraisals, F (1, 74) = 135.03, p Ș2 = .65 (M = 4.54, SE = 0.11) and on feelings of 
elevation, F (1, 74) = 61.81, p Ș2 = .46 (M = 5.65, SE = 0.16), than those who had not 
watched the elevation-inducing video (Mappraisals = 2.63, SE = 0.12; Melevation = 3.87, SE = 
0.16). 
There was a significant main effect of Outrage. Participants who had watched the 
outrage-inducing video scored higher on outrage appraisals, F (1, 74) = 50.33, p Ș2 
= .41 (M = 3.85, SE = 0.17), and feelings of outrage, F (1, 74) = 85.58, p Ș2 = .54 (M 
= 4.90, SE = 0.19) than those who had not watched the outrage-inducing video (Mappraisals = 
2.13, SE = 0.17; Moutrage = 2.42, SE = 0.19).  
Additionally, there was a significant main effect of Outrage on feelings of elevation, 
F (1, 74) = 10.05, p  Ș2 = .12, whereby feelings of elevation were significantly lower 
when participants had watched the outrage-inducing video. Furthermore, there was a 
significant Elevation X Outrage interaction effect on feelings of elevation, F (1, 74) = 7.08, p 
 Ș2 = .09. Pairwise comparisons showed that feelings of elevation were significantly 
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higher in the dual exposure (M = 5.59, SE = 0.22) and elevation-only conditions (M = 5.70, 
SE = 0.22) than in the control condition (M = 4.53, SE = 0.24; p < .001). Moreover, feelings 
of elevation were significantly higher in the control condition than in the outrage condition 
(M = 3.21, SE = 0.23; p < .001). See Table 5.4 for all cell-specific descriptives.  
Compensation and punishment. There was a significant Elevation X Outrage 
interaction on compensation, F (1, 74) = 5.65, p  Ș2 = .07. There were no other 
significant effects (S¶V > .105). Pairwise comparisons showed that participants in the outrage-
only condition compensated significantly more (M = 5.70, SE = 0.67) than those in the 
control condition (M = 3.02, SE = 0.69, p = .007) and than those in the dual exposure 
condition (M = 3.62, SE = 0.66, p = .031). The elevation-only condition did not increase (or 
decrease) compensation relative to any other condition (M = 4.11, SE = 0.64, S¶V > .250) (see 
Figure 5.2). See Table 5.4 for all cell-specific descriptives.  
Despite consistent main effects of the manipulations resulting in high correlations 
between emotions and their respective appraisals, the different patterns of interaction effects 
on elevation and on behaviour meant that appraisals and emotions did not correlate with the 
behavioural outcome. This meant that we could not test for mediation.  
To summarise, effects of the elevation-inducing and outrage-inducing videos in Study 
4 offer further partial support for the appraisal tendency framework (Horberg et al., 2011). 
The outrage-inducing video, but not the elevation-inducing video, increased outrage 
appraisals, feelings of outrage, and justice-relevant behaviour.  
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Table 5.3 
Study 4: Means, Standard Deviations, Confidence Intervals, and Correlations among Key 
Variables 
Variable Mean (SD) 95% CI 2 3     4 5 6 
1.Elevation 4.45 (1.69) [4.19, 4.71] -.23* .56*** -.33** -.10 -.01 
2.Outrage 3.63 (2.14) [3.30, 3.96]  -.09 .64*** .14 .06 
3. Elevation appraisals 3.49 (1.15) [3.31, 3.67]   -.19 -.07 -.01 
4. Outrage appraisals 3.08 (1.35) [2.87, 3.29]    .02 .13 
5. Compensation 3.27 (0.08) [3.11, 3.44]     .13 
6. Punishment 3.20 (0.08) [3.04, 3.36]      
Note.  N = 76. CI = confidence interval. The emotions were scored on a 7-point scale (1= 
GLGQ¶WIHHOLWDWDOO, 7 = felt it very strongly). The appraisals were scored on a 5-point scale (1= 
not at all, 5 = very much). Compensation and punishment range from zero to 16.  
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Table 5.4 








Cell sizes N = 21 N = 19 N = 20 N = 18 
1.Elevation appraisals 4.55 (0.16) 2.42 (0.17) 4.53 (0.16) 2.83 (0.17) 
2.Outrage appraisals 1.83 (0.23) 3.90 (0.25) 3.80 (0.24) 2.42 (0.25) 
3.Feelings of elevation 5.70 (0.22) 3.21 (0.23) 5.59 (0.22) 4.53 (0.24) 
4.Feelings of outrage 2.32 (0.26) 4.92 (0.27) 4.88 (0.26) 2.51 (0.28) 
5.Compensation 4.11 (0.64) 5.70 (0.67) 3.62 (0.66) 3.02 (0.69) 




4.50 (0.56) 6.18 (0.58) 4.84 (0.57) 4.37 (0.60) 
Note. Table depicts means. Standard errors are provided in brackets. Elevation and outrage 
were scored on a 7-point scale (1 = GLGQ¶WIHHOLWDWDOO 7 = felt it very strongly). Cognitive 
appraisals were scored on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all, 5 = very much). Compensation, 
punishment, and total allocation (a mean score of compensation and punishment combined) 
range from zero to 16 points.  
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Figure 5.2. Study 4: Compensation points given to Player B as a function of condition.  
Note. Error bars depict standard errors.  
 
General Discussion  
The current chapter reports two studies that examined whether the domain specific 
effects of moral elevation and moral outrage on prosocial intentions extend to prosocial 
behaviour. The two studies provided further support for the domain-specificity predictions of 
the appraisal tendency framework (Horberg et al., 2011; Lerner & Keltner, 2000). 
Specifically, in line with the studies reported in Chapter 4, results showed that although 
moral elevation and moral outrage both instigated prosocial responses, the two emotions 
derived from distinctive appraisals and had distinctive effects on prosocial behaviours.  
According to the appraisal tendency framework emotions have domain specific 
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occur if moral elevation predominantly increased benevolence-relevant behaviours (Study 3) 
and if moral outrage predominantly increased justice-relevant behaviours (Study 4). 
Consistent with the appraisal tendency framework and the domain specificity hypothesis, 
Study 3 showed that in the benevolence domain, only moral elevation increased charitable 
donations. Furthermore, this effect was sequentially mediated by elevation appraisals (i.e., 
upholding a moral standard) and then by feelings of elevation. Study 4 showed, in a justice-
relevant domain, that only moral outrage affected prosocial behaviour in a third-party 
bystander game. In line with previous findings that moral outrage leads to a preference for 
compensation over punishment, moral outrage affected compensation but not punishment in 
Study 4 (cf. Lotz et al., 2011). Thus, in line with Study 6 reported in Chapter 4, results 
showed that the effects of moral elevation and moral outrage on prosociality are domain 
specific, and correspond to their specific appraisal themes.  
The results from dual exposure provided further insight into ways that these 
contrasting appraisals may combine. In Study 3 dual exposure did not inhibit the prosocial 
effects of the alternative emotion. This is in line with findings reported in Chapter 4 and 
suggests flexibility in the appraisal-behaviour link. However, in Study 4, dual exposure 
appeared to inhibit the effect of outrage on compensation. Specifically, compensation was 
reduced following dual exposure relative to outrage-only exposure. This may be because the 
experimental procedure involved a delay between the emotion induction phase and the 
EHKDYLRXUDOPHDVXUHPHQWSKDVHSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHUHTXLUHGWR³ZDLW´IRUHDFKRWKHUDVDOO
³SOD\HUV´KDGWRVWDUWWKHJDPHDWWhe same time). This finding raises the interesting 
possibility that the sociomoral concerns of a non-domain relevant emotion may interfere with 
a domain-relevant emotion after a period of time. We have shown this can arise when the 
domain is justice-related, and future research will be needed to explore whether similar 
effects occur when the domain is benevolence related.   
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Theoretical and Applied Implications 
Prior research indicates that the appraisal tendency framework can help to account for 
the influence of emotions on moral outcomes (e.g., Tapias et al., 2007). The present research 
substantially informs and extends this literature by selectively comparing the behavioural 
effects of two emotions that are highly distinctive (even opposing) in terms of their appraisals 
but comparable in terms of their action tendencies. This direct comparison enabled a clear 
test of whether moral emotions promote prosocial behaviours across moral domains, or 
whether their effects are domain specific.  
As highlighted in Chapter 2, previous ATF research has predominantly examined the 
effects of discrete emotions on distinctive action tendencies (e.g., to harm others or to help 
others; Iyer et al., 2007; Lerner et al., 2004; Pagano & Huo, 2007). Yet, very little research 
explored whether effects of moral emotions are domain specific (e.g., benevolence, justice, or 
purity; Tapias et al., 2007). Together, Chapters 4 and 5 provide strong evidence for the 
notion that moral emotions have domain specific effects on prosociality (including both 
intentions and behaviours).  
The findings of Studies 3 and 4 contribute to the moral psychology literature by 
measuring behavioural rather than attitudinal or judgmental outcomes (see Teper et al., 
2015). Indeed, there is a significant lack of behavioural research within the moral psychology 
field. The current studies demonstrate the feasibility of behavioural measurement in empirical 
studies. Furthermore, the behavioural findings of Studies 3 and 4 are in line with the findings 
of Studies 1 and 2 that measured prosocial intentions. As prosocial intentions and behaviours 
were not measured within the same studies, it is not possible to know whether intentions were 
predictive of behaviours. Nevertheless, the convergent findings for prosocial intentions 
(Chapter 4) and prosocial behaviours (Chapter 5) suggest that prosocial intentions were not 
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dissociated from prosocial behaviours. Instead, the effects of moral elevation and moral 
outrage on prosocial intentions were replicated when measuring prosocial behaviours.  
The ATF offers a theoretically sound as well as tangible and practical framework for 
practitioners to understand the effects of emotions on prosocial behaviours and utilise them 
accordingly (Horberg et al., 2011). In applying the ATF to moral elevation and moral 
outrage, the current research showed how each emotion should be used appropriately to 
increase distinctive prosocial behaviours. Put differently, different behavioural goals required 
different emotional states. Specifically, the present studies showed that moral elevation 
strongly motivates benevolent behaviours. Thus, when raising money or attracting volunteers, 
charities should show uncommon acts of kindness in their campaign content. This should 
instigate feelings of moral elevation, make salient the sociomoral concern of benevolence, 
and thus encourage the uptake of benevolent behaviours. Moreover, moral outrage strongly 
motivates justice behaviours. Thus, when attempting to increase third-party action or 
intervention in response to injustices or unfairnesses (e.g., through collective protest or 
petition signing) charities should show moral transgressions in their campaign content. This 
should instigate feelings of moral outrage, make salient the sociomoral concern of justice, 
and thus encourage the uptake of justice behaviours.  
Limitations and Caveats 
Similarly to Studies 1 and 2 (see Chapter 4), across Studies 3 and 4 ratings of moral 
elevation and moral outrage were either not particularly high or differed by only 2-points 
from the control video. As discussed in Chapter 4, it seems highly doubtful that the control 
stimulus instigated feelings of moral elevation or moral outrage. Instead, it seems likely that 
participants in the control condition felt as though they should report some sort of emotional 
response, rather than actually feeling any emotion. The significant differences between the 
emotion-inducing videos and the control video on respective emotion ratings (across Studies 
MORAL ELEVATION AND MORAL OUTRAGE 120
   
 
1 to 4), and the consistency of the overall empirical findings with the theoretical predictions 
provide confidence in our stimuli. 
In Chapter 4, results showed that both types of appraisals correlated directly with 
prosociality in Study 1 (i.e., benevolence intentions), but neither type of appraisals correlated 
with prosociality in Study 2 (i.e., justice intentions). It was suggested that participants who 
dispositionally evaluate behaviour with reference to moral standards (regardless of the 
particular situation) may also be more benevolent, but that it is unclear why they might not 
also engage in justice-related actions. The results of Studies 3 and 4 echoed the above 
findings. Specifically, in Study 3 both types of appraisals correlated with prosociality (i.e., 
benevolence-relevant behaviour), in contrast in Study 4 neither type of appraisals correlated 
with prosociality (i.e., justice-relevant behaviour). As suggested in Chapter 4, future research 
should therefore investigate whether particular individual differences can explain these 
relationships. 
In Study 4 compensation did not differ significantly between the elevation-inducing 
and outrage-inducing video. Nevertheless, while the outrage-inducing video increased 
compensation significantly relative to the control, the elevation-inducing video did not. 
Therefore, Study 4 provides support for the notion that the predominant influence over 
justice-relevant intention should be outrage. 
Furthermore, the current research focused on applying the ATF to moral elevation and 
moral outrage to understand their effects on prosocial intentions and behaviours. However, 
future research should also examine how dispositional traits (such as empathy, perspective 
taking, or belief in a just world) are implicated in the link between moral emotions and 
domain specific prosocial behaviours. It is plausible that such dispositional traits may 
moderate the effects of moral emotions on prosocial behaviours.  
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Conclusion 
The present research extended the findings from Chapter 4 to examine whether and 
how moral elevation and moral outrage influence prosocial behaviours. In line with the 
findings from Chapter 3 and with the appraisal tendency framework, results showed that 
moral elevation and moral outrage have distinctive effects on prosocial behaviour. The 
findings inform theoretical development of moral emotion theory and highlight important 
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Chapter 6 
Is Moral Elevation an Approach-Oriented Emotion? 
Two studies were designed to test the contention that moral elevation should be 
conceptualised as an approach-oriented emotion. The studies examined the relationship 
between moral elevation and the behavioural activation and inhibition systems. Study 5 (N =  
80) showed that individual differences in moral elevation were associated with individual 
differences in behavioural activation but not inhibition. Study 6 (N =  78) showed that an 
elevation-inducing video promoted equally high levels of approach orientation as an 
outrage-inducing video and significantly higher levels of approach orientation than a control 
video. Furthermore, the elevation-inducing stimulus (vs. the control condition) significantly 
promoted prosocial motivation and this effect was sequentially mediated by feelings of moral 
elevation followed by an approach-oriented state. Overall the results show unambiguous 
support for the proposal that moral elevation is an approach-oriented emotion. Applied and 
theoretical implications are discussed.6 
 
Researchers have suggested that two systems inform and guide much of our 
behaviour. The behavioural activation system (BAS; Gray, 1982) manages appetitive and 
approach motivations and behaviours. The behavioural inhibition system (BIS; Gray, 1982) 
                                                 
 
6
 Studies 5 and 6 reported in this chapter form part of the following manuscript: Van de Vyver, J., & Abrams, D. 
(in press). Is moral elevation an approach-oriented emotion? The Journal of Positive Psychology.  
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manages aversive, avoidant, and withdrawal-oriented motivations and behaviours. 
Researchers have typically associated the BAS with positive affect and the BIS with negative 
affect (Gray, 1982, 1994). Indeed, Carver and White (1994) found that individual differences 
in BAS were positively associated with individual differences in positive affect, while 
individual differences in BIS were positively associated with individual differences in 
negative affect.  
More recent evidence shows that negative emotions can also be associated with the 
BAS. For example, ample research has now shown that anger (or outrage; see Chapters 1 and 
2) is high in approach orientation (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Harmon-Jones, 2007). 
Therefore, although general negative and positive affect may have quite specific and 
consistent relationships with the motivational system, individual emotional states (e.g., anger, 
inspiration, disgust) may have different and more unique relationships with behavioural 
activation and inhibition systems.  
The current research tests whether moral elevation, a relatively under-researched 
emotion to date, is associated with the BIS or the BAS. More specifically, we test evidence 
for the contention that elevation should be conceptualised as a high approach emotion.  
Researchers have recently begun to explore the nature of moral elevation, in particular 
focusing on its behavioural outcomes. Moral elevation is a positive emotion experienced 
when witnessing a virtuous act, one that improves the welfare of others (Algoe & Haidt, 
2009). Moral elevation consists of a feeling of warmth and expansion that is accompanied by 
admiration and affection for the person(s) who performed the exemplary behaviour. The 
action tendency of moral elevation is to emulate the moral exemplar, and to become a better 
person oneself (Haidt, 2003).  
Empirical studies have consistently shown that moral elevation promotes prosocial 
behaviours (e.g., Cox, 2010; Schnall et al., 2010). Prosocial behaviours are those that benefit 
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others (Penner et al., 2005). For example, moral elevation promotes volunteering, helping the 
experimenter, and organisational citizenship (Cox, 2010; Schnall et al., 2010; Vianello et al., 
2010).  
Based on this evidence that moral elevation is a positive emotion which produces 
prosocial behavioural responses, we contend that moral elevation should be moderately or 
strongly associated with the BAS, and therefore motivate an approach-orientation. 
A contrasting hypothesis seems plausible on the basis of the one study that has, 
somewhat indirectly, explored the behavioural activation and inhibition systems of moral 
elevation. The authors of this study VXJJHVWHGWKDWHOHYDWLRQLV³DFDOPHUHPRWLRQZKLFK
seems to increase openness and warmth towards others; it may not lead to immediate 
DOWUXLVWLFDFWLRQZKHQVXFKDFWLRQLVGLIILFXOW´$OJRH	+DLGWSIn their study, 
$OJRHDQG+DLGWFRGHGSDUWLFLSDQW¶VRSHQ-ended and self-reported motivations and 
actions following feelings of elevation, admiration, gratitude, or joy. One of their codes was 
³HQHUJLVDWLRQ´ZKLFKZDVGHVFULEHGDV³ZKHQSHRSOHLQGLFDWHGWKDWWKH\ZDQWHGWRGRWKLQJV
OLNHMXPSXSDQGGRZQRUVKRXWZLWKH[FLWHPHQW´SAnalyses revealed that 
admiration and joy involved energisation but elevation did not. Moreover, Algoe and Haidt 
(2009) noted that elevation is associated with a release in oxytocin, which has sedative and 
stress-reducing effects (Silvers & Haidt, 2008). These findings seem to indicate that elevation 
may not be strongly associated with the BAS, and may therefore not be considered as an 
emotion that is high in approach.   
The Current Research 
$OJRHDQG+DLGW¶Vstudy used coding of participants¶ open-ended motivational 
VWDWHPHQWVDV³HQHUJLVDWLRQ´WRFRQFHSWXDOLVHHOHYDWLRQDVDQHPotion that is low in approach-
orientation. However, this code seems unlikely to cover all aspects of this motivational 
system. Given this limitation and the contrasting hypotheses based on inferences from prior 
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research, it seems that further research is necessary to more concretely test the relationship 
between elevation and the behavioural activation and inhibition systems.  
Study 5 (N = 80) examines the relationship between individual differences in moral 
elevation and individual differences in the BIS and the BAS, using well-established measures 
of these constructs. In order to effectively differentiate these relationships, Study 5 also 
measures general positive and negative affect, as well as individual differences in outrage and 
shame, the former consistently conceptualised as an approach-oriented emotion and the latter 
as an avoidance-oriented emotion. Given the well-established relationships between general 
negative and positive affect and the BIS and the BAS (Carver & White, 1994), their effects 
will be accounted for in regression analyses. Comparing effects of elevation to those of 
shame (an avoidance-oriented emotion) and outrage (an approach-oriented emotion) will help 
inform the relationships between elevation and the BIS and the BAS. For example, if effects 
of elevation mirror those of shame, then elevation may be an avoidance-oriented emotion. In 
contrast, if effects of elevation mirror those of outrage, then elevation may be an approach-
oriented emotion. If elevation relates to the BAS but more weakly than outrage does, then it 
may not be a strong approach-oriented emotion. If elevation relates to the BAS more strongly 
than outrage does, then it may be a particularly strong approach-oriented emotion.  
Study 6 (N = 78) directly manipulates moral emotions in order to test whether an 
elevation-inducing stimulus (as compared to an outrage -inducing and a control stimulus) 




Participants. Eighty American participants (64.2% female) with a mean age of 37.79 
(SD = 14.26) completed an on-line questionnaire (via the Qualtrics software platform). 
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Sample sizes were determined on the basis of providing sufficient power (.8) to detect a 
medium to large effect size. 3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHVDPSOHGIURP$PD]RQ¶V0HFKDQLFDO7XUND
site for web-based data collection that functions through a participant compensation system. 
Procedure. Participants were given access to a secure web link which sent them to an 
on-line questionnaire. Informed consent and demographic information were obtained. 
Participants then responded to the emotion and motivational orientation measures. 
Specifically, participants completed dispositional measures of elevation, outrage, shame, 
approach and avoidance, and measures of current affect. Participants received (on-line) 
written debrief and compensation upon completion.  
Dispositional measures. Participants first responded to the emotion constructs. Each 
of these was shown on a separate page. Order of presentation of the three emotion constructs 
was randomised and so was the order of the items within each construct. Participants then 
completed the approach/avoidance measure. Presentation of items was again randomised. 
Finally, participants completed the general positive and negative affect measure. Presentation 
of items was randomised.   
Moral elevation. Moral elevation was measured using a six-item scale taken from 
Diessner and colleagues HJ³:KHQSHUFHLYLQJDQDFWRIPRUDOEHDXW\, feel changes 
in my body, such as a lump in my throat, an expansion in my chest, faster heart beat, or other 
ERGLO\UHVSRQVHV´³,QRWLFHPRUDOEHDXW\LQKXPDQEHLQJV´³:KHQSHUFHLYLQJDQDFWRI
PRUDOEHDXW\,ILQGWKDW,GHVLUHWREHFRPHDEHWWHUSHUVRQ´). Moral beauty was defined to 
SDUWLFLSDQWVDV³The statements below refer to experiences in which you perceive or hear 
about some person demonstrating an impressive act of charity or loyalty or kindness or 
compassion or forgiveness or sacrifice for others or sincere service to others. We refer to 
WKHVHDVDFWVRIPRUDOEHDXW\´Participants responded from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
MORAL ELEVATION AND MORAL OUTRAGE 128
   
 
(strongly agree). A mean score of the six items was computed to form the moral elevation 
measure (see Appendix H for all of the items). &URQEDFK¶VDOSKDZDV 
Moral outrage. Moral outrage was measured using an 11-item scale taken from 
Vitaglione and Barnett (2003) HJ³,IHHORXWUDJHGE\LQMXVWLFHVGRQHWRRWKHUV´³,WERWKHUV
me when I see that others are not fairly treaWHG´³,JHWDQJU\ZKHQDIULHQGRIPLQHLVKXUWE\
VRPHRQHHOVH´). Participants responded from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). A 
mean score of the 11 items was computed to form the moral outrage measure (see Appendix 
H for all of the items). &URQEDFK¶VDOSKDZDV 
Shame. Shame was measured using a four-item sub-scale taken from Cohen, Wolf, 
3DQWHUDQG,QVNRHJ³<RXPDNHDPLVWDNHDWZRUNDQGILQGRXWDFRZRUNHULV
blamed for the error. Later, your coworker confronts you about your mistake. What is the 
OLNHOLKRRGWKDW\RXZRXOGIHHOOLNHDFRZDUG"´³You successfully exaggerate your damages 
in a lawsuit. Months later, your lies are discovered and you are charged with perjury. What is 
the likelihood that you would think you are a GHVSLFDEOHKXPDQEHLQJ"´) Participants 
responded from 1 (very unlikely) to 7 (very likely). A mean score of the four items was 
computed to form the shame measure (see Appendix H for all of the items). &URQEDFK¶VDOSKD
was .76.  
Approach and avoidance. Approach and avoidance orientations were measured using 
&DUYHUDQG:KLWH¶V%,6%$6TXHVWLRQQDLUH7KH%,6DYRLGDQFHVFDOHFRQWDLQVVHYHQ
LWHPVHJ³,ZRUU\DERXWPDNLQJPLVWDNHV´³&ULWLFLVPRUVFROGLQJKXUWVPHTXLWHDELW´). A 
mean score of the seven items was computed to form the BIS measure (see Appendix I for all 
of the items). &URQEDFK¶VDOSKDIRUWKH%,6VFDOHZDV7KH%$6DSSURDFKVFDOHFRQVLVWV
RIWKUHHVXEVFDOHVGULYH³,JRRXWRIP\ZD\WRJHWWKLQJV,ZDQW´³When I want 
something I usually go all-RXWWRJHWLW´ZKLFKFRQWDLQVLWHPVWKDWSHUWDLQ³WRWKHSHUVLVWHQW
SXUVXLWRIGHVLUHGJRDOV´IXQVHHNLQJ³,FUDYHH[FLWHPHQWDQGQHZVHQVDWLRQV´³I'm 
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DOZD\VZLOOLQJWRWU\VRPHWKLQJQHZLI,WKLQNLWZLOOEHIXQ´), which haVLWHPV³UHIOHFWLQJ
both a desire for new rewards and a willingness to approach a potentially rewarding event on 
WKHVSXURIWKHPRPHQW´DQGUHZDUGUHVSRQVLYHQHVV³,WZRXOGH[FLWHPHWRZLQD
FRQWHVW´³When I'm doing well at something I love to keep DWLW´), which contains items that 
³IRFXVRQSRVLWLYHUHVSRQVHVWRWKHRFFXUUHQFHRUDQWLFLSDWLRQRIUHZDUG´S
&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDVIRUWKHWKUHHVXEVFDOHVZHUHDQGUHVSHFWLYHO\ Mean scores 
were calculated for each of the three sub-scales (see Appendix I for all of the items). 
Participants responded to all BIS and BAS items from 1 (very false for me) to 4 (very true for 
me). 
General positive and negative affect. General positive and negative affect was 
measured using the 20-item positive and negative affect schedule (PANAS, Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988). Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they felt 20 different 
states (e.g., interested, alert, jittery). Participants responded from 1 (very slightly or not at all) 




Descriptives. Intercorrelations among variables, as well as their means and standard 
deviations, are presented in Table 6.1. 
Correlational analyses showed that moral elevation correlated positively and 
significantly with BAS-reward (r = .43, p < .001). Quite similarly, outrage correlated 
positively and significantly with BAS-reward (r = .37, p = .001) and with BIS (r = .29, p = 
.009). Shame correlated negatively with BAS-drive (r = -.24, p = .030) and positively with 
BIS (r = .45, p < .001). There were no other significant relationships between each of the 
emotions and BIS or BAS. However, when adjusting for Type I error and performing a 
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%RQIHURQQLFRUUHFWLRQĮSDLUZLVHFRPSDULVRQV WKHUHODWLRQVKLSVEHWZHHQ
outrage and BIS (r = .29, p = .009) and shame and BAS-drive (r = -.24, p = .030) 
disappeared.  
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Table 6.1 
Study 5: Means, Standard Deviations, Confidence Intervals, and Correlations among Key Variables 
Variable Mean (SD) 95% CI 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.Elevation 3.85 (0.82) [3.66, 4.03] .62*** .32** .08 .19 .43*** .22 
2. Outrage 3.94 (0.64) [3.79, 4.08]  .39*** -.09 .19 .37** .29** 
3.Shame 5.87 (1.13) [5.62, 6.12]   -.24* -.14 .07 .45*** 
4.Approach-drive 2.55 (0.70) [2.40, 2.71]    .57*** .54*** -.19 
5.Approach-fun 2.62 (0.65) [2.47, 2.76]     .48*** -.05 
6.Approach-reward 3.26 (0.49) [3.15, 3.37]      .13 
7.Avoidance 2.98 (0.68) [2.83, 3.13]       
Note. N = 80. CI = confidence interval. Elevation and outrage were scored on a 7-point scale (1= GLGQ¶WIHHOLWDWDOO, 7 = felt it very strongly). 
Shame was scored on a 7-point scale (1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely). Approach and avoidance were scored on a 4-point scale (1 = very false 
for me, 4 = very true for me).  
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Regression analyses. Regression analyses were conducted to further examine the 
relationships between the emotions and the approach and avoidance orientations. 
Specifically, four sets of regression analyses were conducted to test the predictive effects of 
each of the emotions on (1) BIS, (2) BAS-drive, (3) BAS-fun, and (4) BAS-reward, while 
controlling for each other and for general positive and negative affect.  
BIS. The first regression model was significant, F (5, 74) = 13.48, p < .001, R2 = .48. 
Shame sLJQLILFDQWO\SUHGLFWHG%,6ȕ p  ZKLOHHOHYDWLRQȕ p = .332) and 
outrage ȕ p = .116) did not.  
BAS-drive. The second regression model was significant, F (5, 74) = 3.12, p = .013, 
R2 = .17. Shame significantly (and negatively) predicted BAS-GULYHȕ -.26, p = .030), 
ZKLOHHOHYDWLRQȕ p = .202) and outrage ȕ -.13, p = .365) did not.  
BAS-fun. The third regression model was not significant, F (5, 74) = 1.96, p = .095, 
R2 = .12. However, effects mirrored those of BAS-drive, whereby only shame significantly 
(and negatively) predicted BAS-IXQȕ -.27, p = .027).   
BAS-reward. The final regression model was significant, F (5, 74) = 5.24, p < .001, 
R2 = .26. Elevation significant predicted BAS-UHZDUGȕ p = .040), ZKLOHVKDPHȕ -
.11, p = .335) and outrage ȕ p = .108) did not.  
Discussion 
The findings regarding moral elevation are in line with the hypothesis that it is an 
approach-oriented emotion. Individual differences in moral elevation were significantly 
related to individual differences in BAS. Specifically, the higher participants scored on moral 
elevation, the higher they scored on BAS-reward. Moreover, after accounting for the other 
emotions as well as general positive and negative affect, moral elevation did not relate to 
BIS.  
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Findings for shame are in line with previous research. Individual differences in shame 
were related to individual differences in BIS (positively) and BAS (negatively). The findings 
for outrage are less clear because the bivariate correlational relationship with BAS-reward 
became non-significant once other emotions and general positive negative and positive affect 
were accounted for. These findings are not in line with previous research, which demonstrate 
that outrage is high in approach orientation (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Harmon-Jones, 
2007). The current study did differ from previous research in two ways. First, it measured 
outrage at injustices against others rather than injustices against the self. Second, while 
previous research has compared outrage to positive emotions, this research is the first to 
compare it to moral elevation. Study 6 will test whether these findings relating to outrage are 
replicated when using an experimental rather than correlational design.   
The current findings are consistent with the hypothesis that elevation is an approach-
oriented emotion. Indeed, it was the only emotion that positively related to BAS (BAS-
reward specifically) in the regression analyses. Shame also related with BAS (BAS-drive and 
BAS-fun), but these relationships were negative. However, given the correlational design of 
the study, it is not possible to establish causal relationships. Therefore, Study 6 employs an 
experimental design to test the effect of an elevation-inducing stimulus on approach and 
avoidance orientation, as well as on prosocial motivation more specifically.  
Study 6 
Study 6 examines the effects of an elevation-inducing stimulus, as compared to a 
control stimulus, on approach and avoidance orientations, and on prosocial motivation. As 
the effects for outrage in Study 5 were inconsistent with the existing literature (Carver & 
Harmon-Jones, 2009; Harmon-Jones, 2007), an outrage-inducing condition is included in 
Study 6 in order to clarify the inconsistencies of Study 5. Furthermore, as Study 5 established 
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that elevation is not an avoidance-oriented emotion, Study 6 does not include shame as a 
comparison emotion. 
Given the results of Study 5, it is hypothesised that the elevation-inducing video will 
lead to higher levels of approach-orientation than the control video. In contrast, levels of 
avoidance should be low across conditions. Furthermore, it is hypothesised that the elevation-
inducing video will lead to higher levels of prosocial motivation than the control video. 
Finally, the effect of the elevation-inducing video on prosocial motivation should be 
sequentially mediated by feelings of elevation (rather than outrage) and then by the approach-
oriented state.  
Despite the uncertain conclusions regarding dispositional outrage in Study 5 the 
literature clearly suggests that induced outrage should lead to higher levels of approach 
orientation (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Harmon-Jones, 2007) and prosocial motivation 
(Thomas et al., 2009) than the control condition. Furthermore, the effect of the outrage 
inducing video on prosocial motivation should be sequentially mediated by feelings of 
outrage (rather than elevation) and then by the approach-oriented state. 
Method 
Participants and design. Seventy-eight American participants (52.60% female) with 
a mean age of 34.83 (SD = 11.02) completed an on-line questionnaire (via Qualtrics). Sample 
sizes were determined on the basis of providing sufficient power (.8) to detect a medium to 
large effect size. 3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHVDPSOHGIURP$PD]RQ¶V0HFKDQLFDO7XUNDVLWHIRUZHE-
based data collection that functions through a participant compensation system. Participants 
were randomly assigned to Condition in a one factor between-participants design with three 
levels (Condition: elevation vs. outrage vs. control). Data were collected using an on-line 
questionnaire.  
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Procedure. Participants were given access to a secure web link which sent them to an 
on-line questionnaire. Informed consent and demographic information were obtained, after 
which participants were randomly assigned to watch one of three videos (elevation, outrage, 
and control). Participants then responded to the emotion and motivational orientation 
measures. Participants received (on-line) written debrief and compensation upon completion.  
Experimental manipulations. The elevation (2.14-minutes) and control (2.42-
minutes) videos as described in Pilot Study 1 were employed (see Chapter 3). As the sample 
was American (rather than British), the outrage-inducing (2.58-minutes) video as described in 
Pilot Study 2 was employed (see Chapter 3 and Appendix A).  
Measures. Measures were presented to participants in the following order: first 
emotions, then action readiness, and then prosocial motivation (each on a separate page). 
Presentation of items within each of these three constructs was randomised.  All items were 
measured on a 7-point scale (1 = GLGQ¶WIHHOLWDWDOO, 7 = felt it very strongly).  
Emotion. Moral elevation and moral outrage were measured using the same items as 
described in Pilot Study 1 (see Chapter 3 and Appendix B).  
Action readiness. Items were drawn from Frijda DQGFROOHDJXHV¶(1989) list of action 
readiness items. We used the items that directly measured approach versus avoidance 
RULHQWDWLRQ$SSURDFKRULHQWDWLRQZDVPHDVXUHGXVLQJWKHIROORZLQJWZRLWHPV³,ZDQWWR
DSSURDFKWRPDNHFRQWDFW´DQG³,ZDQWHGWREHRUVWD\FORVHWREHUHFHSWLYHWRVRPHRQH´r 
= .79, p < .001). A mean score of these two items formed the approach measure. Avoidance 
RULHQWDWLRQZDVPHDVXUHGXVLQJWKHIROORZLQJWZRLWHPV³,ZDQWHGWRKDYHQRWKLQJWRGR
ZLWKVRPHWKLQJRUVRPHRQHWREHERWKHUHGE\LWDVOLWWOHDVSRVVLEOHWRVWD\DZD\´DQG³I 
wanted to sink into the ground, to disappear from the Earth, QRWWREHQRWLFHGE\DQ\RQH´r = 
.61, p < .001). A mean score of these two items formed the avoidance measure 
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Prosocial motivation. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they felt 
HDFKRIWKHIROORZLQJWKLQJVZKLOHZDWFKLQJWKHYLGHR³ZDQWWRKHOSRWKHUV´³IHHOOLNHGRLQJ
JRRGIRURWKHUV´³GRQRWZDQWWRKHOSRWKHUV´DQG³GRQRWFDUHDERXWDVVLVWLQJRWKHUV´A 
mean score of these four items formed the prosocial motivation measure. &URQEDFK¶VDOSKD
was .77.  
Results 
Descriptives. Intercorrelations among variables, as well as their means and standard 
deviations, are presented in Table 6.2.  
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Table 6.2 
Study 6: Means, Standard Deviations, Confidence Intervals, and Correlations among Key Variables 
Variable Mean (SD) 95% CI 2 3 4 5 
1.Elevation 4.13 (1.55) [3.78, 4.48] -.18 .41*** .01 .36** 
2.Outrage 2.97 (1.98) [2.53, 3.42]  .42*** .36** .24* 
3.Approach 3.83 (1.78) [3.43, 4.24]   .21 .62*** 
4.Avoidance 1.93 (1.20) [1.66, 2.20]    -.15 
5. Prosocial motivation 5.70 (1.22) [5.43, 5.98]     
Note. N = 78. CI = confidence interval. All measures were scored on a 7-point scale (1= GLGQ¶WIHHOLWDWDOO, 7 = felt it very strongly). 
S< .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.  
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Table 6.3 
Study 6: Means, Standard Errors, and Cell Sizes for each Condition 
 Condition 
 Elevation-only video Outrage-only video Control video 
Cell sizes N = 26 N = 28 N = 24 
1.Feelings of elevation 5.45 (0.24) 3.38 (0.23) 3.56 (0.25) 
2.Feelings of outrage 2.02 (0.26) 4.96 (0.25) 1.69 (0.27) 
3.Approach 4.35 (0.32) 4.39 (0.30) 2.63 (0.33) 
4.Avoidance 1.77 (0.23) 2.29 (0.22) 1.69 (0.24) 
5.Prosocial motivation 6.07 (0.23) 5.94 (0.22) 5.03 (0.23) 
Note. Table depicts means. Standard errors are provided in brackets. All measures were 
scored on a 7-point scale (1 = GLGQ¶WIeel it at all; 7 = felt it very strongly).  
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Emotions. Mixed model analyses of variance testing the interaction effect of 
Condition (elevation vs. outrage vs. control) x Emotion self-reports (elevation vs. outrage) 
revealed a significant interaction, F (2, 75) = 61.48, p Ș2 = .62. Pairwise comparisons 
showed that feelings of elevation were higher following the elevation-inducing (M = 5.45, SE 
= 0.24) than following the outrage-inducing (M = 3.38, SE = 0.23) and control (M = 3.56, SE 
= 0.25) videos (ps < .001, respectively), F (2, 75) = 22.35, p Ș2 = 37. Feelings of 
outrage were higher following the outrage-inducing (M = 4.96, SE = 0.25) than following the 
elevation-inducing (M = 2.02, SE = 0.26) and control (M = 1.69, SE = 0.27) videos (ps < 
.001, respectively), F (2, 75) = 50.77, p Ș2 = .58. See Table 6.3 for all cell-specific 
descriptives.  
Motivational orientation. A mixed model analysis of variance with motivational 
orientation (approach vs. avoidance) as a two-level within participants variable and Condition 
(elevation vs. outrage vs. control) as a three-level between participants variable revealed a 
significant main effect of motivational orientation, F (1, 75) = 81.29, p < .001, Ș2 = .52 and a 
significant main effect of Condition, F (2, 75) = 8.34, p = .001, Ș2 = .18. The main effects 
were qualified by a significant interaction effect, F (2, 75) = 5.27, p = .007, Ș2 = .12.  
Pairwise comparisons showed that approach orientation was significantly higher 
following the elevation-inducing (M = 4.35, SE = 0.32) and outrage-inducing videos (M = 
4.39, SE = 0.30) than following the control video (M = 2.63, SE = 0.33, p¶V < .001), F (2, 75) 
= 9.78, p Ș2 = .21. There was no significant difference between the elevation-inducing 
and outrage-inducing videos (p = .915). Avoidance orientation did not differ by condition 
(Melevation =1.77, SE = 0.23; Moutrage = 2.29, SE = 0.22; Mcontrol = 1.69, SE = 0.24; all p¶V!
.072), F (2, 75) = 2.01, p  Ș2 = .05.  
Moreover, pairwise comparisons showed that approach was significantly higher than 
avoidance following the elevation-inducing (F (1, 75) = 51.45, p Ș2 = .41), outrage-
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inducing (F (1, 75) = 37.05, p Ș2 = .33), and control (F (1, 75) = 6.29, p  Ș2 = 
.08) videos. Nevertheless, the effect sizes for the differences between approach and 
avoidance orientations were much larger following the elevation-inducing and outrage-
inducing videos than following the control video (see Figure 6.1). See Table 6.3 for all cell-
specific descriptives.  
 
 
Figure 6.1. Study 6: Motivational orientation as a function of condition.  
Note. Error bars depict standard errors.  
 
Prosocial motivation. Analyses of variance were conducted to test the effect of 
Condition (elevation vs. outrage vs. control) on prosocial motivation. Results revealed a 
significant effect of Condition, F (2, 75) = 6.03, p  Ș2 = .14. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that prosocial motivation was significantly higher following the elevation-inducing 
















































MORAL ELEVATION AND MORAL OUTRAGE 141
   
 
control (M = 5.03, SE = 0.23, S¶V < .007) video. There was no significant difference in 
prosocial motivation between the elevation-inducing and outrage-inducing videos (p = .679). 
See Table 6.3 for all cell-specific descriptives.  
Mediation analyses. Sequential mHGLDWLRQDQDO\VHVXVLQJ+D\HV¶ 2013, Process 
macro model 6) were conducted to test (1) whether feelings of elevation and then approach 
orientation mediated the effect of the elevation-inducing video on prosocial motivation and 
(2) whether feelings of outrage and then approach orientation mediated the effect of the 
outrage-inducing video on prosocial motivation. Condition (elevation vs. outrage vs. control) 
was dummy coded to produce an elevation condition variable and an outrage condition 
variable. The control condition acted as the reference category. In order to test the 
independent mediating roles of the two emotions, feelings of moral outrage were entered as a 
covariate in the first analysis, and feelings of moral elevation were entered as a covariate in 
the second analysis.  
Results showed that feelings of elevation and then approach orientation significantly 
and sequentially mediated the effect of the elevation-inducing video on prosocial motivation, 
B = 0.34, SE = 0.14, 95CI 0.13/0.71 (indirect effect). The significant total effect of the 
elevation-inducing video on prosocial motivation (B = 0.98, SE = 0.32, t = 3.05, p = .003) 
was reduced to non-significance in the direct model (B = 0.23, SE = 0.33, t = 0.69, p = .491) 
(see Figure 6.2).  
Similarly, results showed that feelings of outrage and then approach orientation 
significantly and sequentially mediated the effect of the outrage-inducing video on prosocial 
motivation, B = 0.47, SE = 0.24, 95CI 0.15/1.09 (indirect effect). The significant total effect 
of the outrage-inducing video on prosocial motivation (B = 0.96, SE = 0.30, t = 3.16, p 
= .002) was reduced to non-significance in the direct model (B = 0.35, SE = 0.40, t = 0.89, p 
= .378) (see Figure 6.2).  




Figure 6.2. Study 6. Unstandardised B coefficients for sequential mediation analyses using Process Macro (Hayes, 2013).  
**p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Discussion  
Results were in line with hypotheses. Specifically, the elevation-inducing and 
outrage-inducing videos led to higher levels of approach orientation than the control video. 
Moreover, the elevation-inducing and outrage-inducing videos led to higher levels of 
prosocial motivation than the control video. Effects of the emotion-inducing videos on 
prosocial motivation were mediated by their respective emotions and then by the approach-
oriented state. Therefore, both elevation and outrage induce an approach (rather than 
avoidance) orientation which in turn leads to a greater willingness to help others.  
Thus, in line with Study 5, the results of Study 6 provide further evidence for the 
hypothesis that elevation is an approach-oriented emotion. Furthermore, the results for 
outrage are in line with existing literature (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Harmon-Jones, 
2007) conceptualising outrage as an emotion high in approach-orientation.  
General Discussion 
The current research is the first to directly test the relationship between moral 
elevation and the behavioural activation and inhibition systems. More specifically, it aimed to 
explore whether elevation can be conceptualised as an approach-oriented emotion. Study 5 
showed that individual differences in elevation (when accounting for general positive and 
negative affect, and two comparison emotions) were positively associated with individual 
differences in the behavioural activation system (the BAS-reward sub-scale specifically) but 
not in the behavioural inhibition system. This provided evidence for the notion that 
dispositional elevation is an approach-oriented, rather than avoidance-oriented, emotion. 
Study 6 showed that an elevation-inducing video, as compared to a control video, 
significantly promoted an approach-oriented state as well as prosocial motivation. Moreover, 
the effect of the elevation-inducing video on prosocial motivation was significantly and 
sequentially mediated by feelings of moral elevation and then by the approach-oriented state. 
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This study showed that situational increases in moral elevation instigate an approach 
orientation. Taken together the two studies provide clear evidence for the notion that 
elevation, whether measured dispositionally or as a situational response, is an approach-
oriented emotion.  
The current findings contribute to the rapidly expanding moral elevation literature. 
First, the findings somewhat contradict those of Algoe and Haidt (2009). Indeed, elevation 
does not appear to be a calmer and sedative emotion and instead strongly promotes a desire to 
do something, to approach, to act, and more specifically, a desire to actively help others. It 
seems likely that the spontaneously self-described responses coded by Algoe and Haidt may 
not have captured the full scope of the approach responses that follow from moral elevation. 
Second, the current findings complement the existing research that has shown the potential of 
moral elevation for promoting a range of prosocial behaviours (Cox, 2010; Schnall et al., 
2010), both in the lab and in the field. Specifically, given the approach-oriented nature of 
elevation, it should effectively promote prosocial behaviour both when the behaviour is easy 
as well as when the behaviour is difficult. In sum, the findings of the current research provide 
yet further evidence for the positive and prosocial potential of moral elevation.   
Limitations and Caveats 
The current research employed outrage (Studies 1 and 2) and shame (Study 1) as 
comparison emotions. These two emotions were employed given their well-established link 
to approach (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Harmon-Jones, 2007) and avoidant (Cohen et 
al., 2011) states respectively. Future research is now needed to compare the behavioural 
activation and inhibition systems of elevation to those of other positive emotions that have 
less obvious action implications (e.g., compassion).  
The findings of the current research suggest that elevation is a strongly approach-
oriented emotion, and therefore should motivate behavioural responses both when they are 
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easy and when they are difficult (see Algoe & Haidt, 2009). However, the current research 
did not measure easy versus difficult prosocial responses and it would be interesting and 
important to develop valid and reliable measures of easy versus difficult prosocial responses 
to better understand the behavioural limits of different emotions (including elevation). 
Conclusion 
The current research provides clear and direct support for the notion that moral 
elevation is associated with the behavioural activation rather than inhibition system, and more 
specifically, that it strongly motivates an approach-oriented rather than avoidance-oriented 
state. These findings disambiguate contradictions in prior evidence, showing that both 
dispositional and situational elevation are associated with increased approach. Encouragingly, 
and in line with past research (Cox, 2010; Schnall et al., 2010), these findings suggest that 
elevation should be a particularly effective emotion for motivating people to pro-actively help 
and benefit others.  
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Chapter 7 
Qualified Prosociality? Comparing Implications of Sympathy and Guilt with Elevation and 
Outrage 
The current chapter examines the distinctiveness of moral elevation and moral 
outrage versus sympathy or guilt as bases for prosociality. Previous research has 
demonstrated that specific component features ± disinterested elicitors and action tendencies 
± are involved in the linkage between moral emotions and the concern for others (Haidt, 
2003). In this chapter I examine two additional component features (stereotyping and self-vs. 
other-focus) that could link elevation and outrage to qualitatively different forms of 
prosociality compared with sympathy or guilt. Study 7 (N =  105) demonstrates that sympathy 
(but not elevation or outrage) instigates undesirable paternalistic stereotypes. Study 8 (N =  
121) shows that guilt (compared with either elevation or outrage) instigates relatively more 
self-focus than other-focus. These studies provide further support for the distinctive roles of 
elevation and outrage as bases of more unqualified prosocial responses than are produced by 
sympathy or guilt. Theoretical and applied implications are discussed.  
 
Vast inequalities and social injustices continue to exist across societies. Yet many 
people remain as passive bystanders. It is essential for research to understand when and why 
people can be mobilised to help and support others. Previous research has shown that guilt, 
sympathy, elevation and outrage can promote prosocial responses (Haidt, 2003). However, it 
has not considered whether the prosocial motivations emanating from elevation and outrage 
differ from the motivations emanating from guilt and sympathy. The present research 
examines the underlying component features of prosocial responses to these four moral 
emotions.  
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Moral emotions may provide a particularly effective strategy for motivating prosocial 
motivation ± wanting to protect or promote the welfare of others (Haidt, 2003; Tangney et al., 
0RUDOHPRWLRQVDUH³WKRVHWKDWDUHOLQNHGWRWKHLQWHUHVWVRUZHOIDUHHLWKHURIVRFLHW\
DVDZKROHRUDWOHDVWRISHUVRQVRWKHUWKDQWKHMXGJHRUDJHQW´(Haidt, 2003, p. 276).  
+DLGWµVPRGHORIPRUDOHPRWLRQSURWRW\SLFDOLW\VXJJHVWVWKDWPRUDOHPRWLRQV
vary in the extent to which they can be linked to the interests of others. Researchers have 
analysed various component features of emotions, LQFOXGLQJWKHHPRWLRQ¶VHOLFLWLQJHYHQW
facial expression, physiological change, appraisal, and action tendency (Frijda, 1986; 
Scherer, 1984). Haidt (2003) suggests that two of these component features are particularly 
useful for identifying prototypical moral emotions. First, disinterested elicitors refer to the 
emotions that can be triggered even when there is no personal stake (e.g., you can feel angry 
about an injustice that affects someone else). Second, prosocial action tendencies refer to the 
degree to which the action tendency following the triggering event benefits others (e.g., the 
action tendency of compassion is to help the victim). Emotions high in both disinterested 
elicitors and prosocial action tendencies are prototypical moral emotions. Given these 
component features, Haidt (2003) suggested that elevation, outrage, sympathy, and guilt are 
the most prototypical moral emotions. In other words, these emotions are the most 
intrinsically linked to the welfare of others.  
The four emotions have been defined as follows. Elevation is an emotional response 
to witnessing a moral virtue (Algoe & Haidt, 2009). Outrage is an emotional response to 
witnessing a person or group transgress a moral standard that harms another person or group 
(Thomas et al., 2009). Guilt is an emotional response felt when the self has transgressed a 
moral standard that harms another person or group (Zeelenberg & Breugelmans, 2008). 
6\PSDWK\LVDQHPRWLRQDOUHVSRQVHWRZLWQHVVLQJDQRWKHU¶VVXIIHULQJ/D]DUXV
Existing empirical evidence shows that elevation, outrage, sympathy and guilt can all 
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promote prosocial intentions and behaviours (e.g., Cox, 2010; De Hooge et al., 2007; 
Freeman et al., 2009; Iyer et al., 2007; Landis et al., 2009; Montada & Schneider, 1989; 
Nelissen et al., 2007; Pagano & Huo, 2007; Schnall et al., 2010; Vianello et al., 2010; 
Waklsak et al., 2007). However, elevation and outrage have been under-researched relative to 
sympathy and guilt and a question for the present research is whether they motivate 
qualitatively different forms of prosocial motivation.   
+DLGW¶VPRGHORIPRUDOHPRWLRQSURWRW\SLFDOLW\KLJKOLJKWVWZRXVHIXO
component features for identifying moral emotions. The current research proposes two 
additional component features that inform the extent to which emotions inspire an interest in 
the welfare of others. Drawing on separate lines of empirical evidence (outlined below), it is 
proposed that stereotyping and self- versus other-focus are potentially important component 
features that could distinctively mark the prosocial quality of responses emanating from 
sympathy and guilt respectively. Specifically, because sympathy involves implicit derogation 
of a target group and because guilt involves increased self-concern, they do not place primary 
value on the other person or group and therefore we consider that they are both qualified 
forms of prosocial motivation. The current research compares the effects of elevation and 
outrage to those of sympathy and guilt on stereotyping and self-focus respectively. This will 
uncover whether, like sympathy and guilt, elevation and outrage are also qualified prosocial 
emotions.  
Stereotyping 
Paternalistic stereotyping occurs when groups are seen as high in warmth but low in 
competence. As paternalised groups (e.g., the elderly) are perceived as low status and 
dependent they are recipients of greater pity and helping (Fiske et al., 2002).  
Importantly, recent evidence shows that the type of help provided to paternalised 
people tends to be dependency-oriented rather than autonomy-oriented (Nadler & Chernyak-
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Hai, 2014). In dependency-oriented helping, the helper provides the full solution to a 
SUREOHP$OWKRXJKWKLVIXOILOVLPPHGLDWHQHHGVWKLVW\SHRIKHOSLQJUHVWULFWVWKHEHQHIDFWRU¶V
self-sufficiency over time. In autonomy-oriented helping, the helper provides only a partial 
solution to the problem. This type of helping fulfils immediate needs and provides the skills 
for self-sufficiency over time (Halabi & Nadler, 2010). Thus, while paternalised people may 
receive more help (Fiske et al., 2002) this is likely to be dependency-oriented. Ultimately, 
such helping could be detrimental as it perpetuates dependence on high-status benefactors, 
rather than enabling recipients to become self-sufficient.  
Research has highlighted that sympathy runs the risk of leading to paternalistic 
stereotyping as it maintains high levels of disparity between the ingroup (i.e., the advantaged) 
and the outgroup (i.e., the disadvantaged) (Nadler & Halabi, 2006; Thomas et al., 2009). 
Sympathy may therefore induce helping that is contingent on dependency, which reaffirms 
status differentiation between the beneficiary and the victim. To date, no research has 
examined whether elevation and outrage also produce paternalistic stereotypes of the target 
group. This will be tested in Study 7.  
Self-Focus 
Emotions vary in the extent to which they instigate a self- or other-focus. Research 
shows that, as other-focused emotions draw attention to the needs of the disadvantaged, 
other-focused emotions motivate helping focused on the needs of others (altruistic 
motivation). In contrast, as self-IRFXVHGHPRWLRQVGUDZDWWHQWLRQWRRQH¶VRZQFLUFXPVWDQFH
self-IRFXVHGHPRWLRQVPRWLYDWHKHOSLQJWKDWSULPDULO\DOOHYLDWHVRQH¶VRZQGLVWUHVVHJRLVWLF
motivation; Batson et al., 1988; Batson & Shaw, 1991).  
Research has highlighted that due to its self-focused nature, guilt runs the risk of 
leading to normative and strategic responses primarily aimed at overcoming the self-focused 
negative state (Hopkins et al., 2007; van Leeuwen, 2007), which may then be associated with 
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egoistic rather than altruistic action (Iyer et al., 2004; McGarty et al., 2005). No research has 
examined whether elevation and outrage also produce a self-focus. This will be tested in 
Study 8.  
The Current Research 
The primary aim of the current chapter is to test the prosocial implications of 
elevation and outrage compared with either sympathy (Study 7) or guilt (Study 8). 
Specifically, Study 7 compares the effects of elevation and outrage to those of sympathy on 
stereotyping of the target group. Study 8 compares the effects of elevation and outrage to 
those of guilt and a control condition on self- versus other-focus.  
Study 7 
To our knowledge no research has examined how elevation and outrage influence 
stereotyping. Research has suggested that sympathy may be associated with paternalistic 
stereotypes (cf. Thomas et al., 2009). Thus, sympathy induction is employed as the 
comparison condition in this study.  
The following hypotheses are based on the appraisal tendency framework (Horberg et 
al., 2011). The appraisal tendency framework (ATF) highlights the role of cognitive 
appraisals in triggering the emotional state itself (which is well established in emotion 
theories, Frijda, 1986), and in determining the outcomes of the emotional state. This 
framework suggests that appraisals remain salient throughout the emotional state and colour 
subsequent judgments (or motivations and behaviours) by prioritising specific concerns 
(termed sociomoral conFHUQVWKDWDUHVHPDQWLFDOO\UHODWHGWRWKHHPRWLRQ¶VDSSUDLVDO 
Given that sympathy derives from an appraisal that a target is needy, it is 
hypothesised that, relative to other conditions, sympathy will reduce perceptions of 
competence. In contrast, given that elevation derives from an appraisal of a morally 
impressive behaviour, thus from high (moral) competence, it is hypothesised that, relative to 
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other conditions, elevation will increase perceptions of competence. The potential 
relationship between outrage and competence stereotypes is less clear. This is because 
outrage derives from an appraisal that someone has transgressed a moral standard which has 
affected another person or group. Whether the affected target is then seen as competent or 
incompetent is not immediately clear. Thus, it is plausible that outrage will lead to neither 
high nor low perceptions of competence. Perceptions of warmth should be high following all 
three emotion-inducing manipulations as there is no theoretical reason for the target to be 
disliked. Furthermore, we hypothesise that sympathy will induce higher levels of paternalism 
(warmth-competence difference score) than elevation and outrage.  
Method 
Participants and design. One hundred and five American participants (59 male, 45 
female) with a mean age of 33.68 years (SD = 11.74) completed an on-line questionnaire. 
Sample sizes were determined on the basis of providing sufficient power (.8) to detect a 
medium to large effect size. 3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHVDPSOHGIURP$PD]RQ¶V0HFKDQLFal Turk; a 
site for web-based data collection that functions through a participant compensation system. 
Participants were randomly assigned to condition in a one factor between participants design 
with three levels (Condition: elevation vs. outrage vs. sympathy).  
Procedure. Participants were given access to a secure web link which sent them to an 
on-line questionnaire. Informed consent and demographic information were obtained, after 
which participants were randomly assigned to read one of three emotion-inducing stories 
(elevation, outrage, and control). Participants then responded to the emotion and stereotyping 
measures. Participants received (on-line) written debrief and compensation upon completion. 
Experimental manipulations.  
Elevation. The elevation-inducing story was a written transcript from the elevation-
inducing video described in Pilot Study 1 (see Chapter 3 and Appendix A). A written story (or 
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transcript) was used instead of the original video stimulus so that some of the information 
could be amHQGHG6SHFLILFDOO\WKHSURWDJRQLVW¶VQDWLRQDOLW\ZDVDPHQGHGWR=DPELDQ7KLV
was necessary in order to maintain consistency of the target outgroup across conditions so 
that it would be possible to compare outgroup stereotypes between conditions. The extract 
was 334 words in length (see Appendix A for the full transcript used).  
Outrage. The outrage-inducing story was a written transcript from the outrage-
inducing video described in Pilot Study 2 (see Chapter 3 and Appendix A). The raw transcript 
was used. The extract was 445 words in length (see Appendix A for the full transcript used).  
Sympathy. The sympathy-inducing story was novel. The extract was taken from the 
Children International website. It describes the state of poverty and hunger in Zambia, 
highlighting problems such as AIDS/HIV and lack of parents in the homes. The extract was 
410 words in length (see Appendix A for the full transcript used).  
Measures. Measures were presented to participants in the following order: first 
emotions and then stereotypes (each on a separate page). Presentation of items within each of 
these two constructs was randomised.  All items were measured on a 7-point scale ( GLGQ¶W
feel it at all, 7 = felt it very strongly) unless indicated otherwise.  
Elevation and outrage. To measure feelings of moral elevation and moral outrage, the 
same items were employed as in Pilot Study 1 (see Chapter 3 and Appendix B).  
Sympathy. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they felt: 
compassionate, moved, softhearted, sympathetic, tender, and warm (Stocks, Lishner, Waits, 
& Downum, 2011). A mean score of these six items formed the sympathy measure. 
&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDZDV 
Stereotypes. 7RPHDVXUHSHUFHLYHGFRPSHWHQFHSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHG³7RZKDW
extent do you view people from Zambia as [competent, confident, capable, efficient, 
intelligent, and skilful@´ (Fiske et al., 2002). A mean score of these six items formed the 
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intentioned, trustworthy, warm, good-natured, and VLQFHUH@´)LVNHHWDOA mean 
score of these six items formed the friendliness measure. &URQEDFK¶VDOSKDZDV
Participants responded from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). 
Results 
Descriptives. Intercorrelations among variables, as well as their means and standard 
deviations, are presented in Table 7.1. 
Emotions. Mixed model analyses of variance showed a significant interaction effect 
of Condition (elevation vs. outrage vs. sympathy) x Emotion self-reports (elevation, vs. 
outrage vs. sympathy), F (4, 204) = 42.99, p Ș2 = .46. Pairwise comparisons showed 
that feelings of elevation were higher following the elevation-inducing (M = 5.66, SE = .23, p 
< .001) than following the outrage-inducing (M = 2.79, SE = 0.23) and sympathy-inducing 
(M = 3.00, SE = 0.22) stories. Feelings of outrage were higher following the outrage-inducing 
(M = 4.74, SE = 0.29, p < .02) than following the elevation-inducing (M = 2.87, SE = 0.28) 
and sympathy-inducing (M = 3.76, SE = 0.28) stories. Feelings of sympathy were marginally 
higher following the sympathy-inducing (M = 5.24, SE = 0.20, p = .069) than following the 
outrage-inducing story (M = 4.71, SE = 0.21), but did not differ following the elevation-
inducing story (M = 4.95, SE = 0.20, p = .308). See Table 7.2 for all cell-specific descriptives.  
Stereotypes. Analyses of variance were conducted to test the effect of Condition 
(elevation vs. outrage vs. sympathy) on stereotypes of competence and warmth. Results 
revealed a significant effect of Condition on competence, F (2, 102) = 5.77, p = .00Ș2 = .10 
but not on warmth, F (2, 102) = 0.49, p  Ș2 = .01.  
Pairwise comparisons revealed that following the elevation-inducing story perceptions 
of competence were rated as significantly higher (M = 3.48, SE = .16) than following the 
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sympathy-inducing story (M = 2.73, SE = .16, p = .001) and marginally higher than following 
the outrage-inducing story (M = 3.10, SE = .16, p = .092). Perceptions of competence 
following the outrage-inducing story were higher albeit not significantly than following the 
sympathy-inducing story (p = .100). See Table 7.2 for all cell-specific descriptives. 
Paternalism. Paternalism is reflected by the combination of high warmth and low 
competence scores. Thus, to test paternalism, we computed a warmth-competence difference 
score, where high difference scores reflect higher paternalism. Analyses of variance were 
conducted to test the effect of Condition (elevation vs. outrage vs. sympathy) on paternalism. 
Results revealed a significant effect of Condition, F (2, 102) = 3.81, p  Ș2 = .07. 
Pairwise comparisons showed that paternalism was higher following the sympathy-inducing 
story (M = 0.67, SE = .14) than following the elevation-inducing (M = 0.14, SE = .14, p = 
.009) and outrage-inducing (M = 0.28, SE = .15, p = .055) stories. There was no difference 
between the elevation-inducing and outrage-inducing stories (p = .489). See Table 7.2 for all 
cell-specific descriptives. 
Regression. Regression analyses were conducted to test the independent predictive 
effects of elevation, outrage, and sympathy on paternalism. The overall model was significant 
(R2 = .17, F (3, 101) = 6.77, p < .001). Sympathy poVLWLYHO\SUHGLFWHGȕ p < .0001) and 
HOHYDWLRQQHJDWLYHO\SUHGLFWHGȕ -.32, p  SDWHUQDOLVP2XWUDJHȕ -.03, p = .727) 
did not predict paternalism. 
MORAL ELEVATION AND MORAL OUTRAGE 156   
 
Table 7.1 
Study 7: Means, Standard Deviations, Confidence Intervals, and Correlations among Key Variables 
Variable Mean (SD) 95% CI 2 3 4 5 6 
1.Elevation 3.82 (1.87) [3.46, 4.18] -.12 .34*** .34*** .20* -.18 
2.Outrage 3.78 (1.82) [3.43, 4.14]  .30** -.07 .05 .13 
3.Sympathy 4.97 (1.21) [4.74, 5.21]   .12 .39*** .29** 
4.Competence 3.10 (0.98) [2.91, 3.29]    .59*** -.49*** 
5.Warmth 3.47 (0.94) [3.28, 3.65]     .42*** 
6.Paternalism 0.37 (0.87) [0.20, 0.53]      
Note. N = 105. CI = confidence intervals. Emotions were scored on a 7-point scale (1= GLGQ¶WIHHOLWDWDOO, 7 = felt it very strongly). Competence 
and warmth were scored on a 5-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). Paternalism was computed by subtracting the competence from 
the warmth ratings. 
S< .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 7.2 
Study 7: Means, Standard Errors, and Cell Sizes for each Condition 
 Condition 
 Elevation video Outrage video Elevation and outrage 
videos (dual) 
Cell sizes N = 35 N = 34 N = 36 
1.Elevation 5.66 (0.23) 2.79 (0.23) 3.00 (0.22) 
2.Outrage  2.87 (0.28) 4.74 (0.29) 3.76 (0.28) 
3.Sympathy 4.95 (0.20) 4.71 (0.21) 5.24 (0.20) 
4.Competence 3.48 (0.16) 3.10 (0.16) 2.73 (0.16) 
5.Warmth 3.62 (0.16) 3.38 (0.16) 3.40 (0.16) 
6.Paternalism 0.14 (0.14) 0.28 (0.15) 0.67 (0.14) 
Note. Table depicts means. Standard errors are provided in brackets. Emotions were scored 
on a 7-point scale (1 = GLGQ¶WIHHOLWDWDOO; 7 = felt it very strongly). Competence and warmth 
were scored on a 5-points scale (1 = not at all; 5 = very much). Paternalism was computed by 
subtracting the competence from the warmth ratings.  
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Mediation analyses7ZRVHWVRIPHGLDWLRQDQDO\VHVXVLQJ+D\HV¶3URFHVV
macro model 4) were conducted (1) to test whether feelings of elevation, sympathy, and/or 
outrage mediated the effects of the elevation-inducing story on paternalism, and (2) to test 
whether feelings of elevation, sympathy, and/or outrage mediated the effects of the outrage-
inducing story on paternalism. Across both analyses the sympathy-inducing story acted as the 
reference category.  
Elevation-inducing story. Results showed that feelings of elevation significantly 
mediated the effect of the elevation-inducing story on paternalism, B = -0.46, SE = 0.18, 95CI 
-0.84/-0.15 (indirect effect). Feelings of outrage, B = -0.01, SE = 0.05, 95CI -0.12/0.07 and 
feelings of sympathy, B = -0.08, SE = 0.08, 95CI -0.26/0.08 (indirect effects) did not mediate 
the effect of the elevation-inducing story on paternalism. The significant total effect of the 
elevation-inducing story on paternalism (B = -0.53, SE = 0.20, t = -2.66, p = .009, 95CI -
0.93/-0.14) was reduced to non-significance in the direct model (B = 0.01, SE = 0.27, t = 
0.05, p = .947, 95CI -0.53/0.56) (see Figure 7.1).  
Outrage-inducing story. Results showed that feelings of sympathy significantly 
mediated the effect of the outrage-inducing story on paternalism, B = -0.14, SE = 0.08, 95CI -
0.33/-0.01 (indirect effect). Feelings of elevation, B = 0.04, SE = 0.06, 95CI -0.07/0.18 and 
feelings of outrage, B = 0.01, SE = 0.05, 95CI -0.08/0.12 (indirect effects) did not mediate the 
effect of the outrage-inducing story on paternalism. The marginally significant total effect of 
the outrage-inducing story on paternalism (B = -0.39, SE = 0.20, t = -1.94, p = .055, 95CI -
0.79/0.01) was reduced to non-significance in the direct model (B = -0.30, SE = 0.21, t = -
1.46, p = .148, 95CI -0.71/0.11) (see Figure 7.1).  
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Figure 7.1. Study 7: Unstandardised B coefficients for mediation analyses using Process macro (Hayes, 2013, model 4). 
Note. This figure depicts two models that were run separately. One model tested whether the effect of the elevation-inducing story on 
paternalism was mediated by the three emotions. The other model tested whether the effect of the outrage-inducing story on paternalism was 
mediated by the three emotions. S< .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
MORAL ELEVATION AND MORAL OUTRAGE 160
   
 
Discussion  
Overall, the results demonstrate that while sympathy increases paternalistic 
stereotyping, elevation and outrage do not. Specifically, relative to the sympathy 
manipulation, the elevation manipulation increased perceptions of competence. Outrage did 
not lead to high or low perceptions of competence relative to the elevation or sympathy 
conditions. Furthermore, while sympathy induced paternalism (high warmth combined with 
low competence), elevation and outrage did not. Elevation even induced stereotypes of high 
warmth and high competence ± normally reserved for ingroups and close allies (cf. Fiske et 
al., 2002).  
One limitation of this study was that sympathy ratings were relatively high across 
conditions. However, regression analyses replicated the key findings that elevation negatively 
predicted paternalism, sympathy positively predicted paternalism, and that outrage did not 
predict paternalism. Further, mediation analyses demonstrated that the effect of the elevation 
manipulation on paternalism was mediated by feelings of elevation and not by feelings of 
sympathy.  
Study 8 
In line with the ATF (Horberg et al., 2011), research has established that guilt is a 
self-focused emotion (Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003). However, no research has 
experimentally tested the focus (self vs. other) of elevation and/or outrage, and consequently 
no research has distinguished the focus associated with guilt versus these two emotions. As 
elevation and outrage are experienced following other-relevant cues, their appraisals can be 
considered as other-focused. Drawing on the ATF (Horberg et al., 2011), it follows that their 
subsequent cognitions and motivations should also be distinctively other-focused. Therefore, 
it is hypothesised that guilt should induce a significantly higher focus on the self as compared 
to elevation and outrage.  
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Method 
Participants and design. Participants were 167 British students. The current study 
included an attention check item. This was a novel addition in this study and was included to 
ensure that participants were reading all of the questions. When excluding participants who 
failed the attention check (27.5%), the sample consisted of 121 participants.  
Of the 121 participants, 89 were female and 32 were male and the mean age was 
21.35 years (SD = 5.88). Participants were University students from across different 
academic disciplines. Participants were incentivised for taking part through course credit or 
prize draw entry. Sample sizes were determined on the basis of providing sufficient power 
(.8) to detect a medium to large effect size. 
Because focus may vary dispositionally and by population (cf. Scheier, Fenigstein, & 
Buss, 1974), we included a control condition to evaluate whether guilt, elevation or outrage 
increased or decreased self-focus relative to the sample baseline. Therefore the design was a 
one factor between participants design with four levels (Condition: elevation vs. outrage vs. 
guilt vs. control). 
Procedure. Participants were given access to a secure web link which sent them to an 
on-line questionnaire. Informed consent and demographic information were obtained, after 
which participants watched one of the four videos (elevation, outrage, guilt, or control). 
Participants then completed the emotion and focus measures. Participants received (on-line) 
written debrief upon completion.  
Experimental manipulations. The elevation-inducing (2.14-minutes), outrage-
inducing (2.42-minutes), and control (2.42-minutes) videos described in Pilot Study 1 (see 
Chapter 3 and Appendix A) were employed.  
Guilt. The guilt-inducing video was a 2.41-minute extract from a Consumer 
International report which demonstrated the impact of electronic waste (e-waste) produced by 
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European consumers (8.8 million tons per year) on the lives of people in developing countries 
(6.6 million tons of European e-waste is dumped in developing countries every year). It also 
discussed the hazardous effects of e-waste on the health of people living in the communities 
where e-waste is dumped as well as its effects on the environment (see Appendix A).  
Measures. Measures were presented to participants in the following order: first focus, 
then emotions, and then perceived responsibility (each on a separate page). Presentation of 
items within each of these two constructs was randomised.  All items were measured on a 7-
point scale (1 = GLGQ¶WIHHOLWDWDOO, 7 = felt it very strongly) unless indicated otherwise.  
Elevation and outrage. Feelings of moral elevation and moral outrage were measured 
using the items described in Pilot Study 1 (see Chapter 3 and Appendix B).  
Guilt. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they felt: guilty, ashamed, 
blameworthy, dissatisfied with myself, disgusted at myself, angry at myself, and embarrassed 
(Watson & Clark, 1999). A mean score of these seven items formed the guilt measure. 
&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDZDV 
Perceived responsibility manipulation check. Guilt and outrage are both evoked by 
the perception that someone has transgressed a moral standard. In the present scenario guilt 
should reflect a sense of responsibility for a transgression whereas outrage should not 
because it is another group that has transgressed. In order to assess responsibility, participants 
in the outrage and guilt conditions were DVNHG³+RZUHVSRQVLEOHGR\RXIHHO(XURSHLVIRU
KDYLQJDOORZHGWKHVLWXDWLRQWKDWZDVGHVFULEHGLQWKHYLGHRFOLS"´DQG³+RZPXFKGR\RX
IHHOLWLV(XURSH¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRGRVRPHWKLQJWRLPSURYHWKHVLWXDWLRQWKDWZDVGHVFULEHG
LQWKHYLGHRFOLS"´7hese two items correlated strongly (r = .64, p < .001). A mean score of 
these two items was computed to form the perceived responsibility manipulation check.  
Focus. :HJQHUDQG*LXOLDQR¶V-LWHP³OLQJXLVWLFLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUP´
was employed. This measure asks participants to complete 20 sentences by selecting one of 
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several correct pronouns (e.g., my, your, ours) for each sentence. Self-focus was scored by 
summing up the number of sentences completed with a first-person singular pronoun (e.g., I, 
me, or my; Wegner & Giuliano, 1980, 1983). 
Results  
All analyses controlled for academic discipline as well as incentive strategy. 
Descriptives. Intercorrelations among variables, as well as their means and standard 
deviations, are presented in Table 7.3.  
Perceived responsibility. Analyses of variance revealed a significant effect of 
Condition (outrage vs. guilt) on responsibility, F (1, 48) = 16.64, p Ș $V
expected, perceived responsibility was higher following the guilt-inducing video (M = 5.31, 
SE = .25) than following the outrage-inducing video (M = 3.84, SE = .24).  
Emotions. Mixed model analyses of variance revealed a significant interaction of 
Condition (elevation vs. outrage vs. guilt vs. control) x Emotion ratings (elevation, vs. 
outrage vs. guilt), F (2, 106) = 32.62, p Ș 3DLUZLVHFRPSDULVRQVVKRZHGWKDW
feelings of elevation were higher following the elevation-inducing (M = 5.23, SE = .25, p 
< .001) than following the outrage-inducing (M = 3.25, SE = 0.24), guilt-inducing (M = 2.30, 
SE = 0.26), and control (M = 3.77, SE = 0.24) videos. Feelings of outrage were higher 
following the outrage-inducing (M = 4.37, SE = 0.21, p < .001) than following the elevation-
inducing (M = 2.78, SE = 0.23) and control (M = 2.16, SE = 0.22) videos, but did not differ 
from the outrage scores following the guilt-inducing video (M = 4.32, SE = 0.23, p = .863). 
Feelings of guilt were higher following the guilt-inducing (M = 3.05, SE = 0.25, p < .04) than 
following the elevation-inducing (M = 2.28, SE = 0.24), outrage-inducing story (M = 2.13, SE 
= 0.23), and control (M = 1.51, SE = 0.23) videos. See Table 7.4 for all cell-specific 
descriptives.  
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Table 7.3 
Study 8: Means, Standard Deviations, Confidence Intervals, and Correlations among Key Variables 
Variable Mean (SD) 95% CI 2 3 4 
1.Elevation 3.63 (1.67) [3.33, 3.93] -.15 .19* -.07 
2.Outrage 3.41 (1.51) [3.14, 3.68]  .50*** .15 
3.Guilt 2.23 (1.34) [1.99, 2.47]   .17 
4. Self-focus 8.33 (3.22) [7.75, 8.91]    
Note. N = 121. CI = confidence interval. Emotions are scored on a 7-point scale (1= GLGQ¶WIHHOLWDWDOO, 7 = felt it very strongly). Self-focus 
ranges from 0 (low self-focus) to 20 (high self-focus).  
S< .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.  
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Table 7.4 









Cell sizes N = 29 N = 32 N = 29 N = 31 
1.Feelings of elevation 5.23 (0.25) 3.25 (0.24) 2.30 (0.26) 3.77 (0.24) 
2.Feelings of outrage 2.78 (0.23) 4.37 (0.21) 4.32 (0.23) 2.16 (0.22) 
4.Feelings of guilt 2.28 (0.24) 2.13 (0.23) 3.05 (0.25) 1.51 (0.23) 
5.Self-focus 7.98 (0.59) 7.90 (0.56) 9.88 (0.61) 7.64 (0.57) 
Note. Table depicts means. Standard errors are provided in brackets. Emotions were scored 
on a 7-point scale (1 = GLGQ¶WIHHOLWDWDOO 7 = felt it very strongly). Self-focus ranged from 0 
(low self-focus) to 20 (high self-focus) 
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Self-Focus. Analyses of variance testing effects of Condition on self-focus showed a 
significant effect, F (3, 106) = 2.86, p  Ș2 = .08. Pairwise comparisons revealed that 
self-focus was significantly higher following the guilt-inducing (M = 9.88, SE = 0.61) than 
following the elevation-inducing (M = 7.98, SE = 0.59, p = .030), outrage-inducing (M = 
7.90, SE = 0.56, p = .019), and control (M = 7.64, SE = 0.57, p = .010) videos. There were no 
other significant differences (S¶V > .680). See Table 7.4 for all cell-specific descriptives. 
Furthermore, one sample t-tests showed that self-focus scores fell significantly below 
the mid-point following the elevation-inducing (t [28] = -3.15, p = .004), outrage-inducing (t 
[31] = -5.01, p < .001), and control (t [30] = -4.91, p < .001) videos, but not following the 
guilt-inducing video (t [28] = -0.63, p = .536). 
As the emotions did not correlate significantly with self-focus (see Table 7.3), no 
mediation analyses were performed. The lack of correlations is likely due to the fact that self-
focus and emotions are very distinct types of measures (i.e., implicit vs. explicit).   
Discussion  
Results are in line with the hypotheses. The results showed that guilt instigates 
significantly greater self-focus than elevation and outrage. Specifically, the guilt-inducing 
video led to significantly higher levels of self-focus than the control, elevation, and outrage 
videos. Moreover, the elevation-inducing and outrage-inducing videos did not instigate more 
or less self-focus than the control video. Given that the mean scores for focus were 
significantly below the midpoint of the scale in all of the non-guilt conditions (p < .01), it 
seems likely that the default situation is to focus on others and that this is altered or disrupted 
by guilt but not by elevation or outrage.  
One limitation of this study is that self-reported outrage and guilt were at similar 
levels within the outrage condition. This could be because the two emotions share some 
general negative affect. However, feelings of outrage were significantly lower than feelings 
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of guilt within the guilt condition. Moreover, perceptions of responsibility (a necessity for 
feeling guilty) were low in the outrage condition and high in the guilt condition. Therefore, 
the emotion-inducing videos do appear to have been effective in instigating distinctive 
emotional responses.  
General Discussion 
A substantial amount of research has compared the component features of a range of 
emotions (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman et al., 1994). The primary aim of the current 
research was to test the extent to which elevation and outrage can be considered as 
distinctively prosocial emotions relative to sympathy or guilt, both of which are qualified by 
undesirable features. We tested this proposition by drawing on two component features 
(stereotypes and self- vs. other-focus) that could motivate prosociality. The results showed 
that drawing on these two novel component features can help to effectively differentiate 
between distinct moral emotions.  
Study 7 showed that sympathy, relative to elevation and outrage, instigates 
paternalistic stereotypes. Thus, sympathy should be more likely to induce helping that is 
contingent on dependency, which reaffirms status differentiation from the victim (cf. Fiske et 
al., 2002; Nadler & Chernyak-Hai, 2014). Given these findings, elevation and outrage may be 
more likely than sympathy to promote autonomous helping.   
Study 8 showed that guilt, but not elevation or outrage, instigates self-focus. Thus, 
JXLOWVKRXOGEHPRUHOLNHO\WRLQGXFHHJRLVWLFKHOSLQJZKLFKWHQGVWRUHOLHYHRQH¶VRZQ
distress rather than meet the needs of the victim. Given these findings, elevation and outrage 
may be more likely than guilt to promote altruistic helping. 
Overall these two studies suggest that elevation and outrage can be considered as less 
qualified prosocial emotions than either sympathy or guilt.   
MORAL ELEVATION AND MORAL OUTRAGE 168
   
 
The current chapter provides further empirical support for the appraisal tendency 
framework (Horberg et al., 2011). Specifically, results of both studies showed that these 
discrete moral emotions have distinctive effects on component features. Furthermore, these 
effects can be theoretically predicted by WKHHPRWLRQ¶V differing appraisals.  
Applied Implications 
Study 7 showed that elevation and outrage (unlike sympathy) do not instigate 
paternalistic stereotypes. This is a particularly relevant insight for the applied field. Indeed, 
charitable campaigns often paternalise beneficiaries and depict them as helpless victims 
(Balaji, 2011; Manzo, 2006). Organisations such as VSO have critiqued such campaigns for 
focusing on the short-term benefits (i.e., donations) over the long-term consequences, 
LQFOXGLQJLJQRUDQWSHUFHSWLRQVRISRYHUW\QHJDWLYHVWHUHRW\SHVDQGFUHDWLQJ³DQLPSOLFLW
VHQVHRIVXSHULRULW\DQGLQIHULRULW\´9622WKHUQHJDWLYHORQJ-term consequences 
include compassion fatigue and a reduced investment in African businesses due to 
perceptions of incompetence (cf. Manzo, 2006). It is essential to understand which 
intervention strategies (e.g., emotions) can render short-term gains (i.e., increasing helping) 
without also incurring negative consequences (i.e., negative stereotypes). Past research shows 
that elevation and outrage increase prosocial action (e.g., Freeman et al., 2009; Montada & 
Schneider, 1989). The current research extends these findings by demonstrating that, unlike 
sympathy, elevation and outrage do not induce paternalistic stereotyping. 
Overall, charity campaigns should endeavour to employ strategies that are effective at 
increasing genuine helping. The findings of the current research suggest that elevation and 
outrage should be more likely to promote autonomous and altruistic forms of helping 
compared to sympathy and guilt respectively. Developing and extending our understanding of 
moral emotions will maximise their effective use in applied settings. Future research should 
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consider the qualified nature of prosociality and continue to explore the component features 
that may facilitate or inhibit particular types of prosocial responses.  
Limitations and Caveats 
In the current chapter prosocial responses were not directly measured. There were two 
reasons for this. First, measuring component features rather than prosocial responses helps to 
minimise confounding effects (e.g., socially desirable responding). Second, the relevant links 
between the component features and prosocial responses have already been well-established 
in the literature (e.g., Batson & Shaw, 1991; Nadler & Chernyak-Hai, 2014). Therefore, the 
priority of the current research was to establish the novel links between elevation, outrage, 
sympathy, and guilt on the one hand, with the relevant component features on the other. 
However, as neither study included a direct measure of prosociality, it remains unclear 
whether the differences between guilt and sympathy on the one hand, and elevation and 
outrage on the other, would indirectly lead to differential propensities to engage in 
prosociality. We suggest that this is an important next step for this line of research.  
In Study 8 a high rate of participants failed the attention check. As no attention checks 
were included in Study 7 it seems plausible that a proportion of participants in this study also 
did not read the questions properly and that the data therefore include some error variance. 
Nevertheless, it seems likely that the attention check issue was specific to the sample in study 
8. Specifically, the sample in Study 8 comprised of students, whereas the sample in Study 7 
comprised of MTurk users. Research shows that MTurk users are more attentive to 
instructions than student samples (Hauser & Schwartz, 2015).  
Study 8 employed an established scale to measure feelings of guilt. Nevertheless, it 
could be argued that some of the items in the scale (e.g., dissatisfied with myself, ashamed) 
measured feelings of shame rather than guilt. While factor analyses did show that all items 
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loaded strongly onto one factor (all loadings > .77), future research should employ a different 
measure of guilt that directly distinguishes between guilt and shame. 
Study 7 did not include a control condition. Therefore, it is not possible to determine 
whether warmth ratings were higher (or lower) in the emotion-inducing conditions than 
following a neutral condition.  While the current study showed important differences between 
the emotions on competence ratings, future research should also examine, more closely, 
whether differences occur on warmth ratings.  
Conclusion 
The present research has examined, for the first time, whether elevation and outrage 
induce paternalistic stereotypes and self-focus. Understanding how these moral emotions 
influence these particular component features is essential for deciding whether and how to 
use them in important practical interventions such as charity campaigns, educational efforts, 
or social policy strategies. The evidence shows that, unlike sympathy and guilt, elevation and 
outrage do not induce paternalistic stereotypes or self-focus. These new findings suggest that 
elevation and outrage may be less qualified prosocial emotions than either sympathy or guilt.  
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Chapter 8 
General Discussion, Conclusions and Future Research Directions 
Theoretical Background and Aims 
As highlighted throughout this thesis high levels of poverty and inequality persist, 
both nationally and internationally. Engaging the general public to genuinely care about the 
concerns and wellbeing of others is necessary to bring about pressure and support for pro-
equality social change. Although people are intuitively motivated to help others (Crockett et 
al., 2014; Rand et al., 2012), this motivation is often not enacted (see Chapter 1). Academic 
researchers, in particular psychologists, have a unique ability to empirically test, and 
therefore to uncover, effective strategies for mobilising people to actively and appropriately 
help others. The aim of the present research was to examine the prosocial effectiveness of 
two promising, yet under-researched moral emotions - moral elevation and moral outrage. 
Prosocial Outcomes 
Despite deriving from opposing appraisals (i.e., upholding a moral standard vs. 
transgressing a moral standard), and despite their opposite valences (i.e., positive vs. 
negative), moral elevation and moral outrage appear to have convergent effects on prosocial 
outcomes. For example, elevation and outrage both promote donations and volunteering 
(Cox, 2010; Freeman et al., 2009; Montada & Schneider, 1989; Thomas & McGarty, 2009; 
see also Chapter 1). This thesis drew on important theoretical frameworks to suggest, and 
demonstrate, that the prosocial outcomes of moral elevation and moral outrage may in fact be 
more nuanced and distinctive. As no research has examined (or compared) the prosocial 
effects of moral elevation and moral outrage within the same research framework, it remained 
unknown whether they promote similar or distinctive prosocial outcomes.  
The current thesis addressed this gap in the literature by drawing on the appraisal 
tendency framework (Horberg et al., 2011; Lerner & Keltner, 2000) to test and compare the 
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prosocial effects of moral elevation and moral outrage within the same research framework. 
According to the appraisal tendency framework (Horberg et al., 2011; Lerner & Keltner, 
2000) and the domain specificity hypothesis (Horberg et al., 2011), moral elevation should 
primarily influence prosocial intentions and behaviours relevant to benevolence concerns, 
while moral outrage should primarily influence prosocial intentions and behaviours relevant 
to justice concerns. Therefore, moral elevation and moral outrage should not have similar 
effects on prosocial responses, and their effects should instead be distinctive and nuanced. 
Testing this hypothesis represented the main empirical aim of Chapters 4 and 5.  
Component Features 
+DLGW¶VPRGHORI moral emotion prototypicality suggests that two specific 
component features (i.e., disinterested elicitors and action tendencies) are crucial for 
understanding the prosocial effectiveness of moral emotions. Drawing on three further 
component features, this thesis suggested that motivational orientation (approach vs. 
avoidance), stereotyping (paternalistic vs. non-paternalistic), and focus (self vs. other) can 
DOVRLQIRUPPRUDOHPRWLRQ¶VSURVRFLDOHIIHFWLYHQHVV:KLOHUHVHDUFKKDVH[DPLQHGWKH
prosocial component features of emotions such as sympathy and guilt, little research had 
explored the prosocial component features of moral elevation and moral outrage. This line of 
research is essential in order to inform whether elevation and outrage are indeed effective for 
promoting unqualified prosociality. Overcoming this gap in the literature represented the 
main empirical aim of Chapters 6 and 7.  
The overarching aim of this thesis was to develop a more in-depth understanding of 
the prosocial effects of moral elevation and moral outrage. Chapter 4 explored whether moral 
elevation and moral outrage have distinctive or comparative effects on prosocial intentions. 
Chapter 5 extended these findings further and explored the effects of moral elevation and 
moral outrage on prosocial behaviours. Chapters 6 and 7 uncovered the prosocial 
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implications of moral elevation and moral outrage by examining their component features. 
Specifically, Chapter 6 examined whether moral elevation can be considered as an approach-
oriented emotion. Chapter 7 examined whether moral elevation and moral outrage promote 
paternalistic stereotyping of the target group and self-focus. 
Summary of Findings  
The appraisal tendency framework (Horberg et al., 2011; Lerner & Keltner, 2000) and 
the domain specificity hypothesis (Horberg et al., 2011) suggest that during an emotional 
VWDWHHDFKHPRWLRQ¶VPRUDODSSUDLVDOWKHPH remains salient and affects subsequent moral 
judgments, intentions, and behaviours by prioritising specific sociomoral concerns (or moral 
GRPDLQVWKDWDUHVHPDQWLFDOO\UHODWHGWRWKHHPRWLRQ¶VPRUDODSSUDLVDOWKHPH7RLGHQWLI\
for the first time, how moral elevation and moral outrage may act in concert to affect the 
same or distinct prosocial intentions, Chapter 4 reported two studies testing the joint and 
independent effects of these two emotions on different types of prosocial intentions. 
Comparing their effects in an experimental design enabled a test of whether they increase 
helping behaviours generally (across moral domains), or whether their effects are more 
nuanced and whether they are dependent on the salience of the relevant sociomoral concern 
(domain specific). Specifically, Study 1 examined benevolence-relevant intentions in the 
form of benevolent helping intentions. Study 2 examined justice-relevant intentions in the 
form of prosocial political action intentions following an inequality.  
In line with the domain-specific predictions from ATF, it was predicted that moral 
elevation and moral outrage should have domain specific effects on prosocial intentions. 
Moral elevation should increase prosocial intentions most when the intention measure is 
relevant to benevolence concerns. Moral outrage should increase prosocial intentions most 
when the intention measure is relevant to justice concerns. More specifically, in Study 1 
moral elevation, but not moral outrage, should increase prosociality (benevolent helping 
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intentions) and this effect should be mediated by elevation appraisals and feelings of 
elevation. In Study 2, moral outrage, but not moral elevation, should increase prosociality 
(prosocial political action intentions) and this effect should be mediated by outrage appraisals 
and feelings of outrage. In support of the ATF, results of Study 1 showed that moral 
elevation, but not moral outrage, marginally increased benevolent helping intentions and this 
effect was sequentially mediated by elevation appraisals and feelings of elevation. In further 
support of the ATF, results of Study 2 showed that moral outrage, but not moral elevation, 
increased justice-relevant prosocial intentions and behavioural engagement, and these effects 
were sequentially mediated by outrage appraisals and feelings of outrage.   
An important limitation of Chapter 4 was that prosociality was measured using self-
reported intentions rather than actual behaviours. Chapter 5 aimed to overcome this 
limitation by testing the effects of moral elevation and of moral outrage on prosocial 
behaviours. A substantial body of research has tested the effects of emotions on moral 
judgments and intentions (see Teper et al., 2015). However, there is a significant lack of 
behavioural research across areas of social psychology, but particularly in moral psychology 
(Baumeister et al., 2007; Teper et al., 2015). Given the dissociation between attitudes and 
behaviours (Blasi, 1980), it is essential to understand how emotions may also affect 
behaviour (Teper et al., 2015). Measuring behavioural (rather than intentional) outcomes in 
Chapter 5 enabled a stronger test of the prosocial effects of moral elevation and moral 
outrage and a stronger test of the appraisal tendency framework.  
Chapter 5 reported two studies testing the joint and independent effects of moral 
elevation and moral outrage on different types of prosocial behaviours. Study 3 examined 
benevolence-relevant behaviour in the form of charitable donations. Study 4 examined 
justice-relevant behaviour in the form of third-party bystander compensation and punishment 
following unfairness. Based on the domain-specific predictions from ATF (see Horberg et al., 
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2011) and on the findings reported in Chapter 4, it was predicted that moral elevation and 
moral outrage should have domain specific effects on prosocial behaviours. Moral elevation 
should increase prosocial behaviour most when the behavioural measure is relevant to 
benevolence concerns. Moral outrage should increase prosocial behaviour most when the 
behavioural measure is relevant to justice concerns. More specifically, in Study 3 moral 
elevation, but not moral outrage, should increase prosociality (donations) and this effect 
should be mediated by elevation appraisals and feelings of elevation. In Study 4, moral 
outrage, but not moral elevation, should increase prosociality (third-party bystander 
compensation and punishment) and this effect should be mediated by outrage appraisals and 
feelings of outrage. In support of the ATF, results of Study 3 showed that moral elevation, 
but not moral outrage, increased donations to charity (i.e., benevolence relevant prosocial 
behaviour) and that this effect was sequentially mediated by elevation appraisals and feelings 
of elevation. In further support of the ATF, results of Study 4 showed that the outrage-
inducing video, but not the elevation-inducing video, increased outrage appraisals, feelings of 
outrage, and justice-relevant behaviour. 
Chapters 6 and 7 explored the prosocial implications of moral elevation and moral 
outrage by examining three of their component features (i.e., motivational orientation, 
stereotyping, and self-focus).  
Study 5 explored the relationship between individual differences in moral elevation 
and individual differences in the behavioural inhibition and activation systems. Results 
revealed that moral elevation was positively related to behavioural activation rather than 
inhibition. Study 6 tested the effect of an elevation-inducing video on approach and 
avoidance states as well as on prosocial motivation (compared to a control condition). Results 
revealed that the elevation-inducing video led to significantly higher levels of approach 
orientation as well as prosocial motivation than the control video. Moreover, the effect of the 
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elevation-inducing video on prosocial motivation was sequentially mediated by feelings of 
elevation and then by the approach-oriented state. The existing literature has already 
demonstrated that outrage is an approach-oriented emotion. While results in Study 5 
suggested that individual differences in outrage were not associated with individual 
differences in the behavioural activation system, the results of Study 6 showed that an 
outrage-inducing video significantly increased approach-orientation relative to a control 
video. Therefore, results of Studies 5 and 6 showed that moral elevation (and moral outrage) 
can be considered as approach-oriented emotions.  
Study 7 compared the effects of moral elevation and moral outrage to those of 
sympathy on stereotyping of the target group. In line with the appraisal tendency framework 
(Horberg et al., 2011), it was predicted that sympathy should instigate low perceptions of 
competence of the target group, moral elevation should instigate high perceptions of 
competence of the target group, and moral outrage should instigate neither high nor low 
perceptions of competence of the target group. It was further predicted that perceptions of 
warmth of the target group should be relatively high across the emotion-inducing conditions. 
Finally, it was predicted that sympathy should induce higher levels of paternalism (warmth-
competence difference score) than moral elevation and moral outrage.  
Overall, the results of Study 7 were in line with the predictions. Perceptions of 
competence were higher following the elevation-inducing condition than following the 
sympathy-inducing condition. Perceptions of competence were neither high nor low 
following the outrage-inducing condition (scores did not differ significantly from the other 
emotion-inducing conditions). Furthermore, as expected, while sympathy promoted 
paternalistic stereotypes of the target group, moral elevation and moral outrage did not. 
Finally, in line with hypotheses, warmth scores did not differ between emotion-inducing 
conditions.  
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Finally, Study 8 compared the effects of moral elevation and moral outrage to those of 
guilt and a control condition on self-focus. In line with the appraisal tendency framework 
(Horberg et al., 2011), it was predicted that moral elevation and moral outrage should induce 
less self-focus than guilt. Results supported the predictions. Specifically, while guilt 
promoted a self-focus, moral elevation and moral outrage did not.  
Taken together, the results reported in this thesis suggest that moral elevation and 
moral outrage are effective emotions for promoting prosociality. Specifically, moral elevation 
and moral outrage both promoted prosocial intentions and behaviours, but in line with the 
ATF their prosocial effects were distinctive. Furthermore, moral elevation and moral outrage 
promoted an approach-orientation, non-paternalistic stereotypes, and an other-focus, and can 
therefore be considered as unqualified prosocial emotions (see Table 8.1 for a summary of all 
studies).  
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Table 8.1 
Summary of Studies 
Study Participants Independent 
variables 
Dependent variables Main findings 
Chapter 4 




viewed vs. not 
viewed 
2. Outrage-inducing 
video: viewed vs. 
not viewed 
 
DV: Prosocial benevolence intentions 
MV: Appraisals and emotions 
Benevolence intentions were marginally higher when pts had viewed (vs. had 
not viewed) the elevation-inducing video. This effect was sequentially 
mediated by elevation appraisals and feelings of elevation.  




viewed vs. not 
viewed 
2. Outrage-inducing 
video: viewed vs. 
not viewed 
DV: Prosocial political action 
intentions 
MV: Appraisals and emotions 
Prosocial political action intentions were significantly higher when pts had 
viewed (vs. had not viewed) the outrage-inducing video. This effect was 
sequentially mediated by outrage appraisals and feelings of outrage.  
Chapter 5 




viewed vs. not 
viewed 
2. Outrage-inducing 




MV: Appraisals and emotions 
Donations were significantly higher when pts had viewed (vs. had not 
viewed) the elevation-inducing video. This effect was sequentially mediated 
by elevation appraisals and feelings of elevation.  




viewed vs. not 
viewed 
2. Outrage-inducing 




DV: Compensation and punishment 
when witnessing an unfairness 
MV: Appraisals and emotions 
Compensation after witnessing an unfairness was significantly higher 
following the outrage-only video than following dual exposure or the control 
video.   







Correlational design Vars: individual differences in 
elevation, shame, outrage, behavioural 
inhibition, and behavioural approach 
and general positive affect and 
negative affect. 
 
Individual differences in elevation were related to individual differences in 
behavioural activation (pos). Individual differences in shame were related to 
individual differences in behavioural inhibition (pos) and behavioural 
activation system (neg). Individual differences in outrage were not related to 
individual differences in behavioural inhibition or activation. 
 
Study 6 78 Amer 
adults  
Condition: elevation 
vs. outrage vs. 
control videos 
DV: Approach orientation, avoidance 
orientation, and prosocial motivation 
MV: Emotions 
Approach orientation and prosocial motivation were significantly higher 
following the elevation and outrage-inducing videos than following the 
control video. Effects of the emotion-inducing videos on prosocial 
motivation were sequentially mediated by their respective emotions and then 
by the approach-oriented state.  
Chapter 7     
     
Study 7 105 Amer 
adults  
Condition: elevation 
vs. outrage vs. 
sympathy stories 




Paternalistic stereotyping was significantly higher following the sympathy-
inducing story than following the elevation and outrage-inducing stories. The 
effect of the elevation-inducing story on (lower) paternalistic stereotyping 
was mediated by feelings of elevation.  
 
Study 8 121 Brit 
u/grads 
Condition: elevation 
vs. outrage vs. guilt 
vs. control videos 
DV: Focus 
 
Self-focus was significantly higher following the guilt-inducing video than 
following the elevation-inducing, outrage-inducing, and control videos.  
Note. Amer = American. Brit = British. U/grad = undergraduate. DV = dependent variable. MV = mediating variable. Pos = positively. Neg = 
negatively.  
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The current thesis provides novel insights into the prosocial potential of moral 
elevation and moral outrage. Nevertheless, there are some limitations and caveats that must 
be identified and discussed. Below I outline eight limitations of this research.  
One limitation of this thesis is that the sample sizes for many of the studies could be 
considered as somewhat small (especially Study 4 which had a sample size of 20 per cell). 
Nevertheless, very large effect sizes were found for the effects of the emotion-inducing 
stimuli on the relevant emotions across the pilot studies, and a-priori power analyses showed 
that 20 to 25 participants per cell should provide sufficient power (.8) to detect a medium to 
large effect size (see Chapter 3). Moreover, a meta-analysis of the effects of the elevation-
inducing video (vs. the control video) on elevation ratings across the relevant studies in this 
thesis (Pilot Study 1 and Studies 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8) showed persistently strong effects, meta-
analytic Z (weighted by sample size = 373) = 11.35, p < .001, SMD = 1.35 [1.12, 1.58]. 
Indeed an SMD above 0.8 is typically considered as a large effect size (Cohen, 1988). 
Similarly, a meta-analysis of the effects of the outrage-inducing video (vs. the control video) 
on outrage ratings across the relevant studies in the thesis (Pilot Study 1 and Studies 1, 2, 3, 
4, 6, and 8) also showed persistently strong effects, meta-analytic Z (weighted by sample size 
= 376) = 10.77, p < .001, SMD = 1.92 [1.57, 2.27].  
All studies (but one) employed emotion-inducing videos to manipulate feelings of 
moral elevation and moral outrage. While most elevation research has employed videos to 
instigate feelings of moral elevation (e.g., Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Freeman et al., 2009; Lai et 
al., 2014; Oliver et al., 2015; Schnall et al., 2010; Schnall & Roper, 2012; Silvers & Haidt, 
2008), and while the emotion-inducing videos employed in the current thesis were thoroughly 
piloted prior to the empirical research (see Chapter 3), it is plausible that confounds existed. 
Specifically, even though the videos were matched in terms of length and style (e.g., 
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interview vs. documentary vs. movie), other variables such as sound and visual features may 
have differed between the elevation-inducing and outrage-inducing stimuli. The results of the 
pilot research, the theoretical basis of the research findings, and the replicability of the 
research findings across studies provide confidence in the effectiveness of the emotion-
inducing videos employed in this thesis. However, to overcome this limitation future research 
could also employ a single stimulus to instigate feelings of moral elevation versus feelings of 
moral outrage by instructing participants beforehand to focus either on the elevating or the 
outrageous material. Nevertheless, this strategy may also be associated with methodological 
issues (e.g., participants may be more likely to feel both emotions across conditions). 
Alternatively, while potentially less emotional, written stories (rather than video clips) may 
be more suitable in order to minimise confounds across conditions 
It is important to discuss the limitations of the video clips used in this thesis in a bit 
more depth. Most importantly, the targets in the video clips varied in terms of whether they 
were one individual person (e.g., the moral elevator) or whether they were a larger body or 
group of people (e.g., a multi-national company; people in Congo). Future research should 
ensure that this component of the video clips remains consistent across targets and across 
conditions. In order to facilitate such consistency future research could employ the same 
context for all emotion-inducing stimuli and manipulate only the behaviour of the targets. For 
example, future research could draw on the refugee crisis and demonstrate either morally 
elevating behaviour by a third-party (trying to help refugees) or morally outrageous 
behaviour by a third-party (trying to traffic refugees). 
Emotions were measured using explicit self-report emotion scales drawn from 
previous research (Aquino et al., 2011; Freeman et al., 2009; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011). 
Research on emotions often uses pictures of emotional faces to complement the self-report 
scales (e.g., Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011). However, no research has developed emotional 
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faces to depict feelings of moral elevation. Therefore, emotional faces were not used in the 
current thesis. This could be an aim for future research. Furthermore, implicit measures of 
emotional arousal (e.g., via Biopac or Face reader) may also be informative for measuring 
emotional responses following elevation-inducing and outrage-inducing stimuli. This could 
also be an interesting step for future research. In particular, it could help further inform the 
effectiveness of the emotion-inducing stimuli.  
In the current research, benevolence relevant outcomes and justice relevant prosocial 
outcomes were measured in different studies. Specifically, Studies 1 and 3 measured 
benevolence relevant prosocial outcomes and Studies 2 and 4 measured justice relevant 
prosocial outcomes. Results were in line with theoretical frameworks and relevant 
predictions. However, measuring benevolence relevant and justice relevant prosocial 
outcomes within the same study may provide additional insights. Future research could 
measure benevolence relevant and justice relevant outcomes within the same study and then 
employ a mixed model design to directly compare the effects of elevation-inducing and 
outrage-inducing stimuli on these two outcomes.   
The current thesis did not measure how long the prosocial effects of moral elevation 
and moral outrage last. The studies reported in this thesis usually only lasted 10-20 minutes 
from start to finish. The immediate priority and therefore focus of the current research was to 
understand the effects of moral elevation and moral outrage on prosociality. Nevertheless, 
future research should explore whether the effects of these emotions last or whether they are 
relatively short-lived. If effects are short-lived then reminders or novel prompts may be 
required to facilitate longer-term effects.  
The studies reported in Chapter 7 tested two specific component features of moral 
elevation and moral outrage ± stereotyping and self-focus. In these studies prosocial 
responses were not directly measured as the relevant links between the component features 
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and prosocial responses were already well-established in the literature (e.g., Batson & Shaw, 
1991; Nadler & Chernyak-Hai, 2014). Therefore, the priority was to establish the links 
between moral elevation and moral outrage on the one hand, and the relevant component 
features on the other. Nevertheless, an avenue for future research could be to measure the 
effects of moral elevation and moral outrage on autonomous and altruistic types of helping 
directly.  
Study 8 showed that 27.5% of the sample failed the attention check (see Chapter 7). 
This raises the question of whether a proportion of participants in the other studies (1-7) also 
did not read the questions properly and whether the data of these studies also include some 
error variance. As highlighted in Chapter 7, research shows that MTurk users are more 
attentive to instructions than student samples (Hauser & Schwartz, 2015). Participants were 
sampled from MTurk in Studies 2, 5, 6, and 7. Moreover, Study 4 was lab-based (rather than 
on-line), so attention should have been maximised in this setting. This leaves Studies 1 and 3 
that were conducted online with student samples, and therefore the data of these two studies 
may contain some error variance. A strength of these two studies is that the results of Study 1 
were replicated using a different outcome measure in Study 3. Moreover, findings were in 
line with theoretically-grounded a-priori predictions. Nevertheless, future research should 
include attention checks as a standard methodological procedure.  
The current thesis explored third-SDUW\LQGLYLGXDOV¶GHVLUHWRKHOSRWKHUV7KLUGSDUWLHV
are those who are not directly involved in or affected by the relevant situation or context 
(e.g., inequality, injustice; see also Saab et al., 2015). The primary aim of this thesis was to 
understand whether and how moral elevation and moral outrage can mobilise third-party 
individuals to want to help others. For this reason, participants were shown videos that 
depicted other people who they did not know and had no relationship with. Unfortunately, 
manipulating ingroup identity and therefore examining intergroup helping behaviours was 
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beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, given the importance of intergroup dynamics 
for predicWLQJSHRSOH¶VSURVRFLDODVZHOODVGLVFULPLQDWLYHEHKDYLRXUVWRZDUGVRWKHUVVHH
Sturmer & Snyder, 2010), this should be a fundamental next step for this line of research.  
All studies reported in this thesis were either lab-based or on-line studies. 
Nevertheless, to effectively advance the evidence on these emotions it is essential to also 
conduct field studies. Indeed, in order to effectively and reliably inform charitable and other 
applied campaigns, the effects of moral elevation and moral outrage on prosociality must first 
be replicated in field studies. This is an important avenue for future research.  
Summary of Theoretical Implications   
Empirical evidence has shown that moral elevation and moral outrage are effective 
emotions for promoting prosociality (e.g., Haidt, 2003; Schnall et al., 2010; Thomas et al., 
2009). However, given that these two emotions have received substantially less theoretical 
and empirical attention compared to other emotions (e.g., sympathy and guilt; see Chapter 1) 
their effects were less well understood. The current thesis drew on and extended well-
established theoretical frameworks (e.g., the appraisal tendency framework; Horberg et al., 
2011; Lerner & Keltner, 2000) to better understand the effects of moral elevation and moral 
outrage on prosociality. Below I outline how the findings of this thesis inform the appraisal 
tendency framework, the model of moral emotion prototypicality, and the moral elevation 
and moral outrage literatures more specifically.  
Chapter 2 provided an overview of the appraisal tendency framework (Horberg et al., 
2011; Lerner & Keltner, 2000), which suggests that moral elevation and moral outrage should 
have distinctive effects on prosociality. Nevertheless, while this theory is well-established in 
terms of judgmental research and non-moral emotions, it has only recently been applied to 
the study of moral emotions and prosocial outcomes in particular (see Horberg et al., 2011). 
Moreover, the ATF has been criticised by psychological constructionist accounts of emotions 
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and morality which posit domain general, rather than domain specific, morality-emotion 
correspondences (Cameron et al., 2015). Therefore, it remained unclear whether or not the 
ATF could effectively account for the effects of moral elevation and moral outrage on 
prosocial intentions and behaviours. As discussed in Chapter 4, comparing the effects of 
moral elevation and moral outrage provides a particularly effective test of the appraisal 
tendency framework. Specifically, Lerner and Keltner (2000, p. 478) suggested that research 
RQWKH$7)³VKRXOGFRPSDUHHPRWLRQVWKDWDUHKLJKO\GLIIHUHQWLDWHGLQWKHLUDSSUDLVDOWKHPHV
RQMXGJPHQWVFKRLFHVWKDWUHODWHWRWKDWDSSUDLVDOWKHPH´0RUDOHOHYDWLRQDQGPRUDORXWUDJH
derive from opposing core appraisals. Moreover, while moral elevation and moral outrage 
derive from opposing appraisals, the empirical evidence to date documents convergent effects 
of both emotions on prosocial outcomes (e.g., charitable donations, volunteering). Thus, 
comparing moral elevation and moral outrage allows a direct test of whether the two 
emotions influence prosocial behaviours across the sociomoral domains of justice and 
benevolence, or whether their effects are domain specific (cf. Horberg et al., 2011). Chapters 
4 and 5 provided unique support for the contention that the appraisal tendency framework can 
explain the effects of moral elevation and moral outrage on prosocial intentions as well as 
behaviours. Moreover, Chapters 4 and 5 extended the separate strands of research on moral 
elevation on the one hand, and moral outrage on the other by demonstrating that these 
emotions do not simply promote general prosociality, but that instead, their prosocial effects 
are determined by their initial appraisal theme (i.e., benevolence vs. justice; see also Horberg 
et al., 2011).  
Chapter 2 highlighted that while emotions such as sympathy and guilt have been 
considered as prosocial emotions, they also suffer from some important prosocial short-
comings. It was suggested that as the body of research on these two emotions has expanded, 
VRKDYHWKH³LIV´DQG³EXWV´RIZKHQWKH\GRDQGGRQRWHYRNHSURVRFLDOLW\DQGZKDWW\SHVRI
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prosociality they induce. Chapters 6 and 7 drew on three component features (motivational 
orientation, stereotyping, and self-focus) to test whether moral elevation and moral outrage 
also suffer from such limitations. The findings of these chapters inform moral emotion 
research, and in particular the model of moral emotion prototypicality (Haidt, 2003).  
The model of moral emotion prototypicality (Haidt, 2003) draws on two component 
features (disinterested elicitors and prosocial action tendencies) to suggest that moral 
elevation, moral outrage, sympathy, and guilt are the most prototypical moral emotions as 
they can be most directly linked to the needs of others. Chapter 2 informed and extended this 
model by suggesting that three further component features can inform the extent to which 
these emotions can be linked to the needs of others. Results of Chapter 6 showed that both 
state elevation and state outrage are approach-oriented and should therefore promote 
prosociality both in easy as well as difficult situations (Algoe & Haidt, 2009). Results of 
Chapter 7 suggested that moral elevation and moral outrage may be more prosocially 
effective emotions than sympathy and guilt. Specifically, sympathy (but not elevation or 
outrage) increased undesirable paternalistic stereotypes of the target group. Moreover, guilt 
(but not elevation or outrage) increased a focus on the self. Therefore, the model of moral 
emotion prototypicality (Haidt, 2003) could be extended to include these three additional 
component features. Furthermore, drawing on these additional component features, moral 
elevation and moral outrage appear to be more prosocially effective emotions than sympathy 
and guilt.  
Summary of Practical Implications  
As highlighted throughout this thesis, large inequalities and injustices persist across 
the world. Charitable (and other) organisations aim to overcome such inequalities and 
injustices through countless projects and campaigns. These campaigns may include providing 
direct support to people in need, raising awareness about a particular issue among the general 
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public, or engaging the general public to stand up for their (or other¶s) rights. For such 
organisations to be successful in their work, it is usually essential to gain support and help 
from the general public. Nevertheless, while people are intuitively motivated to help others 
(Crockett et al., 2014; Schulz et al., 2014, see Chapter 1), there are many everyday factors 
that inhibit prosocial action from occurring. The current thesis provides direct insights for 
charitable (and other) organisations by exploring and testing effective strategies for engaging 
the general public to genuinely care about the concerns and wellbeing of others. This research 
has a number of direct implications for the applied field, each outlined below.   
First and foremost this thesis tested the potential of two relatively under-researched 
moral emotions (i.e., moral elevation and moral outrage) for promoting prosocial intentions 
and behaviours. In line with their separate strands of research (e.g., Algoe & Haidt, 2009; 
Montada & Schneider, 1989; Schnall et al., 2010; Thomas et al., 2009), the current findings 
showed that moral elevation and moral outrage are effective emotions for increasing 
prosocial intentions as well as behaviours. Therefore, charitable (as well as other) campaigns 
can draw on these emotions for mobilising people to want to help others.  
Substantial amounts of money are invested in charitable campaigns each year. 
Therefore, to spend money appropriately charitable (and other) organisations (more 
specifically - their marketing teams) require academic knowledge about what strategies may 
be most effective for mobilising prosocial action. The current thesis demonstrates that moral 
elevation and moral outrage affect distinct types of prosocial outcomes, and should therefore 
be used appropriately. While moral elevation effectively promotes benevolent behaviours, 
outrage effectively promotes justice behaviours. This is an essential insight for charitable 
(and other) organisations. Consider a scenario in which a marketing team discovers research 
that demonstrates that moral elevation effectively promotes prosocial behaviours (e.g., 
Schnall et al., 2010). The marketing team may then want to develop a campaign using this 
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emotion. The current thesis shows that this campaign will be effective if the goal is to 
promote a benevolence-relevant behaviour, not a justice-relevant behaviour. In other words, 
this thesis provides directly applied insights into how and when marketing campaigns should 
employ emotions to mobilise prosocial action.  
The current thesis also demonstrates the ease by which campaigns can promote 
prosocial outcomes. Specifically, in this thesis, short two-minute video clips were employed 
to induce feelings of moral elevation and/or moral outrage. These short video clips effectively 
and significantly increased prosocial intentions as well as behaviours. This suggests that 
campaigns can use short video clips as effective tools for promoting these emotions, and 
thereby promote prosociality. Charities could either use videos that already exist or they 
could develop such videos for their specific purposes. For example, at the end of Russel 
+RZDUGV¶*RRG1HZVVKRZHDFKZHHNKHVKRZVDPRUDOO\-elevating video. Charities could 
endeavour to air their advertisement just after such a TV-show (thereby employing already 
existing videos). Alternatively, charities could incorporate either morally elevating or morally 
outrageous material in their advertising videos or copy. Indeed, most charity advertisements 
(especially those aimed at raising money) tend to focus on inducing sympathy and/or guilt 
(i.e., showing people, usually children, who are starving and in need). The current thesis 
shows that elevation and outrage are also effective at promoting prosociality, and that they 
might promote less qualified responses than sympathy and guilt. For example, in their advert, 
a charity could focus on showing the exceptionally good work that they are doing. A next 
step would be for researchers to work directly with the fundraising and campaign teams 
within charities to help develop and test their advertising materials.  
 &KDULWDEOHFDPSDLJQVRIWHQDWWHPSWWR³SXOORQWKHKHDUWVWULQJV´7KH\GRWKLVE\
employing emotions such as sympathy and guilt to encourage people to help others (Breeze 
& Dean, 2012). Nevertheless, while these emotions may be effective for promoting prosocial 
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VLGHHIIHFWV´)RUH[DPSOHGXHWRLWVVHOI-focus, guilt may lead to strategic actions that 
primarily aim at overcoming its self-focused negative states (Hopkins et al., 2007; van 
Leeuwen, 2007), which may then be associated with tokenistic top-down forms of behaviour 
rather than victim-oriented actions (Iyer et al., 2004; McGarty et al., 2005). Moreover, 
sympathy may lead only to paternalistic forms of helping because it maintains high levels of 
disparity between the ingroup (i.e., the advantaged) and the outgroup (i.e., the disadvantaged) 
(Nadler & Halabi, 2006; Thomas et al., 2009). In other words, sympathy implies that the 
disadvantaged are dependent on the goodwill provided by the advantaged. The current thesis 
demonstrates, drawing on three component features (focus, stereotyping, and motivational 
orientation), WKDWPRUDOHOHYDWLRQDQGPRUDORXWUDJHGRQRWVXIIHUIURPVXFK³QHJDWLYHVLGH
HIIHFWV´7KHUHIRUHJLYHQWKDWPRUDOHOHYDWLRQDQGPRUDORXWUDJHHIIHFWLYHO\SURPRWH
prosocial action (like sympathy and guilt), but do not suffer from such negative side effects 
(unlike sympathy and guilt), moral elevation and moral outrage may be particularly useful 
emotions for promoting prosocial action in the applied field. They enable charities to 
accomplish short-term goals such as raising money, but avoid long-term negative 
repercussions such as negative stereotyping of disadvantaged groups.   
The applied impact of this research outlined above largely focuses on the third sector 
as the primary beneficiary of these insights. However, the research reported in this thesis is 
also relevant to other applied sectors and institutions. For example, policy makers within the 
public sector are increasingly drawing on behavioural insights (drawn from psychology and 
economics) to enhance the effectiveness of their policy initiatives (Dolan et al., 2012). 
Indeed, policy makers are eager to employ low-cost and effective strategies for changing 
SHRSOH¶VEHKDYLRXUV&HQWUDOJRYHUQPHQWGHSDUWPHQWVVXFKDVWKH'HSDUWPHQWIRU
Communities and Local Government (DCLG) and the Cabinet Office (CO) commission 
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projects aimed at promoting prosocial action and community engagement (e.g., as part of 
'&/*¶VFRPPXQLW\LQWHJUDWLRQSROLF\DVSDUWRI&2¶VVRFLDODFWLRQSROLF\7KHUHIRUH
knowledge about the most effective approaches (e.g., emotions) for promoting prosocial 
action is particularly important and relevant. Other public sector organisations such as the 
HM Prison Service and the NHS often rely on volunteers to support their work. Therefore, 
understanding effective strategies for encouraging people to become volunteers is also 
directly relevant to such organisations.  
Finally, educational and school programs often aim to engage children in prosocial 
behaviours. Such programs can be commissioned or organised by central government 
departments (e.g., Department of Education, Cabinet Office), by charitable organisations 
(e.g., Anne Frank Trust, People United, Bullying UK), or directly by schools. It seems likely 
that moral emotions may also be effective for promoting prosocial action among children and 
adolescents. For example, moral elevation may encourage children or adolescents to 
volunteer or engage in extra-curricular activities that benefit the community. Moral outrage 
may be more appropriate to use among adolescents rather than children, but may promote 
prosocial bystander intervention when witnessing an incident of bullying (Jones et al., 2009).  
Nevertheless, no research has tested whether manipulating feelings of moral elevation or 
moral outrage affect prosocial outcomes among children and/or adolescents. This is an 
important gap in the literature that should be addressed by future research.  
Future Research  
The current research has inspired and paved the way for exciting directions for future 
research. Below I outline six important directions for future research.  
Intergroup Emotion and Prosociality  
Research suggests that it is essential to distinguish intergroup prosociality from 
interpersonal prosociality (Sturmer & Snyder, 2010). This stems from the long-standing 
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576). Intergroup bias can be manifested as (a) favouring the ingroup and/or (b) derogating the 
outgroup. Hewstone et al. (2002) suggest that ingroup bias in prosociality is a form of 
ingroup favouritism. Specifically, when individuals categorise themselves as belonging to an 
ingroup, they will extend trust, positive regard, cooperation, empathy, and prosociality to 
ingroup, but not outgroup, members. Thus, this body of research suggests that the ways in 
which people behave towards others who are categorised as either ingroup or outgroup 
members will not parallel the ways in which people behave towards other individuals in 
interpersonal contexts.  
 Interpersonal versus intergroup distinctions in behaviour are typically made on the 
basis of the salient (intergroup) identity. That is, interpersonal behaviour occurs when 
someone is focused on their relationship with another person (relational self), while 
intergroup behaviour occurs when a person is focused on their relationship with their group 
(collective self) (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). Helping is considered as intergroup when 
someone who identifies oneself with one group, helps a person who is perceived to belong to 
an outgroup (Levine, Cassidy, Brazier, & Reicher, 2002; Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, 
Hopkins, & Levine, 2006). Thus, it is essential to explicitly consider the intergroup-level 
processes underlying prosocial responses.   
Similarly, intergroup emotion theory (IET; Smith, 1993) highlights the role that 
salient social identities play in predicting emotional arousal. Specifically, IET suggests that 
intergroup emotions (e.g., anger) arise from intergroup appraisals (e.g., illegitimacy), and in 
turn predict intergroup action tendencies (e.g., social action against an outgroup). In other 
words, emotional processes and responses vary depending on the social identity that is salient 
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in a given context. Thus, it is also essential to consider the intergroup-level processes 
underlying emotional responses.   
The current thesis did not include an intergroup factor in the study designs. In other 
words, it did not examine the influence of salient social idenWLWLHVRQSHRSOH¶VVXEVHTXHQW
emotions and behaviours. This is a natural and essential next step for this research. 
Employing an explicit intergroup-level approach will enable the development of a more 
advanced understanding of the effects of moral elevation and moral outrage on ingroup, 
outgroup, and third-party prosocial responses.  
Furthermore, future research should investigate the connections between social 
appraisal and group-level emotions (Parkinson & Manstead, 2015). Social appraisal implies 
that pHRSOHWDNHRWKHUSHRSOH¶VHPRWLRQVLQWRDFFRXQWZKHQDSSUDLVLQJZKDWLVKDSSHQLQJ
Therefore, future studies should explore the effects of elevation and outrage on intergroup 
and third-party helping during social interactions. This is important as the reactions of peers 
LQDJLYHQFRQWH[WDUHOLNHO\WRDIIHFWSHRSOH¶VRZQDSSUDLVDOVDQGWKHUHIRUHalso to affect their 
emotional and behavioural responses in that context. Indeed, Livingstone et al. (2011) 
showed that anger is more likely to influence willingness to engage in social action when this 
emotional reaction is shared by other group members. Given that much of our time is spent in 
social contexts (e.g., at work, at school), it is essential to understand how such social contexts 
influence emotional processes.  
  Field Research  
In order for this research to effectively inform third sector and public sector projects 
(e.g., charity campaigns, policy campaigns), the effects must first be replicated in a field 
study. The studies reported throughout this thesis clearly demonstrated that moral elevation 
and moral outrage effectively promote (distinct) prosocial outcomes. Nevertheless, all studies 
were laboratory or online studies. An essential step for future research is to collaborate with 
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external organisations to conduct large-scale field studies testing the effects of these emotions 
on prosocial behaviours.  
Individual Difference Variables  
The current research focused on understanding the effects of situational factors (e.g., 
emotions) on prosocial outcomes. However, it is highly likely that individual difference 
variables may moderate the effects of (1) the emotion-inducing stimuli on the relevant 
emotional states, and/or (2) the emotions on prosociality. Future research should explore 
whether individual difference variables such as values, belief in a just world, empathy, and 
perspective taking moderate such effects. It seems likely that greater valuing of universalism 
may lead to higher feelings of moral outrage when witnessing injustices. Similarly, greater 
valuing of benevolence may lead to higher feelings of moral elevation when witnessing moral 
virtues. Belief in a just world (BJW) may reduce feelings of moral outrage and subsequent 
desires to help others. Alternatively, witnessing an injustice may challenge the worldviews of 
people high in BJW, and they may therefore feel more outraged and may be more likely to 
help others. Future research is necessary to integrate situational and individual difference 
variables to develop a better understanding of prosocial behaviours.  
Cognate Measures 
There seems to be substantial scope to collaborate with cognitive psychologists to 
further develop and extend this line of research. For example, using eye tracking technology 
it would be possible to explore whether participants are focused on the perpetrator or the 
victim when watching outrage-inducing stimuli. This would inform research demonstrating 
the prosocial (rather than antagonistic) outcomes of moral outrage (see Chapter 5; Lotz et al., 
2011). Furthermore, employing physiological measures (e.g., EEG, heart rate, skin 
conductance response) to assess the intensity of relevant emotional states may enable 
exploration of whether and how intensity affects prosocial responses.  
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Developmental Research  
The current thesis aimed to understand the effects of moral emotions on prosociality 
among adults. This was an essential step in order to develop an initial understanding of the 
effects of moral elevation and moral outrage. Future research should draw on these findings 
to explore when and how these moral emotions may promote prosociality during childhood 
and adolescence. Understanding the developmental trajectory of when children and 
adolescents can understand and feel emotions like moral elevation and moral outrage, and 
when and how these emotions influence behaviours will inform relevant theory as well as 
applied initiatives.  
Appraisal Tendency Framework 
The findings of this thesis demonstrate clear support for the appraisal tendency 
framework (Horberg et al., 2011). However, the thesis focused on two specific moral 
emotions ± moral elevation and moral outrage. Research is necessary to test whether a wider 
range of moral emotions (e.g., admiration, shame) also have such domain specific effects. 
This would provide greater empirical evidence and insights for the appraisal tendency 
framework.  
Conclusion  
The aim of this thesis was to examine the prosocial effectiveness of two promising, 
yet under-researched moral emotions - moral elevation and moral outrage. The findings of 
this thesis significantly advance the existing insights into these two emotions. The results 
showed that moral elevation and moral outrage have distinctive effects on prosociality. Moral 
elevation promotes prosocial outcomes when outcomes are relevant to benevolence concerns. 
In contrast, moral outrage promotes prosocial outcomes when outcomes are relevant to 
justice concerns. Therefore, they should be used appropriately in charitable and other applied 
campaigns. The results further showed that moral elevation and moral outrage are associated 
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with prosocial component features. Specifically, they promote an approach orientation, non-
paternalistic stereotyping, and an other-focus. Therefore, moral elevation and moral outrage 
may be particularly effective at promoting unqualified prosociality. The findings reported in 
the current thesis are particularly informative for applied campaigns aimed at encouraging 
more helpful and cooperative societies.     
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I grew up in Derry in the early 70s it was a fairly violent place, bombs went off, the smell of sinus 
gas in the air. 1972 when I was on my way home from school I was running up through the 
football field and as I ran past a British soldier fired a rubber bullet and the rubber bullet struck me 
here between the eyes, I lost my sight, so I have been blind now since 1972. I just knew that I 
wanted to spend most of my life working to help others in other parts of the world. I just had a 
natural affiliation towards children who were vulnerable. In 1996 Richard set up Children in 
Crossfire. My dream is to work with groups that help children out of poverty. The sort of work 
ZH¶YHEHHQGRLQJLVSURYLGLQJDFFHVVWRFOHDQZDWHUSURSHUIRRGPHGLFLQHHGXFDWLRQ:KDWI 
began to realise is that there are children in other parts of the world who may have had their 
H\HVLJKWEXWGLGQ¶WKDYHWKHRSSRUWXQLWLHVWKDW,KDYH:KDWLVLPSRUWDQWLVZHIRFXVRQZKDWZH
FDQGRQRWZKDWZHFDQ¶WGR$QG,WKLQNWKDW¶VEHHQWKHVWRU\ of my life in a way. ³5LFKDUGIRU
me is like the blind leading the sighted. He really began this whole peace process on the day he 
was shot. Whatever happened to him and whatever happened on that day there was never any 
KDWUHGRUDQLPRVLW\´'HV'RKRUW\Childhood friend). Anger is like a rotten apple, it eats you 
IURPWKHLQVLGHRXW,GLGQ¶WKDYHDOORIWKDWDQJHUVRZKDWKDSSHQHG",ZDVDEOHWRJHWRQZLWKP\
life in a very positive way. &KLOGUHQLQ&URVVILUHQRZZRUNVLQRIWKHZRUOG¶VSRRUHVW
countries)RUJLYHQHVVLVDWUHPHQGRXVJLIW,W¶VDIDQWDVWLFSODFHWREH:KHQ,IRUJLYHWKHVROGLHU
that blinded me then I am much happier inside. You look at Children in Crossfire you can see how 






I grew up in Zambia in the early 70s it was a fairly violent place, bombs went off, the smell of 
sinus gas in the air. 1972 when I was on my way home from school I was running up through the 
football field and as I ran past a soldier fired a rubber bullet and the rubber bullet struck me here 
between the eyes, I lost my sight, so I have been blind now since 1972. I just knew that I wanted 
to spend most of my life working to help others out of poverty. In 1996 Daniel set up a charity 
called Zambia Support Group. My dream is to work with groups that help children out of poverty. 
7KHVRUWRIZRUNZH¶YHEHHQGRLQJLVSURYLGLQJDFFHVVWRFOHDQZDWHUSURSHUIRRGPHGLFLQH
education. What I began to realise is that there are children all over the world who may have had 
WKHLUH\HVLJKWEXWGLGQ¶WKDYHWKHRSSRUWXQLWLHVWKDW,KDYH:KDWLVLPSRUWDQWLVZHIRFXVRQZKDW
ZHFDQGRQRWZKDWZHFDQ¶WGR$QG,WKLQNWKDW¶VEHHQWKHVWRU\RIPy life in a way.³'DQLHOIRU
me is like the blind leading the sighted. He really began this whole peace process on the day he 
was shot. Whatever happened to him and whatever happened on that day there was never any 
KDWUHGRUDQLPRVLW\´&KLOGKRRGIULHQG Anger is like a rotten apple, it eats you from the inside 
RXW,GLGQ¶WKDYHDOORIWKDWDQJHUVRZKDWKDSSHQHG",ZDVDEOHWRJHWRQZLWKmy life in a very 
positive way. Zambia Support Group now works in 14 of the poorest towns in Zambia. 
Forgiveness is a tremendous JLIW,W¶VDIDQWDVWLFSODFHWREH:KHQ,IRUJLYHWKHVROGLHUWKDW
blinded me then I am much happier inside. You look at Zambia Support Group you can see how 
forgiveness changed my future. 
Video link http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SQjfzSeMSJA 
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Table A2 
Moral Outrage 1 







million dollars owed to the African nation, he says that that money is owed to him. In this village the 
British government and UNICEF dug a well at the cost of less than $2000 they were able to provide 
clean water, cholera free water for 400 people. That still leaves 15 million Congolese without clean 
ZDWHU7KHYXOWXUHSDLGMXVWPLOOLRQGROODUVIRU&RQJR¶VGHEWEXWKHZDQWVPLOOLRQRI
&RQJR¶VPRQH\UHWXUQHG,$VNHGWKHGLUHFWRURIWKH81,&()SURMHFWZKDWPLOOLRQFRXOGGR
KHUH³WKRXVDQGFKLOGUHQZRXOGKDYHWKHLUOLIHVDYHG´± so 100 million dollars, 200 thousand 
children saved. So how did a New York vulture end up claiming 100 million dollars on a 3 million 
GROODUGHEWIURPRQHRIWKHZRUOG¶VSRRUHVWFRXQWULHV"7KHVWRU\EHJDQ\HDUVDJRZKHQ
Yugoslavia built poweUOLQHVIRUWKH&RQJRWKH\KDGQ¶WILQLVKHGSD\LQJIRUWKHOLQHVZKHQERWK
Yugoslavia and the Congo slipped into civil war. 100 thousand died as Yugoslavia split up into 7 
separate countries and millions died in Congo. Somehow in all this mayhem, vulture speculators 
obtained the right to collect that power line debt owed by the Congo. The vulture paid 3 million 
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Table A3 
Moral Outrage 2 
Transcript ³6RPHWKLQJURWWHQLQWKHVZHHWHVWWRZQRI=DPELD´QDUUDWHGE\.U\WLFLRXV1VKLQGDQR$FWLRQ$LG
Zambia 
Sweet town of Mazabuka situated in the southern part of Zambia. 
The levels of poverty in Zambia have been high for the last 10 years or so. Mazabuka has one of the 
highest poverty levels in the country; about 68% of the people there live in poverty. Zambia sugar is 
a major and key industry in Mazabuka. If you look at the millions of dollars that Zambian sugar, ABF 
the parent company, are dodging in terms of taxes and what that could do for a town like Mazabuka, 
LW¶VTXLWHDORW³7RGD\WKHODUJHVWSDUWRI$VVRFLDWHG%ULWLVK)RRGV$%)SURGXFWLVJHQHUDWHGE\
sugDU´-- Associated British Foods plc promotional video). Caroline sells Zambia sugar products. 
She paid more tax in Zambia than the giant multinational from 2008-³2XUSURILWVDUHQRW
enough to supply us with good food at home. The most challenging meal is usually supper so we 
XVXDOO\HDWSRUULGJH´&DUROLQH0XFKDQJD0DUNHWVWDOORZQHU 
Associated British Foods has made profits of $123 million in Zambia since 2007 but admits to paying 
³YLUWXDOO\QRFRUSRUDWHWD[´LQWKHFRXQWU\<RXZRQ¶WEHOLHYHWKHNLnd of amount that is lost through 
tax havens and even through incentives by Zambia sugar. They use legal loopholes to shift an 
estimated $13.8 million a year out of Zambia, into tax havens. Zambia loses enough to put an extra 
48,000 children in school a year.  
7KH\¶UHDEOHWRPRYHDURXQGWKHLUSURILWVWKURXJKWKHVHWD[KDYHQVZKLFKUREWKHFRXQWU\RIWKH
PXFKQHHGHGWD[HVUHYHQXHIRUSXEOLFVHUYLFHSURYLVLRQ³,IFRPSDQLHVSDLGWD[WKHJRYHUQPHQW
would be collecting enough revenue and grants to hospital and VFKRROVZRXOGLQFUHDVH´0U
Sunatama, Headmaster of 1DNDPEDOD6FKRRORQWKHHGJHRIWKH=DPELD6XJDUHVWDWH³6RPHWLPHV
when we come from home we usually come with clean uniforms. But when we get to school, we feel 
bad because we get dirty. We need to at OHDVWKDYHDIORRULQRXUVFKRRO´,UHQH+DQJRPDVWXGHQWDW
1DNDPEDOD6FKRRORQWKHHGJHRIWKH=DPELD6XJDUHVWDWH³,IWKDWWD[ZDVEHLQJSDLGPD\EHWKRVH
PRQH\VZRXOGEHXVHGE\PDQ\KRVSLWDOVWREX\PRUHGUXJVWRDFFHVVWKHKDUGWRUHDFKSODFHV´
Sister Florence Mweemba, Head of the clinic at Nakambala Health Centre, Mazabuka 
³:HUHFHLYHXSWRFKLOGUHQSHUZHHN$IWHUZHLJKLQJZHLGHQWLI\PDQ\FKLOGUHQDVPDOQRXULVKHG












Transcript Each year the Serengeti planes in Tanzania play host to one of the greatest animal migrations on 
earth. Some 2 million animals begin a round trip that will take them almost 2000 miles. Fossil 
evidence suggests that modern wildebeests grazed these planes more than a million years ago. At the 
beginning of each year wildebeests congregate at the fringes of the Serengeti, all giving birth in the 
same month. Rapidly their numbers swell. The calves can run as fast as their mothers within 2 days 
of being born. No one knows what triggers the migration. There is no discernable signal, it just takes 
one or two to sniff the air and decide the time is right to leave. 
7KHPLJUDWLQJDQLPDO¶VMRXUQH\LVDORQJDQGDUGXRXVRQH(YHQZLWKRXWWKHDWWHQWLon of predators 
around 200 thousand of the weakest wildebeest zebras will die of starvation, disease or overexertion 
during the trek. Everyday fresh carcasses are left behind.  The migrating animals rest at the swirling 
streams and regroup.  
A single cat finds it tricky taking down a full grown wildebeest, but if it can separate a wildebeest 
calf off from its mother then it has a chance of a meal. 
,Q.HQ\D¶V0DDVDL0DUDWKHPLJUDWLQJKHUGVDUULYH5DLQVKDYHFUHDWHGDKXJHDUHDRIZHOOZDWHUHG
grazing. Here WKHZLOGHEHHVWZLOOVWD\XQWLOWKHVPHOORI1RYHPEHU¶VVKRUWUDLQVWHOOWKHPLW¶VWLPHWR













As morning dawns in the rambling squatter community of Kanyama, sunlight warms the thickening 
haze of early-morning pollution and lung-burning dust already filling the air. By mid-morning, heat 
rises in visible waves from the tattered tin roofs covering the tiny, weatherworn brick houses 
crowding the densely-populated community. Children, hungry and lacking classrooms to fill, gather 
in barren common areas to play and seek shelter from the stifling heat under anything that casts a 
VKDGRZ7KLVLVZKHUHRI=DPELD¶VSRRUHVWUHVLGHQWVOLYHSHRSOHIRUZKRPWKHFROODSVHG
copper market, a soaring unemployment rate and worsening AIDS crisis have been particularly 
devastating. Most families here live in small, crumbling brick homes that are no more than eight or 
10 feet across and a few feet in the other direction. Some have concrete floors; sadly, others have dirt. 
What they share are yawning gaps in the roofs and walls that choking dust and heavy rains easily 
breach. Absent from most homes are any furnishings or personal belongings, with the exception of a 
blanket or two for sleeping. Also markedly absent are parents. While UNICEF reports that 16 percent 
RIWKHSRSXODWLRQRI=DPELDLVLQIHFWHGZLWK+,9$,'6WKHQXPEHUVHHPVDPELJXRXVZKHQLW¶V
nearly impossible to find a family untouched by the disease in Kanyama. Thousands of children have 
been orphaned, many left to fend for themselves. And grandparents, after suffering the loss of their 
own children to the disease, are left with the seemingly insurmountable task of raising handfuls of 
grandchildren on incomes that amount to pennies a day. Street vending is about the only means of 
survival for many. Unskilled, uneducated and overburdened, they muster the energy to sell 
everything from vegetables and cooking oil to fire-roasted peanuts, french fries and chicken 
LQWHVWLQHV,IWKH\¶UHLQGXVWULRXV± and blessed with a good deal of luck ± they can afford to feed their 
grandchildren at least one meal a day, which typically consists of nshima, a local dish made of corn, 
water and cooking oil. Others, less fortunate and often too old or feeble to make the daily trek to buy 
supplies from markets miles away, can only afford to feed their grandchildren a few meals each 
week, further compromising their immune systems and making them more susceptible to rampant 
diseases. This is especially true during the rains when malaria, tuberculosis and cholera outbreaks 
spread like flash fire in the confined, destabilized community. 
Video 
link 
Not applicable ± no video used 
 
  




Transcript A vast dangerous and hidden trade in old televisions, computers, and other electrical equipment is 
IORZLQJIURPULFK:HVWHUQQDWLRQVWRGHYHORSLQJQDWLRQVLQ$VLDDQG$IULFD(OHFWURQLFZDVWHRU³H-
ZDVWH´DVLW¶VRIWHQNQRZQLVIDVWEHFRPLQJRQHRIWKHEiggest global threats to human health and the 
environment. As more and more electronic junk is burnt, broken up, or stripped for valuable second 
hand parts a cocktail of dangerous toxic chemicals and heavy metals is being released.  
Workers in the crude recycling facilities are exposed to harmful persistent chemicals which then find 
WKHLUZD\LQWRWKHDWPRVSKHUHDQGZDWHUVXSSOLHV³*KDQDLVLQFUHDVLQJO\EHFRPLQJDGXPSLQJ
ground for E-ZDVWHPDLQO\IURP(XURSHDQGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVRI$PHULFD+HUHZH¶UHWalking of 
VHYHUDOWRQQHVRIREVROHWHGLVFDUGHGFRPSXWHUV7KHSUREOHPLVWKDWZHGRQ¶WKDYHWKHPHFKDQLVPV
or the systems in place in this country to recycle this waste. Some come in under the guise of 
GRQDWLRQEXWZKHQ\RXH[DPLQHWKHLWHPVWKH\GRQ¶WZork. So one would wonder why someone 
ZRXOGZDQWWRGRQDWHLWHPVWKDWGRQ¶WZRUN,ILW¶VQRWGXPSLQJWKHQLW¶VMXVWDZD\WRJHWULGRIWKHVH
FRPSXWHUV:KHQ\RXJRWRWKHVLWHZKHUHWKHVHLWHPVDUHGXPSHG\RX¶OOVHHDORWRIROGFRPSXWHUV
dumped in these rivers. The lead, the mercury, and all the other toxins bio-accumulate. That is to say, 
they stay in the food chain. People, who break up these copper-wired tubes, tell you that they have 
nausea, they have headaches, they have respiratory problems as a result of breaking these wires. They 
inhale a lot of fumes, the residents in the neighbourhood inhale a lot of fumes, from the burning 
processes. Sometimes we even find children breaking these copper-wired tubes apart just to get the 















While you were watching this video clip please indicate how much you felt each of the following 
things from 1 (didn't feel it at all) to 9 (felt it very strongly) 
   'LGQ¶WIHHOLWDWDOO 
1 











10. Softhearted  
11. Tender  
12. Warm  





18. Dissatisfied with myself 
19. Disgusted at myself 
20. Angry at myself 
21. Embarrassed 
Note. Items 1 to 4 measured moral elevation. Items 5 to 8 measured moral outrage. 
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Appendix C 
Cognitive Appraisal Scale 
Table C1 
Cognitive Appraisals 
The video clip demonstrates a wide variety of aspects of life      















1. To what extent is there behaviour in the video clip 
which is well above the normal standards of behaviour? 
     
2. To what extent did any aspects of the video clip reflect 
the way people should behave, ideally? 
3. To what extent is there behaviour in the video clip 
which is well below the normal standards of 
behaviour? 
4. To what extent did any aspects of the video clip reflect 
WKHZD\SHRSOHVKRXOGQ¶WEHKDYe? 
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Appendix D 
Benevolent Helping Intentions Scale (Study 1) 
Table D1 
Benevolent Helping Intentions 
Please rate the extent to which you intend to do each of 
the following things over the next 6 weeks: 
     





















1. Give money to charity      
2. Donate goods or clothes to a charity 
3. Go our of your way to help a friend 
4. Go out of your way to help a stranger in need 
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Appendix E 
Prosocial Political Action Scales (Study 2) 
Table E1 
 
Prosocial Action Intentions and Behavioural Engagement 
 
72 million children are out of school. 771 adults worldwide are illiterate (Oxfam). Some 
Americans are taking action to express their opinions about what should be done to improve 
access to education worldwide. 
1. One group has been formed to call for the U.S. to provide more support and help to 
improve access to education (e.g., by funding the development of school buildings, books, 
WHDFKHU¶VZDJHVDQGFKLOGUHQ¶VXQLIRUPVUsing the scale below, indicate how willing you 
would be to engage in various activities to support this group and its strategy: 















1. Volunteer with this group  
     
2. Vote for a candidate who agrees with this 
group 
     
3. Sign a petition  
     
4. Wear a badge supporting this group  
     
5. Attend a rally  
     
6. -RLQWKHJURXS¶VH-mail list  
     
7. Recruit others to become involved with this 
group  
     
8. Go to a meeting of local representatives of 
this group 
     
2. Other Americans have formed a group to identify those responsible for the lack of access to 
education worldwide and to directly challenge them to fix the problems they have created. 
Using the scale below, indicate how willing you would be to engage in various activities to 
support this group and its strategy: 















1. Volunteer with this group  
     
2. Vote for a candidate who agrees with this 
group 
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3. Sign a petition  
     
4. Wear a badge supporting this group  
     
5. Attend a rally  
     
6. -RLQWKHJURXS¶VH-mail list  
     
7. Recruit others to become involved with this 
group  
     
8. Go to a meeting of local representatives of 
this group 
     
3. Other Americans have formed a group to advocate for the U.S. to not get involved in this 
issue of access to education worldwide. Using the scale below, indicate how willing you 
would be to engage in various activities to support this group and its strategy: 















1. Volunteer with this group  
     
2. Vote for a candidate who agrees with this 
group 
     
3. Sign a petition  
     
4. Wear a badge supporting this group  
     
5. Attend a rally  
     
6. -RLQWKHJURXS¶VH-mail list  
     
7. Recruit others to become involved with this 
group  
     
8. Go to a meeting of local representatives of 
this group 
     
If you would like more information about one or more of the groups please indicate the group 
you would like details from below: 
1. The group that advocates more support and help to improve access to education 
worldwide 
2. The group that advocates to identify those responsible and directly challenge them to 
improve access to education worldwide 
3. The group that advocates to not get involved 
Note*URXSZDVWKH³VXSSRUWJURXS´*URXSZDVWKH³FKDOOHQJHJURXS´*URXS
ZDVWKH³DYRLGDQFHJURXS´7KHILQDOVHFWLRQRIWKHWDEOHVKRZVWKHEHKDYLRXUDO
engagement measure.  
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Appendix F 
Charitable Donations Measure (Study 3) 
Table F1 
Charitable Donations Measure 
Prize Draw 
³(YHU\RQH WKDW WDNHV SDUW LQ WKLV UHVHDUFK ZLOO EH HQWHUHG LQ D SUL]H GUDZ RI  7KH
following questions will ask you if you would like to give any of the amount to charity. 
- Please note that if you win, the researcher will distribute the money according to your 
answers below. 
- Please note that this is entirely confidential and is your own choice. 
- On the following page you will be able to choose up to two charities to donate to amongst 
the following options: NSPCC, Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Foundations 
for Peace, Save the Children, Nonviolent Peace Force, Amnesty International, WWF, 
*UHHQSHDFHDQG:KHHO3RZHU´ 
1. How much of the £60 would you like to donate to charity?  
 
2. Please choose up to two charities to donate your chosen amount of money to.  
If you choose one charity then all of the money you want to donate will go to that charity. If 
you choose two charities then the money you want to donate will be evenly distributed 
between the 2 charities. 
NSPCC (The National Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Children). 
Short Description: The NSPCC is a British charity which 
aims to end cruelty to children in the UK.  
 
Handicap International 
Short Description: Handicap International is a charity 
which aims to help people with disabilities around the 
world. 
 
Human Rights Watch 
Short Description: Human Rights Watch is a nonprofit, 
nongovernmental human rights organisation which aims 
to lobby for and promote human rights and justice 
around the world.   
Foundation for Peace 
Short Description: The Foundation for Peace is a charity 
which aims to support those affected by local and global 
 




Short Description: WWF is a charity which aims to stop 
WKHGHJUDGDWLRQRIWKHSODQHW¶VQDWXUDOHQYLURQPHQWDQG
to build a future in which humans live in harmony with 
nature. 
 
Save the Children 
Short Description: Save the Children is a charity which 
aims to help children inflicted by poverty and violence 
around the world. 
 
Nonviolent Peace Force 
Short Description: The Nonviolent Peace Force is a 
charity which aims to promote, develop and implement 
unarmed civilian peacekeeping as a tool for reducing 




Short Description: Amnesty International is charity 
which aims protect people wherever justice, fairness, 
freedom and truth are denied. 
 
WheelPower (Sport for All) 
Short Description: WheelPower (Sport for All) aims to 
promote equality of opportunity in sport for all people 
with physical disabilities. 
 
Greenpeace 
Short Description: Greenpeace is a charity which aims to 
defend the natural world and promote peace by 
investigating, exposing and confronting environmental 
abuse, and championing environmentally responsible 
solutions. 
 
Note. Order of charity presentation was randomised. The short descriptions are based 
RQWKHFKDULW\¶VZHEVLWHV3DUWLFLSDQWVZRXOGRQO\EHVKRZQWKLVVHFWLRQLIWKH\RSWHG
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Appendix G 
Third-Party Experimental Game Transcript (Study 4) 
Dear participant, 
The next part of this study is on social interactions. Please read the following 
instructions carefully. In case of questions or uncertainties, please ask the 
experimenter.   
[NEW PAGE] 
You are going to participate in an interaction between three parties. All participants 
will be randomly assigned to either one of three possible roles, Player A, B, or C. In 
the course of this interaction, you and the other players can earn points. Each point is 
equivalent to £0.10. When the experimenter has collected all of the data, ten percent 
of participants will be randomly selected by a lottery and will receive their 
amount of money based on the decisions made in their interaction.  
This means that your decisions in this interaction may determine how much you 
receive if you win the experiment lottery.  
Before we start, the computer will now randomly assign each participant to the role of 
either Player A, B, or C. 
[TIME LAG] [NEW PAGE] 
You are assigned to the role of Player C. 
Everyone will remain completely anonymous during and after the experiment. So, 
you will never know which other participants were the Players A and B in this 
interaction, nor will they know that you were the Player C with whom they had 
interacted. 
,I\RXSUHVV³&RQWLQXH´\RXZLOOUHFHLYHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHWZRSKDVHVRIWKH
social interaction. Players A and B will receive the same information. 
[NEW PAGE] 
3KDVH3OD\HU$¶V'HFLVLRQ 
In this social interaction, Player A has 100 points, Player B has no points, and Player 
C has 50 points. 
In Phase 1, Player A may allocate a voluntary number of points to Player B.  
It is up to Player A to decide how many points he or she will allocate to Player B.  
Player B has no say in how much he or she receives. 
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Player A may decide not to allocate any points at all to Player B, or to allocate half of 
the points to Player B. All possible distributions that Player A could make are shown 







(Player A keeps 










(Player A allocates 
















Based on the distribution that Player A makes, Player C can choose to assign 
reduction points to Player A and/or compensation points to Player B.  
Every reduction point that Player C assigns to Player A reduces the total number of 
points from Player C by 1, but reduces the total number of points from Player A 
by 3.  
Every compensation point that Player C assigns to Player B reduces the total number 
of points from Player C by 1, but increases the total number of points from Player 
B by 3.  
Player C is free to assign any number of reduction points to Player A and/or 
compensation points to Player B, anything from zero to all 50 points that were 
initially assigned.  
However, Player C cannot use more than 50 points in total. Some EXAMPLES are 
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So, if for example Player A made the following distribution: 
Player A = 70 points 
Player B = 30 points 
Player C could choose to: 
 Points OR Points 
Punish Player A with: 4 10 
Compensate Player B with 2 12 
This would leave Players A, B, and C with this many points: 
 
3OD\HU$¶VSRLQWSRLQWV 70 ± 4(3) = 58  70 ± 10(3) = 40 
3OD\HU%¶VSRLQWVSRLQWV 30 + 2(3) = 36 30 + 12 (3) = 66  




While Player A makes his or her choice, we want you to choose how many reduction 
and/or compensation points you would assign for each of the possible six distributions 
that Player A could make.  
Player A can make any of the following six distributions: 
 Points 
Player A gets: 100 90 80 70 60 50 
Player B gets:  0 10 20 30 40 50 
 
Please decide how many compensation and/or reduction points you would assign for 
each of these six distributions in case Player A makes such an offer.  
Your decision will be binding. In other words, your decisions will be compared with 
WKHDFWXDOGHFLVLRQWKDW3OD\HU$PDNHV<RXUGHFLVLRQVWRJHWKHUZLWK3OD\HU$¶V
decision will determine how much each player in this interaction receives if they win 
the experiment lottery.  
Player A 100 90 80 70 60 50 
Player B 0 10 20 30 40 50 
Punishment to 
Player A: 
      
Compensation 
to Player B: 
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Remember: 
x For every 1 reduction point you give, 3 points will be deducted from Player A. 
x For every 1 compensation point you give, 3 points will be compensated to 
Player B. 
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Appendix H 
Dispositional Emotion Scales (Study 5) 
Table H1 
Dispositional Elevation 
The statements below refer to experiences in which you perceive or hear about some person 
demonstrating an impressive act of charity or loyalty or kindness or compassion or 
forgiveness or sacrifice for others or sincere service to others. We refer to these as acts of 
moral beauty. 
















1. I notice moral beauty in human beings      
2. When perceiving an act of moral beauty I feel 
changes in my body, such as a lump in my throat, an 
expansion in my chest, faster heart beat, or other 
bodily responses 
     
3. When perceiving an act of moral beauty I feel 
HPRWLRQDO LW ³PRYHV PH´ VXFK DV IHHOLQJ D VHQVH RI
awe, or wonder or excitement or admiration or 
upliftment 
     
4. When perceiving an act of moral beauty I feel 
something like a spiritual experience, perhaps a sense 
of oneness, or being united with the universe, or a love 
of the entire world 
5. When perceiving an act of moral beauty I find that I 
desire to become a better person 
6. When perceiving an act of moral beauty I find that I 
desire to do good deeds and increase my service to 
others 



























1. I feel angry when I see others being unfairly 
treated 
     
2. It bothers me when I see that others are not fairly 
treated 
     
3. I feel outraged by injustices done to others      
4. I am concerned by unfairness done to others 
5. If I see that someone is feeling mad because he or 
she was mistreated, then I feel mad too 
6. When I see someone feeling sad because he or she 
was hurt by another person, I feel angry 
7. I feel angry for other people when they have been 
victimized by others 
8. I feel angry for a person when his or her feelings 
have been hurt by someone else 
9. I get angry when a friend of mine is hurt by 
someone else 
10. When someone I know gets angry at someone 
else, I feel angry at that person too 
11. When I see others being taken advantage of, I 
GRQ¶WIHHOPDGIRUWKHP 
     













Below you will read about situations that people are likely to encounter in day-to-day life, 
followed by common reactions to those situations. As you read each scenario, try to 
imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate the likelihood that you would react in the 






















1. You rip an article out of a journal in the library 
and take it with you. Your teacher discovers what 
you did and tells the librarian and your entire class. 
What is the likelihood that this would make you 
would feel like a bad person? 
     
2. You give a bad presentation at work. Afterwards 
your boss tells your coworkers it was your fault that 
your company lost the contract. What is the 
likelihood that you would feel incompetent? 
     
3. You successfully exaggerate your damages in a 
lawsuit. Months later, your lies are discovered and 
you are charged with perjury. What is the likelihood 
that you would think you are a despicable human 
being? 
     
4. You make a mistake at work and find out a 
coworker is blamed for the error. Later, your 
coworker confronts you about your mistake. What is 
the likelihood that you would feel like a coward? 
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Appendix I 
Approach and Avoidance - BIS/BAS Scale (Study 5) 
Each item of this questionnaire is a statement that a person may either agree with or 
disagree with. For each item, indicate how much you agree or disagree with what the 
item says.  Please respond to all the items; do not leave any blank. Choose only one 
response to each statement. Please be as accurate and honest as you can be. Respond 
to each item as if it were the only item. That is, don't worry about being "consistent" 
in your responses. Choose from the following four response options: 
  1 = very true for me  
  2 = somewhat true for me  
  3 = somewhat false for me  
  4 = very false for me 
1.  A person's family is the most important thing in life.  
2.  Even if something bad is about to happen to me, I rarely experience fear or 
nervousness.  
3.  I go out of my way to get things I want.  
4.  When I'm doing well at something I love to keep at it.  
5.  I'm always willing to try something new if I think it will be fun.  
6.  How I dress is important to me.  
7.  When I get something I want, I feel excited and energized.  
8.  Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit.  
9.  When I want something I usually go all-out to get it.  
10.  I will often do things for no other reason than that they might be fun. 
11.  It's hard for me to find the time to do things such as get a haircut.  
12.  If I see a chance to get something I want I move on it right away.  
13.  I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know somebody is angry at me.  
14.  When I see an opportunity for something I like I get excited right away.  
15.  I often act on the spur of the moment.  
16.  If I think something unpleasant is going to happen I usually get pretty "worked 
up."  
17.  I often wonder why people act the way they do.  
18.  When good things happen to me, it affects me strongly.  
19.  I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at something important.  
20.  I crave excitement and new sensations. 
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21.  When I go after something I use a "no holds barred" approach.  
22.  I have very few fears compared to my friends.  
23.  It would excite me to win a contest.  
24.  I worry about making mistakes.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note. Items other than 2 and 22 were reverse-scored. Items 3, 9, 12, and 21 measured 
BAS Drive. Items 5, 10, 15, and 20 measured BAS Fun Seeking. Items 4, 7, 14, 18, 
and 23 measured BAS Reward Responsiveness. Items 2, 8, 13, 16, 19, 22, and 24 
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Appendix J 
General Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) (Study 5) 
Table J1 
General Positive and Negative Affect 
Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment: 
 



































     
Note. Items 1, 3, 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17 and 19 measured positive affect. Items 2, 4, 6, 
7, 8, 11, 13, 15, 18, and 20 measured negative affect.   
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Appendix K 
Action Readiness Scale (Study 6) 
Table K1 
Action Readiness 
While you were watching this video clip please indicate how much you felt each of the 





























1. I wanted to approach, to make contact 
2. I wanted to be or stay close, to be receptive to 
someone 
3. I wanted to have nothing to do with something 
or someone, to be bothered by it as little as 
possible, to stay away 
4. I wanted to sink into the ground, to disappear 
from the Earth, not to be noticed by anyone 
     
Note. Items 1 and 2 measured approach orientation. Items 3 and 4 measured 
avoidance orientation.  
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Appendix L 
Prosocial Motivation Scale (Study 6) 
Table L1 
Prosocial Motivation 
While you were watching this video clip please indicate how much you felt each of the 
following things from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very strongly so) 





















1. Want to help others 
2. Feel like doing good for others 
3. Do not want to help others 
4. Do not care about assisting others 
     
Note. Items 3 and 4 were reverse scored.  
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Appendix M 
Stereotypes of Competence and Warmth Scale (Study 7) 
Table N1 
Stereotypes of Competence and Warmth 
To what extent do you view people from Zambia as: 



















Very strongly so 
5 
1. Competent  
2. Confident  
3. Capable  
4. Efficient  
5. Intelligent  
6. Skilful  
7. Friendly  
8. Well-intentioned  
9. Trustworthy  
10. Warm  
11. Good-natured  
12. Sincere  
.     
Note. Items 1 to 6 measured perceived competence. Items 7 to 12 measured perceived 
warmth.  
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Appendix N 
Perceived Responsibility Manipulation Check (Study 8) 
Table N1 
Perceived Responsibility 





















1. How responsible do you feel Europe is for having 
allowed the situation that was described in the video 
clip? 
     
2. +RZ PXFK GR \RX IHHO LW LV (XURSH¶V
responsibility to do something to improve the 
situation that was described in the video clip? 
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Appendix Q 
Focus Measure (Study 8)  
It has often been found that what people say contains a certain amount of 
redundancy. For example, you might hear only a part of a conversation going on 
across the room at a party, but still be able to fill in the blanks because much of the 
information in the conversation is repetitious. To research this phenomenon, we are 
collecting some judgments of standard passages--brief phrases, sentences, and the 
like--to find out how redundant they are. This exercise is concerned with the use of 
pronouns. 
 
Your task is to look at each of the following passages and try to fill in the blank in 
each one. In each blank there are several possible pronouns that may make sense in 
the sentence. Please choose the word that makes the most sense to you. 
Even if you have to guess on some or many of the passages, go ahead and make your 
best guess for each one. Please try to fill in the most likely word. 
  
1. All of (our, my, his) answers matched the ones in the back of the book. 
2. At first it didn't seem to make any difference, but by later that night the noise from 
the party was entirely too loud to allow (her, me, us) to sleep. 
3 . The salesman tried to persuade (me, her, us) to buy a set of encyclopedias. 
4. The noise got to (us, them, me) before long. 
5. (Our, His, My) idea of fun is sitting at home and listening to music. 
6. The sun went in just when (we, she, I) decided to go outside. 
7. Please don't do this to (her, us, me); it is just not fair. 
8. It was (her, our, my) understanding that the deadline for the paper had been delayed 
one week. 
9. Except for (me, us, her), everyone failed the test. 
10. As a result of (our, my, his) suggestions, a minor revision in the policy has 
occurred. 
11. (He, We, I) spent so much time on the initial planning that it seemed impossible to 
finish before the deadline. 
12. It rained so hard that all of (our, my, her) clothes got soaked. 
13. For the past two or three months, (I, we, they) have had reports of squabbling and 
dissatisfaction among the workers in the office. 
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14. According to (our, my, her) notes, only five of the original seven laws are still in 
existence. 
15. Someone stopped (them, me, us) to get directions to the stadium. 
16. (We, He, I) waited by the phone for the doctor to return the call. 
17. The cashier charged (her, us, me) too little for the groceries. 
18. The mosquitoes didn't even bother (him, us, me). 
19. Dinner was waiting on the table when (he, I, we) came back from the store. 
20. It isn't easy to get lost in this town, but somehow (I, we, they) managed it. 
 
